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Abstract 
Abstract 
Anthropogenic climate change is a potentially serious ecological problem. The science of 
climate change is complex, uncertain and contested. This combined with the scale of its 
potential terrestrial impacts has ensured that the topic remains the focus of debate amongst 
scientists, politicians and the wider public. The importance of climate science, and of 
climate scientists as experts informing the policy process, has contributed to the 
controversy that surrounds the production of scientific knowledge in this field. Previous 
studies have claimed that climate science has been unduly influenced both by external 
vested interests and the inappropriate emphasis placed by some climate scientists 
themselves on securing continued research funding. Against this background the thesis 
explores the funding of climate change research in the UK and USA. In this it pays 
particular attention to the attitudes and experiences of climate change scientists themselves 
through a study of their accounts of the process of obtaining research funding. 
The thesis begins by reviewing the development of climate change science since the start of 
the 20th century, with particular attention to its progressive politicisation in recent decades. 
This introduction to the empirical focus of the thesis is complemented by an exploration of 
previous theoretical expressions of the relationships between science and scientists, and 
wider society. A neo-Marxist approach is advanced as a potential theoretical foundation for 
the thesis. The implications of this approach for research methodology are next outlined. 
Interviews with US and UK climate change scientists and associated social commentators 
provide the basis for a more detailed exploration of their perceptions of relationships in 
practice between climate change science and wider societal forces. These accounts focus in 
particular on the availability of research funding and its distribution between researchers 
adopting different scientific positions on climate change. Government and business are 
highlighted as important influences upon the scale and distribution of financial support for 
climate change research - and by extension upon the conduct and content of climate change 
science. 
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Abstract 
The interviews also suggest, however, that climate scientists feel at least some degree of 
freedom from their paymasters; a perception not exclusively confined to a small elite of 
leading scientists. Processes of bidding for funding, and research review and dissemination 
allow scientists to engage in strategic behaviour to secure support for research that 
addresses their own interests. Furthermore, the continuing debate between scientists about 
the reality, causes and scale of anthropogenic climate change of itself helps to maintain 
funding for research in this field. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1.1 Setting the Scene 
1.1.1 The Importance of Climate Change 
Anthropogenic climate change, or `global warming' is a potentially severe ecological 
problem. The science of climate change is complex, uncertain and contested, and this, 
combined with the scale of its potential terrestrial impacts and the associated threat to 
established socio-economic systems, has ensured that the topic remains the focus of 
continuing debate amongst scientists, politicians and the wider public. Indeed, climate 
change is an issue that is `hard to grasp through scientific inquiry and hard to address 
with political measures' (Krueck and Borches, 1999, p. 105). It is also an area in which 
society at large is particularly dependent on the understanding developed by a relatively 
small group of scientific `experts'. 
Opinion, both within the scientific community and society as a whole, remains divided 
about the reality of global warming, its causes and likely consequences. At its simplest 
the climate debate can be viewed as a contest between two opposing camps. One is 
informed by the understanding of `protagonist' scientists, who believe that there is good 
evidence that increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases in the earth's atmosphere, 
resulting from human activity, are causing climate change. The other draws on the work 
of `contrarian' scientists, or sceptics, who question the evidence and the existence of 
anthropogenic climate change. The reality of the climate debate is, of course, more 
complicated, with many different shades of opinion represented, rather than two polar 
opposites. 
Greenhouse gas emissions caused by the burning of fossil fuels are now widely 
regarded as central contributors to anthropogenic climate change, as they trap outgoing 
thermal radiation, thus warming the Earth (Drake, 2000). Since the onset of the 
Industrial Revolution in the late 18th century, humanity's dependence on such fossil 
fuels has grown significantly. Human development has increased energy demand, in 
turn amplifying our potential to alter the global environment. It follows that those 
developed countries with a strong carbon-based economy - including the USA, Japan 
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and the states of Western Europe - are generally identified as having made the greatest 
historical contribution to raising atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases, and thus to 
climate change. Yet this attribution of responsibility has provoked further tensions. 
There is no international consensus as to how to respond to the apparent threat of 
climate change. Global warming is seen by many to present a real challenge to the 
continued expansion of established socio-economic systems. A radical change in the 
basis of economic development - and specifically energy production - is therefore 
advocated. This may not only head off environmental disaster, but also open up new 
markets and investment opportunities in fields such as sustainable energy. Yet those 
who question the certainty of anthropogenic climate change claim to see no logic to 
economic and technological reforms which, they argue, will sacrifice economic growth 
and social welfare. 
1.1.2 The Policy Response to Climate Change 
For any action against climate change to be effective it must be executed at an 
international scale, as well as national and local levels. This increases the importance of 
securing greater consensus on both climate science and climate policy. Mounting 
concern about climate change, therefore, inspired the World Meteorological 
Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to 
establish the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988. This new 
body was charged with examining the unfolding scientific evidence on climate change 
and producing a report every five years that would brief world leaders about the current 
state of scientific understanding. This scientific endeavour also had a political 
counterpart; the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) 
launched at the Rio Earth Summit of 1992. States that became parties to the FCCC 
committed themselves, at least in principle, to the stabilisation of greenhouse gas 
concentrations `at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system' (Vrolijk, 2001, p. 252). This marked the beginning of attempts to 
support this commitment through a system of international regulation. The Kyoto 
Protocol of 1997 set supposedly binding targets for emission reduction by the most 
developed states of a basket of six greenhouse gases. The average reduction planned 
was 5.2% by 2008-12. This was to be achieved through a series of more specific targets, 
involving, for example, a 7% cut in US emissions and an 8% reduction by the EU 
(UNFCCC, 1997). However, subsequent discussions on the implementation of the 
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Protocol, most notably at The Hague in November 2000, ended in stalemate. The 
eventual agreement secured in the absence of the USA, at Bonn in July 2001 and 
Marrakech in October 2001, have been criticised as weak by environmentalists (Hare, 
2001). But even the modest targets for emission reduction set out in the Kyoto Protocol 
seem unlikely to be met. Thus, the issue still poses a potentially serious global threat. 
Significantly, lack of complete scientific certainty regarding climate change has 
contributed to the political wrangling over the Kyoto Protocol. Governments opposed to 
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, not least the United States - especially since 
the arrival of George W Bush in the White House in 2001 - have in part justified their 
stance by questioning the reality of climate change. 
1.1.3 Colliding Worlds - Science, Society and Money 
Contest over policy thus reflects the nature of climate science per se, but also the 
potential involvement of vested interests in the overlapping scientific and political 
debates. Indeed, scientific controversy is further reinforced by the presence of a diverse 
range of potential funding sources for climate research. Where science is sponsored by 
actors with a particular interest in the outcome it is hardly surprising that accusations 
have been levelled about a loss of scientific objectivity. 
Claims made by several previous authors, including Beder (1997,1999), Rowell (1996), 
Karliner (1997) and Gelbspan (1998) suggested that the research agenda of contrarian 
scientists has been affected by the financial support of fossil fuel and automobile 
companies. Such business interests allegedly have a particular interest in playing down 
the seriousness of global warming, in a context where climate policy seems to threaten 
their short-term commercial growth. By contrast, Boehmer-Christiansen (1994a, 1994b, 
1997 and forthcoming; see also Morris, 1997; Singer, 1998) have questions the 
objectivity of climate protagonists, including leading figures in the IPCC. She claims 
that in presenting climate change as a real and serious threat they over-state the extent 
of the problem. But more than this, it is asserted that their motives for doing so are in 
part self-interested, reflecting a desire to attract further funding for their own research. 
Boehmer-Christiansen (1996) also suggested that other parties, including 
environmentalists, promoters of renewable energy technologies and insurance 
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companies, may have their own motives for encouraging climate scientists to exaggerate 
the scale and certainty of the threat associated with global warming. 
Such studies raise important questions not only about the funding and reliability of 
climate science, but also about the roles played by climate scientists. In a context where 
external interests arguably play an important role in shaping the research agenda 
through their funding of particular types of project it may be tempting to view scientists 
themselves as essentially passive figures - as little more than the `tools' of external 
sponsors. This is, indeed, not inconsistent with the view put forward by some economic 
reductionist Marxist models of the relationship between science and the determining 
forces of a dominant economic substructure (as discussed in Hessen 1971; Rose and 
Rose 1976). Such theoretical arguments that a capitalist economy necessarily produces a 
capitalist science have, however, been subject to increasing challenge in recent decades 
(as discussed in Bunge, 1991; Sohn-Rethel, 1975; Abraham, 1995). In cases such as 
climate research we cannot simply assume that scientists are allowing their expertise to 
be `bought' in this way. 
It is possible that scientists themselves are actively involved in setting - and perhaps 
distorting - the agenda for research and funding. In its own way expert knowledge can 
be a source of influence and for an elite of scientists this may be reinforced by an ability 
to shape the thinking of others through publications, public speaking, political lobbying 
and media appearances. On the surface, at least, such activity may appear justified as a 
means to ensure that the limited funds available for research are directed towards 
addressing those issues that are scientifically most interesting and socially most relevant 
and useful. But, of course, assessments of the interest and relevance of particular 
research rest on value judgements that reflect the perceptions of individual assessors - 
including scientists themselves. Their individual interests may, for example, be best 
served by defining the research agenda in ways that maximise opportunities for securing 
further funding for their own particular work. Any such charges of the pursuit of self- 
interest or collaboration with external agencies are potentially serious - not just as a 
specific distortion of the scientific agenda, but also because they strike at the very basis 
of claims of scientific worth and credibility as a privileged means of understanding the 
world. 
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1.1.4 A Focus on Climate Change Scientists 
If the activities of climate change scientists are themselves a focus of contention it 
follows that there is a pressing need to improve our understanding of the actions and 
motives of such scientists. The charges laid against particular groups of researchers 
form the starting point for the current study, which takes the analysis further through 
interviews with climate scientists themselves. This direct engagement with a cross- 
section of the principal actors aims to explore the views they hold about their own 
professional activities as researchers, the ways in which research is funded and 
executed, and the attitudes and work of scientific colleagues. The present study is thus 
distinct from, but potentially complementary to a much larger body of research which 
explores public understanding of science in the specific context of climate change (for 
example, Hinchliffe, 1996; Drier et al, 1999; Dunlap, 1998; for related discussion of the 
broader theme of the public understanding of science see Irwin, 1995; Irwin and 
Wynne, 1996; Wynne, 1992,1993,1995); and work that focuses on the internal 
dynamic of debate and exchange within and between the interconnected communities of 
science and politics as forces shaping the definition of scientific `truths' (for example, 
Jasanoff and Wynne, 1997; Shackley and Wynne1995a, 1995b). 
A focus on individual experiences also allows the thesis to explore the extent to which 
scientists present their experiences as a product of particular circumstances, as against 
assertions of a universal relationship of dependency of scientists on their paymasters 
advanced in some theoretical accounts. If such differences of experience are seen to 
exist this might be expected to reflect the specifics of institutional contexts, the 
academic status and opinions of individual scientists, and the structures of commercial 
and political decision-making in particular national contexts. The potential importance 
of such differences has influenced the selection of interview subjects for the present 
study in ways that are detailed in later chapters. Here, however, attention may be drawn 
to the logic of the trans-Atlantic element to the thesis. Two of the most important 
geographical foci of debate about climate change are located in the USA and the UK. 
Both are home to key centres for climate research and, thus, have significant 
communities of climate scientists. But the political and diplomatic stance of the two 
states on climate change policy is rather different. While successive US administrations 
have resisted commitment to the Kyoto process, the UK remains one of its strongest 
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supporters. Many of the most prominent business sponsors of the research of climate 
sceptics are American, while their British counterparts have generally fought shy of 
such direct involvement in the controversy surrounding climate change science. 
1.2 Thesis Outline and Aims 
At the heart of the present thesis is an empirical exploration of the practice of climate 
change science - and specifically of the potential influence of external funding upon its 
scientific integrity - in relation to wider theoretical debates about the relationship 
between science and society. This focus also reflects previous studies of climate change 
science that have called its integrity into question. It is noteworthy, however, that such 
studies often present only a partial view, with the assertion that it is chiefly researchers 
on one particular side of the protagonist-sceptic `divide' who have been unduly 
influenced by their paymasters, or other external forces, into misrepresenting the 
scientific evidence. In the thesis that follows an attempt is made to explore the position 
of both sceptics and protagonists, and the ways that they represent the actions and 
attitudes of each other. 
Chapter Two, however, outlines an initial scientific context in its exploration of the 
evolution of scientific theories concerning climate change from the early 20th century to 
current thinking about anthropogenic enhancement of the greenhouse effect. It 
documents the involvement of key scientific figures and institutional actors in an 
increasingly politicised debate about the causes and effects of climate change. The 
chapter also makes a preliminary examination of the increasing attention given by 
leading developed countries to the funding of climate change. 
Chapter Three introduces a theoretical dimension, exploring various attempts to portray 
the relationships that appear to exist between external economic and political actors and 
the production of scientific knowledge. After an initial review of alternative 
perspectives on the science-society relationship, the chapter explores the logic of neo- 
Marxist thinking as a theoretical foundation for the thesis as a whole. Thinking in this 
way recognises the potential influence of external forces upon scientific activity, but 
attempts a more subtle interpretation than the base-superstructure model of some 
reductionist Marxist models. In particular, a neo-Marxist analysis points to the need to 
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recognise the diversity of specific interests and functions, both political and economic, 
that must be disinterred in any examination of the societal base. There is thus a logical 
basis on which to suggest that individual state agencies and particular economic sectors 
may pursue quite different agendas in relation to research sponsorship in a field such as 
climate science. This does indeed seem consistent with what we already know about the 
different sources of funding available to climate scientists and the particular types of 
science which individual sponsors seek to encourage. It also reinforces the need to 
consider the role of scientists and the choices open to them when research funding is 
potentially available from a range of different sources. In refining the framework for the 
following empirical chapters in this way, the theoretical material introduced in Chapter 
Three also adds a further task for the thesis as a whole. Ultimately, it is important that 
the thesis reflects upon the adequacy of a neo-Marxist analysis as a way of 
understanding the relationship between climate scientists and their external sponsors. 
Chapter Four is concerned with the methodological dimensions of this study. It explores 
the ways in which the theoretical perspective developed in Chapter Three is used to 
inform the methodological strategies adopted for this project. Thus, it outlines the 
development of a schedule of points and questions to be used in semi-structured 
interviews with climate scientists and scientific commentators, together with a wider 
rationale for the use of interviews as a means of obtaining empirical information about 
the practice of UK and US scientists. This is accompanied by discussion of the methods 
used in identifying specific interviewees, in executing the interviews and in analysing 
the results. This last in particular involves the comparison and confirmation of 
information and opinions obtained from interviewees with a range of secondary sources, 
which are also briefly outlined in Chapter Four. 
The empirical study begins in Chapter Five by reviewing evidence of the scale of 
funding available to support climate change science, focusing on the major 
concentrations of research activity in the USA and UK. Attention is also given to the 
main sources of funding, which may offer some indication of its potential distribution in 
relation to support for the two main `camps' of sceptics and protagonists. In this way 
the opening sections of Chapter Five establish a context for a more detailed exploration 
of scientists' perceptions and presentations of their own activities. The chapter proceeds 
to review evidence obtained from interviews with scientists and other commentators 
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regarding their perceptions of the availability of research funding, their awareness of the 
involvement of different types of funding sources and assessment of the equity with 
which funding is distributed between scientists in different institutional contexts and 
between those adopting differing perspectives on questions about the causes and 
consequences of climate change. In particular, opinion is sought as to whether the 
distribution (or maldistribution) of funding has implications for the tone and content of 
scientific debate about climate change - perhaps because it is seen as causing particular 
viewpoints to be over- or under-represented amongst researchers. 
Attitudes towards the availability of research funding are also set against scientists' 
discussion of the process of securing funding for research. Chapter Five thus also 
considers accounts of the strategies adopted by scientists - both individually and 
collectively - as a means of increasing their chances of securing funding. Given the 
overall aim of the thesis it is important to consider whether any such strategies are 
presented as compromising scientific independence and integrity. In this respect it is 
particularly interesting to examine how scientists present their own actions in relation to 
those of other colleagues. Is there, for example, a tendency amongst interviewees to 
raise particular questions about the integrity of others with opposing views on climate 
change? And are any such charges supported by substantiating detail? 
The discussion in Chapter Five also raises questions about the relative influence of 
individual scientists, both within their own community and in affecting external 
sponsors' judgements about the scale and distribution of funding for climate change 
research. It is difficult to secure an objective measure of influence to set against the 
interviewees' accounts. However, one way in which many leading scientists project 
their influence is through their own publications and the control they exert as referees 
and journal editors over the publishing record of others. Publications not only shape 
scientific debate about a particular topic, they are also a tangible expression of 
scientists' status as experts and thus support their claims on the attention of commercial 
and political decision-makers. The publishing record of selected figures in the climate 
debate is therefore reviewed in outline in Chapter Six. The intention here is to consider 
whether there is any evidence that specific perspectives on climate science have been 
particularly successful in presenting themselves through the most prestigious and 
influential scientific outlets, perhaps to the exclusion of dissenting voices. If this is the 
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case it has implications not only for current scientific debate, but also for the future 
allocation of much research funding in a context where success in securing funding is 
often a function of an individual's status as an academic author. 
The specific case of research on climate change is related in Chapter Six to wider 
discussion of the potential for abuse of the refereeing system as a means of 
marginalising certain voices in academic publishing. Other studies have, however, 
highlighted the increasing role of alternative forms of publication, particularly on-line, 
and of the general media, as means of raising the profile of particular scientific 
perspectives. The use made of such alternative means by various parties in the climate 
change debate will thus be considered here. 
The structure of the empirical enquiry outlined here also reflects the prior examination 
of existing theoretical discussion of relations between science and society. Neo-Marxist 
thinking as presented in Chapter Three suggests a series of different rationales which 
may explain the interest of specific political and commercial agencies in sponsoring 
research in a field such as climate change. This reinforces suggestions of the importance 
of efforts to acknowledge the range of different funding sources available to climate 
change scientists. It also raises questions about the implications of the availability of 
funding from different sources for different forms of research in relation to questions 
concerning scientific autonomy. Potentially, at least, diversity in the agendas of 
particular funding sources creates choices for scientists about how they shape their own 
research and which sources of funding they pursue. The thesis thus considers whether 
interviewees recognise the existence of such choices in the present case. However, the 
introduction of the neo-Marxist theory in Chapter Three does more than influence the 
content of the subsequent empirical investigation. It also raises questions about the 
adequacy of this theoretical framework as a means of understanding relations between 
science and society. The concluding reflections in the final chapter of the thesis thus 
relate to both the empirical and the theoretical dimensions of the present study. 
The specific objectives of the present thesis may thus be summarised as follows: 
" to explore the scale and sources of funding available to UK and US climate change 
scientists; 
9 
Chapter One: Introduction 
9 to document the accounts of the funding process offered by individual scientists - 
including their awareness of the availability of funding from different sources and 
their accounts of the access to funding secured by climate sceptics and protagonists; 
" to review scientists' accounts of the influence which funding bodies have upon the 
practice and content of climate change science, paying attention to potential 
differences between the activities and the accounts of activities advanced by climate 
sceptics and protagonists, and by interviewees from the USA and UK; 
" to examine scientists' accounts of their activities in relation to the publication of 
scientific research in both academic and other contexts, and the conclusions drawn 
concerning the impacts of publication upon decision-making about the funding of 
further research. 
Pursuit of these specific themes is intended to provide the basis on which to address 
some larger questions about the practice of climate science: 
" do scientists themselves share in the perception expressed externally that existing 
systems of funding compromise the integrity of climate science research? 
" do they see any such problems as common to all stances on climate change and all 
sources of potential funding? - perhaps even to scientific research in general - or as 
the product of particular circumstances and relationships that can be changed? 
" are there strategies which scientists can and do adopt to assert their autonomy? - to 
what extent do these reflect the influence associated with scientific expertise and/or 
other circumstances of the funding process in practice? 
9 do the specific circumstances of academic life in particular national contexts colour 
scientists' perceptions of their academic roles and freedoms? 
The thesis also aims to reflect on the implications of the study of the particular case of 
climate change science for our wider understanding of the status of scientific knowledge 
and theoretical discussion of the relationship between science and society. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Concerns about Anthropogenic Climate Change: Science, Politics and 
Investment 
2.1 Introduction 
Scientific concern about the potential for human influence over climate change has been 
expressed for more than 100 years. However, it was not until the 1970s that national and 
international scientific and political institutions took a sustained interest (O'Riordan and 
Jäger, 1996, p. 12). This changed the context in which climate research took place, 
turning an essentially scientific process into one with important political dimensions. 
Section 2.2 outlines the science of the natural and anthropogenic greenhouse effect, 
highlighting the main scientific arguments presented by protagonists. It explores the 
initial development of the natural climate change theory, pointing out that early interest 
was centred on glacial cycles and forcing mechanisms. It thus examines the history of 
the science that led to controversial theories about anthropogenic climate change. 
Section 2.3 considers the wider context within which greenhouse theory developed. 
From the 1950s onwards science became increasingly entwined with politics. This led 
to a political need for a scientific consensus on the issue because of the mounting 
concern that climate change represented a threat to social and economic systems. 
Consequently, a series of international conferences were held in attempt to dispel 
uncertainty regarding anthropogenic climate change and unite scientists in the 
discussion of priorities and objectives. This discussion underlines how limitations in 
understanding the complexities of the issue created opportunities for some scientists to 
influence the political process, especially within the USA and a lesser extent in the UK. 
Section 2.3 also shows how scientific uncertainty generated momentum for further 
research into the area. 
Section 2.4 investigates how the climate issue became politicised, outlining the factors 
that acted to push climate change into the policy arena within the UK and USA. 
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Section 2.5 attempts to explain the climate debate through a critique of the accounts 
offered by three key social commentators. All identify similar forces acting within the 
debate - science, scientists, politics, economic and society - yet they have very different 
perspectives on the relationships between them. 
As a preliminary to subsequent discussion the overall chronology of the unfolding 
scientific and political processes associated with climate change is outlined is outlined 
on Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Chronology of Significant Events: Climate Change 
Date Event 
ERA OF ABSTRACT SCIENCE 
1827 Fourier: heat in the atmosphere is analogous to heat in a greenhouse. 
1863 Tyndall: CO2 and water vapour absorb heat affecting temperature and 
glacial cycles. 
1896 " Arrhenius: changes in CO2 levels lead to alterations in the earth's surface 
temperature. 
1899 Chamberlin: CO2 and water vapour are absorbed by oceans. 
1900-1908 Angstrom, Koch, Abbot and Fowle: CO2 and water vapour argued not to 
absorb as much heat as previously thought. Global warming theory, 
therefore, lies dormant until 1930s. 
SCIENTIFIC ADVANCES 
1930s Callender: re-establishes the importance of CO2 to climate change. 
Recognises that anthropogenic changes, as well as natural variation, can 
alter climate. 
1957 Revelle and Suess: CO2 not absorbed by oceans to extent previously 
presumed, suggesting rise in CO2 levels in atmosphere. 
  International Geophysical Year: 30,000 international scientists discuss 
ideas and complexities of atmosphere - attempt to establish scientific 
consensus. 
  IMO established: attempts to institutionalise cooperation 
  Mauna Loa Observatory established to monitor CO2 concentrations. 
ERA OF POLITICISATION 
1963 Conservation Foundation report: first report by NGO on climate change - 
stimulates political reaction. 
1965 " PSAC report: public recognition that human activities could cause climate 
change. 
1968 World Weather Watch established: attempts to extend and expand 
international cooperation in collection and distribution of weather data. 
1970 SCEP: raises awareness of anthropogenic climate change. 
1971 " SMIC: continuing focus on raising awareness of anthropogenic climate 
change, but no consensus reached. Key advisory paper to UNCHE. 
1972 UNCHE: emphasises seriousness of climate change to international 
political community. 
1975 " NAS report: highlights need for further climate research. 
1977 NAS report: calls for further research - combined with `prompt action' to 
address climate change. 
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Table 2.1: Chronology of Significant Events: Climate Change (continued) 
1979 " First World Climate Conference: recognises need for greater international 
cooperation and advancement in `scope and complexity' of climate 
science. 
" World Climate Programme created by WMO. 
  NAS report: emphasises credibility and scientific basis of climate models. 
1980 Villach Conference: rising levels of greenhouse gases will negatively 
effect the earth's equilibrium. 
1981 Hansen: sends pre-print reports to New York Times to raise profile of issue. 
1985 Villach Conference: alliance between scientists and politicians - global 
warming placed on the political agenda. 
  AGGG established: investigates policy actions to reduce greenhouse gases. 
1987 Villach-Bellagio workshops: call for `agreement on a law of the 
atmosphere as a global commons or the need to move towards a [climate] 
convention' (Paterson, 1996a, p. 31). 
  UNEP and WMO: agree to establish intergovernmental body to assess 
climate science and formulate responses. 
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL TAKEUP OF ISSUE 
1988 Hansen: speaks to US Senate claiming that the `greenhouse effect is here'. 
  Toronto Conference: recognises political urgency of action to reduce CO2. 
  World Atmosphere Fund established: funded by levy on fossil fuels 
companies - recognised as major contributors to CO2 emissions. 
  IPCC established: aims to establish scientific consensus and gain greater 
political interest in climate change. 
" Thatcher and Bush senior: recognise the importance of the issue. 
1989 Formation of Special Committee on the Participation of Developing 
Countries: aims to represent developing countries in IPCC 
  AOSIS established: global warming now seen to be truly international. 
Emphasises concern for low-lying developing countries. 
  CAN established: NGOs group together to lobby for emission reduction 
policies. 
1990 Second World Climate Conference: backed by WGI of IPCC. Leads to 
international political concern and recognition of need for climate 
convention. Recognises potential impact of anthropogenic climate change 
on ecosystems. 
  IPCC First Assessment Report: raises prospect of huge stress on natural 
and social ecosystems if greenhouse gases are not reduced. 
1992 Rio Earth Summit (UNCED): FCCC opened for signatories - countries to 
commit to reducing greenhouse gas emissions - no legally binding targets. 
Recognises uncertainty not to be used as an excuse for delaying emission 
reduction implementation. 
1996 IPCC Second Assessment Report: Asserts that ` balance of evidence 
suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate' 
(Houghton et al, 1996, p. 5). 
1997 Kyoto Protocol: specific limits on greenhouse gas emissions but no 
penalties if unenforced. 160 states, parties to FCCC, adopt Kyoto Protocol. 
  Uncertain still being used by some governments as excuse for inaction. 
2000 Hague meeting of Kyoto parties: no agreement on implementation of 
Protocol. 
  EU and US: disagree over terms for achieving greenhouse gas emission 
reduction policies. 
2001 IPCC Third Assessment Report: claims CO2 emissions are rising - as a 
consequence of human activities. 
" NAS report: supports IPCC findings. 
  Meeting of Kyoto parties: Protocol signed - without USA. 
2002 Kyoto Protocol now signed by 84 Parties and ratified by 74. 
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2.2 The Science of the Greenhouse Effect 
2.2.1 The Natural Greenhouse Effect 
The greenhouse effect is a naturally occurring process which drives the climate. The 
basic understanding of the workings of the climate-atmosphere system is not disputed 
among scientists (Houghton et al, 1996; Houghton et al, 2001). To understand these 
mechanisms an energy balance model can be used. 
The earth-atmosphere system must achieve a thermal equilibrium of radiant energy to 
preserve a constant temperature at the surface and the top of the atmosphere (TOA). The 
energy balance is different at these two locations. At the TOA seventy units of short- 
wave radiation pass through the upper atmosphere, which has to be balanced by 70 units 
of long wave radiation going out. At the earth's surface 51 units of short wave radiation 
from the sun are absorbed and 51 units of long wave radiation are radiated into the 
atmosphere. Greenhouse gases: water vapour, carbon dioxide and methane absorb this 
long wave radiation, predominantly in the troposphere. These gases scatter this radiation 
in all directions, downward to the surface of the earth and upward to the stratosphere 
(see Fig. 2.1). This is known as radiative forcing. The gases `act as a partial blanket' 
enabling the earth to be 33°C warmer than it would otherwise be without them (Drake, 
2000, p. 24; see also Houghton et al, 1996; Houghton, 1997). This is the naturally 
occurring greenhouse effect, which raises the annual global average temperature of the 
earth's surface to about 15°C. 
Figure 2.1: The Natural Greenhouse Effect. 
The Greenhouse Effect 
4V 
". Some sew mduffion 
PTA 1s ideded ey n,. 
W WOW, 
POSM 
IIhmugh 
tw aea 
aoýosp+ea 
Most rraaaon is aceorbed 
to e ýr wrfioe 
am rwmm I 
,. 
ýý 
son. ag*Ims rarMMmpasty. 
swough the amwsprwm aid sons is 
absorbed anti reenreed in ri 
al-*- by v nw.. 9- 
m eQlYi_ The YMmCt otilk a bViYflh 
lie sail's H%flOY aid of lo'AW 
. 
14 
(Source: Environmental Protection Agency, 1999) 
Chapter Two: Concerns about anthropogenic climate change 
2.2.2 The Anthropogenic Greenhouse Effect 
Human activities, such as the combustion of fossil fuels, deforestation and biomass 
burning, can increase the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. This 
increase in concentration of greenhouse gases alters the radiative forcing and has the 
potential to lead to anthropogenic climatic change. At the earth's surface an increase in 
long wave radiation from the atmosphere (mainly the troposphere) occurs. The surface 
responds by heating up to balance the radiant energy it is receiving. As the troposphere 
is emitting more radiation downwards it also emits more radiation upward towards the 
stratosphere. As the stratosphere is receiving extra radiation it cools to maintain 
equilibrium. Thus, there is a change in temperature structure throughout the atmosphere, 
to a new surface equilibrium. This is known as the human-induced or anthropogenic 
greenhouse effect. 
Hypothetically, increasing the concentration of CO2 and other greenhouse gases, 
without triggering a response from the earth-atmosphere system (i. e. with no internal 
feedback) would only raise surface temperatures by 1°C (Houghton et al, 1990). The 
likelihood is, however, that the earth-atmosphere system will respond to the increased 
concentration of greenhouse gases through feedbacks, either positive or negative, within 
the system. Protagonists predict a vigorous positive feedback. As the earth warms the 
amount of water vapour in the upper (free) troposphere increases. As water vapour is a 
greenhouse gas it amplifies the warming. It is believed by protagonists that this will lead 
to global warming and major climate shifts (Houghton et al, 1996, p. 58). Increases in 
cloud may act either to amplify the warming (a positive water vapour feedback effect, 
see left-hand-side of Fig. 2.2), or reduce it (negative water vapour feedback effect, see 
right-hand-side of Fig. 2.2). Contrarians believe that an increase in greenhouse gas 
concentrations will cause a negative water vapour feedback effect. This water vapour 
feedback effect is the crux of the global warming debate. It is the response of the 
climate system, rather than the physics of the atmosphere, which is disputed among 
scientists. 
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Figure 2.2: Water Vapour Feedback Mechanisms 
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2.2.3 Early Key Developments in Climate Science: the Development of the 
Greenhouse Theory 
The development of the greenhouse theory can be traced to the early 1800s and the 
work of Fourier (1827) (see Table 2.1) (Agrawala, 1998a; Drake, 2000; Christiansen, 
1999; Mudge, 1997). Climate science was fragmented during the 19th century and the 
issue attracted the attention of only a few scientists. With the gradual acceptance of the 
existence of quaternary glacial cycles, climatologists began to look for mechanisms 
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capable of promoting such climate changes. Whilst Fourier had proposed the natural 
greenhouse effect, it was Tyndall (1863) who developed the theory to address ice ages, 
thus linking the greenhouse effect to climate change. He argued that changes in 
atmospheric concentration of CO2 would lead to changes in glacial temperatures. 
Arrhenius (1896) and Chamberlin (1899) provided further insights into how changes in 
the balance of CO2 in the atmosphere might lead to glacial cycles (Fleming, 1998a). 
During this period opponents of the CO2 theory voiced their dissent. By the early 1900s 
Angstrom (1900,1901 a, 1901 b), Koch (1901), Abbot and Fowle (1908) had all disputed 
the idea that natural CO2 could affect the climate (Mudge, 1997). Their challenge was 
such that the theory that fluctuations in CO2 levels could affect climate fell into 
abeyance until the 1930s (Kellogg, 1987). It appears that there was minimal interest in 
climate science in the early twentieth century, with little or no research occurring in this 
area. Research reflected individual isolated one-off efforts rather than collective 
contributions. Although the climate was being studied, interest concerned other areas, 
such as climate determinism (Brooks 1949; Huntington 1907), which suggested that 
climate was very as an influence upon the course of history and the development of 
civilisation (Drake, 2000; Fleming, 1998b). Hence, it was possible for the theory of 
climate change to lie dormant for around 30 years. 
By the late 1930s Callender revived the climate debate by introducing the theory that 
anthropogenic emissions of CO2 could lead to climate change, which would benefit 
agriculture and plant growth. Before Callender's work, the causes of climate variation 
had been though to be natural (Callender, 1938; Revelle and Suess, 1957; Rowlands, 
1995). Callender's arguments about the potential benefits of increased CO2 emissions 
still have their supporters today. For instance, Sherwood and Craig Idso and Robert 
Balling (2000) suggest that an increase in atmospheric CO2 would act as an effective 
aerial fertiliser and enhance the growth of vegetation (Idso et al, 2000; see also Morris, 
1997). Callender also thought that warming from human activities would protect 
humanity against an ice age (Callender, 1938). His ideas were radical and contrary to 
the general scientific consensus of the time. However, the scientific community was not 
that interested in his research, never mind the public or politicians. Thus, he 
encountered widespread scepticism. Coste (1938), Brunt (1938) and Brooks (1938) 
argued that an increase in CO2 from human emissions could not affect climate because 
of the absorbing quality of oceans. This effectively ended discussions of Callender's 
theory until the late 1950s (Callender, 1938). 
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By the early 1940s, however, terrestrial data (thermometers) revealed an increase in 
average surface temperature compared to early decadal readings; decreases in Arctic ice 
and rises in sea levels were also recorded. Scientists were reluctant to acknowledge that 
this was perhaps a result of an increase in anthropogenic C02, rather than being due to 
natural forcings. The possibility that humanity could influence the `vast scale' of the 
climate was incomprehensible at this time. Many asked `how can little creatures like us 
compete with those titanic forces that drive the winds of the atmosphere and the ocean 
currents' (Kellogg, 1987, p. 113). Climate research still reflected a continuing interest in 
scientific observation by a small community of scientists. 
2.2.4 Recent Key Developments in Climate Science: a Growing Consensus of 
Scientists Supporting the Greenhouse Paradigm 
In the late 1950s climate science began to involve a larger community of researchers. 
Interest in climate change escalated and there was greater openness to theories. At this 
time Roger Revelle, a well-respected oceanographer, appears to have been an influential 
individual who inspired new interest in climate science. In particular, he challenged the 
general scepticism regarding Callender's theory of anthropogenic climate change (Hart 
& Victor, 1993). In research funded by the Scripps Institute of Oceanography, Revelle 
and Suess, claimed that the oceans did not absorb as much CO2 as formerly thought, 
thus `most of the CO2 added by fossil fuel combustion... has gone into the biosphere' 
(Revelle and Suess, 1957, p. 24). They estimated, therefore, that atmospheric CO2 
concentrations would rise by between 20-40 per cent in the following decades, given 
present trends in energy consumption in advanced industrial countries. They claimed: 
Human beings are now carrying out a large geophysical experiment of a kind 
that could not have happened in the past, nor be reproduced in the future 
(Revelle and Suess, 1957, p. 19). 
Revelle's research provoked interest and concern about climate change, which led to the 
International Geophysical Year (IGY), a UN-sponsored international programme to 
learn about the earth's physical systems, between 1957-1958 (Miller and Edwards, 
2001, p. 46; Rowlands 1995). Revelle and Suess's research appeared to have caused 
excitement and interest in understanding the complexities of weather and climate 
processes. The IGY brought together 30,000 scientists to share ideas and begin to create 
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a general consensus on climate change (Paterson, 1996a, p. 22). It was also the first 
meeting that internationalised the subject (or at least interest and debate began to be 
more widely evident throughout the developed world). Hence the IGY was jointly 
sponsored by the WMO and the International Council for Scientific Unions (ICSU). To 
test Revelle and Suess's theory it was necessary to establish regular measurements of 
atmospheric CO2. Consequently, Mauna Loa Observatory set up the first reliable and 
continuous data set of background CO2 concentrations, which is still active today 
(Kellogg, 1987, p. 117; Woodwell, 1978, p. 34). The success of the IGY led to greater 
interest and international co-operation in meteorology (Soroos, 1991). In the 1960s 
much of the science of global climate change was still unexplored, there were only a 
few scientists who were concentrating on climate fluctuations. However, Revelle and 
Suess's research had led to substantial developments in climate science highlighting the 
influence of key scientists upon the direction of research (Hart & Victor, 1993; 
Rowlands, 1995). By the late 1960s the anthropogenic greenhouse paradigm became 
increasingly accepted within the international scientific community. The World Weather 
Watch was established by the WMO and ICSU, in 1968, to extend and expand co- 
operation between countries by collecting and distributing weather information. Thus, 
larger scale research on climate change was beginning, which eventually contributed to 
generating a significant measure of agreement on the subject. 
In the 1970s Flohn and Mitchell highlighted a drop in air temperatures that had been 
occurring since the 1940s (Flohn, 1977, p. 4; Lamb, 1972, p. 613; Mitchell, 1972, p. 441). 
Consequently, a new debate was ignited regarding the significance of this present trend 
in climate, which was related to the effect of industrial aerosols and general climate 
variability (Agrawala, 1998a, p. 607). Some speculated that it was the onset of the next 
ice age (Kellogg, 1979; Ponte, 1976; Schneider, 1976). During the course of these 
discussions Rasool and Schneider put forward the idea that anthropogenic emissions of 
CO2 and aerosols were more `likely to lead to a reduction rather than an increase in 
global temperature' (Rasool and Schneider, 1971, p. 17 and p. 224). (Schneider has since 
reconsidered his view on climate change and now firmly believes in global warming). 
Thus, the climate change theory appeared to be loosing scientific support at this time. 
Bert Bolin, the new director of the World Meteorological Organisation, was, however, 
promoting his pet theory, of Global Warming. This perhaps contributed to the rejection 
of Rasool and Schneider's hypothesis by the scientific community and growing belief in 
anthropogenic climate change. Yet, one important by-product of Rasool and 
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Schneider's work was the recognition of aerosols as significant particles in the 
atmosphere. Their incorporation in global climate models has allowed modellers to 
reproduce observed climate trends (see Houghton et al, 2001). As a result, by the late 
1970s the ice age theory had been dismissed, resulting in a stronger scientific consensus 
on global warming. The growing sophistication of climate modelling during the 1970s 
provided further support for anthropogenic climate change. One of three reports by 
NAS (1979) highlighted the credibility and scientific basis of climate models. Kellogg 
claims that with models backing climate scientists it was increasingly difficult to doubt 
that a doubling of CO2 concentrations would lead to warming (Kellogg, 1987, p. 116). A 
critical mass of scientists now believed that global warming was possible and serious. 
This both reflected and reinforced the extension of climate science as a focus for large- 
scale research, often including international collaboration (Paterson, 1996a). 
By the mid 1980s, data were available to show that the rise in CO2 was not only 
attributable to fossil fuel combustion, but also to deforestation. In addition, CFCs, 
methane, nitrous oxides, and tropospheric ozone were recognised as being `radiatively 
important'; in other words, they also contributed to the anthropogenic greenhouse effect 
(Malone, 1986, p. 30). This led to greater concern among the scientific community about 
the potential seriousness and effect of climate change. With developments in the scope 
and complexity of General Circulation Models (GCMs) the external profile of global 
warming rose, further supporting climate scientists' theories. 
Outside interest regarding the scale of the potential damage that climate change could 
inflict, and a critical mass of scientific support for global warming meant that a public 
consensus on the issue had to be established. In the late 1980s, therefore, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established. This collated 
climate research and generated even further interest in the issue, both inside and outside 
the scientific community. Through the IPCC stronger statements about the effect of 
anthropogenic climate change emerged. For example, in 1990 the scientific working 
group of the IPCC (WGI) stated that tropospheric CO2 was calculated to have increased 
by 31%, from 280 ppmv in 1750 to a value of over 360 ppmv by 1997 as a result of 
industrialisation, mainly due to the combustion of fossil fuels and deforestation (See 
Fig. 2.3) (Houghton et al, 1990). Thus, they argued for an immediate reduction in CO2 
emissions by 60% to stop the build-up. 
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Figure 2.3: The increase in atmospheric CO2 concentration since 1957 
Mauna Laai, Hawaii 
WE 
. 7r. 
soc 
35C 
F3 
O 
R Ir. 
Ycar 
(Source: Keeling and Whorf, 1998) 
Support from the scientific community continued to grow for theories of global 
warming throughout the 1990s. Scientists who supported the IPCC believed that the 
surface of the earth could warm by 6°C within a century (Houghton et al, 2001). This 
would increase the risk of extreme climate events, threaten unique ecosystems, continue 
to erode northern snow cover and sea-ice, cause additional retraction of glaciers and ice 
caps and further increases in sea level (see Fig 2.4) (Houghton et al, 2001). With greater 
certainty and a stronger consensus within the scientific community, dissenters on the 
issue became more visible and vocal in their challenge to the `accepted paradigm'. This 
was not a wholly new phenomenon, rather these viewpoints started to matter more as 
the debate became increasingly politicised (see section 2.2.3). 
These dissenting voices included the well-respected US professor, Richard Lindzen, 
who believes that water vapour `would compete with, not reinforce, global warming 
caused by C02' causing a negative feedback (Lindzen quoted in Pearce, 1997, p. 41; see 
also Lindzen, 1994; Lindzen et al, 2001; Schneider ei al, 1999; Sun et al, 2001). Such 
thinking still retains a degree of credibility. Another American, Patrick Michaels also 
argues that the climate is less sensitive than the mainstream thinking on climate change 
accepts and that the observed warming is in fact a natural temperature trend (Michaels 
quoted in Pearce, 1997; Michaels and Knappenberger, 1996; Michaels (1991a; 1993; 
1994). Contrarians, including Nierenberg (1993; 1995) and Singer (1992; 1998; 2001), 
highlight the inability of climate models (GCMs) accurately to represent the atmosphere 
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system. Lovelock suggests that the Earth is self-regulating and preserves climate 
stability even in the face of increases in concentration of greenhouse gases (Lovelock, 
1988,1997; Jamieson, 1992). Calder believes that the climate changes as a result of 
variations in radiation from the sun (Calder, 1997). Budyko in Miller and Pearce (1989, 
p. 24) claims that the anthropogenic greenhouse effect will be beneficial `raising [crop] 
yields by around 50%'. Hoyle, past President of the Royal Astronomical Society, and 
Wickramainghe, professor of Astronomy at the University of Cardiff, even suggest that 
we should continue to burn fossil fuels to counteract the possibility of an ice age (de 
Bruxelles, 2001, p. 9). Sceptical voices are thus still evident today, even though they 
have become marginalised by the IPCC's Third Assessment Report. 
Figure 2.4: Various sea level rises scenarios 
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2.3 The Politicisation of Climate Science 
2.3.1 The Politicising of Climate Science: The Precursor to the Direct Involvement 
of Politicians in the Debate 
Today, climate science is increasingly entwined with politics, reinforcing the position of 
scientists as potentially influential knowledge holders in the debate (Haas, 1992). The 
politicisation of climate change can be traced to the 1950s. The subsequent efforts of 
certain key or elite scientific figures, backed by the weight of the scientific community 
are seen to have succeeded in placing the issue firmly on the political agenda by the 
1980s (Hart and Victor, 1993; Paterson, 1996a). As Mulkay (1976) notes, the scientific 
elite are potentially influential figures as they are well-established and have a network 
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of social relations. Between the 1950s and 1970s the importance of anthropogenic 
climate change became recognised within both national and international political 
realms. However, the chief scientific input and political debate was centred in the US. 
Miller (2001) argues that America's interest in climate science during the post-war era 
was `intertwined with the pursuit of a free, stable, and prosperous world order' (Miller, 
2001, p. 173). The IGY began the process of connecting scientists of different 
disciplines and nationalities into networks for collaboration and the exchange of ideas 
(O'Riordan and Jäger, 1996). This reflected a general perception that without 
international co-operation, research could not advance. The International 
Meteorological Organisation (IMO) was, therefore, established to institutionalise co- 
operation. 
The gradual development of a critical mass of international scientific support for the 
subject came at a time when there was increasing environmental awareness amongst the 
lay public and a change in the nature of environmental groups from non-political 
conservation groups to politically involved non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
(Paterson, 1996a; Pepper, 1984). In 1963 the Conservation Foundation, an American 
NGO, produced a report on climate change (Agrawala, 1998a; Kellogg, 1987). It stated 
strongly `that a doubling of the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere would 
produce a temperature rise of 3.8°C' (Kellogg, 1987, p. 1 17). Unlike earlier predictions 
of temperature rises the claim received political exposure. It appears that as early as the 
1960s pro-environmental NGOs reached a critical turning point, taking advantage of the 
increase in public concern for the environment. Recognising the potential political 
influence and seriousness of global warming, NGOs adopted climate change as a 
campaign issue (See section 2.4.2). The change in NGOs' strategies and their 
subsequent influence upon the political system caused a reaction from the US 
President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). Commissioned by the US 
government, with the aim of restoring `the quality of our environment', the PSAC's 
involvement gave public recognition to claims that climate change could be caused by 
human activities and would have important consequences for the world (Kwa, 2001, 
p. 156, see also Agrawala, 1998a; Kellogg, 1987; Rowlands, 1995). The PSAC 
statement was probably as strong as it could have been at the time, emphasising marked 
changes for the environment and humanity. Scientists were unable to commit 
themselves fully to strong conclusions due to the lack of hard evidence at this time 
(Rowlands, 1995). 
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As noted earlier, Revelle appears to have been a `concerned' scientist who, at an early 
stage in the climate debate, was seen to engage willingly in politics and propel the issue 
onto the wider political agenda. He appears to be one of the first climate scientists who 
ceased to be purely a scientist, crossing the line between science and politics. Indeed, he 
was heavily involved in the IGY and he chaired the sub-panel of the PSAC. He also 
recognised the need to establish a weight of scientific support behind climate concerns 
and for collective research to help advance the subject on the political stage (Paterson, 
1996a; Hart and Victor, 1993). This emphasises his determination to establish climate 
change on the political agenda and gain political support for action to combat global 
warming. It also highlights the opportunism of an individual scientist (See Section 2.5) 
(Hart and Victor, 1993). Revelle's influence, coupled with other perhaps stronger 
pressures, such as the publication of Silent Spring (Carson, 1962), a radical publication 
criticising the chemical industry's impact upon nature, and the general weight of 
scientific opinion, forced politicians to think seriously about the environment (Burnside, 
2002, p. 1). 
2.3.2 The Development of Scientists Involved in Politics: Some Scientists Stop 
Being Scientists 
US Professor William Wilson can be credited with further establishing climate change 
on the political agenda, as well as securing an obvious critical mass of scientific opinion 
in support of the theory of anthropogenic climate change in the early 1970s (Hart and 
Victor, 1993; Paterson, 1996a). Organised by Wilson, the Study of Critical 
Environmental Problems (SCEP) of 1970 - sponsored by the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) and a variety of governmental organisations, private foundations, 
and corporations - directly aimed to raise `the level of informed public and scientific 
discussion and action on global environmental problems' (Kellogg, 1987, p. 120). SCEP 
brought together a distinguished committee of over 70 American scientists thus securing 
the weight of scientific opinion needed to push climate change onto the political agenda 
(see section 2.5). 
The subsequent Study of Man's Impact on Climate (SMIC), organised by Wilson in 
1971, and involving the international scientific community, was intended to further the 
`process of co-operation among the nations of the world [by trying to] provide an 
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international scientific consensus on what we know' (SMIC, 1971, p. 12). SMIC was not 
as successful as had been hoped; a consensus among scientists was not established 
because there were `just too many honest differences of opinion and not enough hard 
facts at hand to resolve them' (Kellogg, 1987, p. 121). There was also a reluctance to 
`stick out one's neck' (Ibid. ). However, SCEP and SMIC had raised awareness of the 
greenhouse issue among political institutions. The reports emphasised the importance of 
CO2, which led to the inclusion of climate change on international institutions' 
environmental agendas (Kellogg, 1987). Furthermore, it highlighted that there was a 
legitimate debate. SMIC was also a key advisory paper to the UN Conference on the 
Human Environment (UNCHE) in 1972, helping to alert the international political 
community to the seriousness of climate change. 
2.3.3 Growing International Political Awareness and Concern: Key Scientists 
Establish Political Support 
Belief in theories of anthropogenic climate change was beginning to gain stronger 
ground within the scientific community and given greater priority among political 
agendas during the 1970s. Scientists, politicians, businesses and the public took greater 
interest in the issue. This was compounded by the severe global weather events of the 
1960s and 1970s, which further raised concern about the possible consequences of 
anthropogenic climate change upon humanity (See section 2.4.3) (Christiansen, 1999, 
p. 197; Paterson, 1996a, p. 25; Rowlands, 1995, p. 68). An analysis of the number of 
international conferences held during the 1960s and 1970s indicates an increased 
interest in and concern about greenhouse science. For instance, between 1971 and 1979, 
excluding United Nations' meetings, there were more than 15 international conferences 
on the topic of climate change. The United States still appears to have been driving 
climate change research during this period. Indeed, there were far more scientists 
researching climate change in the USA than anywhere else in the world. Of the 15 
international conferences, reports and meetings, the US organised just under half. The 
others were collective international efforts rather than the result of initiatives taken by 
individual national institutions. Furthermore, a series of US government funded NAS 
reports (1975; 1977; 1979) were some of the first major government studies to 
investigate the causes and consequences of climate change (Hart and Victor, 1993). 
These reports also emphasised both the need for further research into greenhouse 
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science and the importance of `prompt action' to curb climate change, even while 
uncertainty about its cause and extent still prevailed (Rowlands, 1995, pp. 69-70). 
Contradiction, debate and uncertainty characterised climate science, which is still 
evident today. The increasing recognition of the importance of climate change during 
the early 1970s was further stimulated by reports of possible benefits on the one hand, 
(see for example, National Research Council, Committee on Atmospheric Science, 
1973) and potentially serious consequences, on the other. However, debate during the 
1970s echoed uncertainties over the verifiability and consequences of climate science. 
There were also few definite statements about the scale of potential climatic changes. 
Kellogg implies that this silence from the majority of the scientific community reflected 
an unwillingness or inability to commit to uncertain science. Indeed, scientists are 
trained not to jump to conclusions. Scientists were also aware of the inability of science 
at the time to interpret the complexities of the climate system (Kellogg, 1987, p. 122). 
However, the World Climate Conference in 1979 led to greater understanding of 
climate change and also emphasised the need for greater international cooperation. It 
highlighted a need for advancement in the `scope and complexity' of climate science, 
and called on all nations to unite in efforts to understand climate change, to plan for it, 
and where possible to lessen its effects (Kellogg, 1987, p. 124). Research had begun to 
gather enough interest and scientific understanding to initiate debate concerning the 
potential consequences of climate change. International bodies were set up and 
conferences began to discuss the implications for society at large. 
Paterson suggests that it was institutional, technical and organisational developments 
within the WMO and the ICSU that helped to co-ordinate and achieve greater 
agreement in climate science (Paterson, 1996a, pp. 23-25). There was a definite rise in 
international interest in anthropogenic climate change in the 1970s. Yet the existence of 
the debate, drawing in other actors (particularly big business) created new sources of 
controversy and uncertainty. Corporate interests in the UK and US began to support 
scholars whose views were compatible with their own outlook and approach to stringent 
emission reduction policies which might impose economic burden. Thus, the direct 
sponsorship of sceptical scientists began. This provided new opportunities for scientists 
such as Seitz and Singer to advance their stance through anti-environmental NGOs 
(Beder, 1999; 1997). 
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2.3.4 The New Phase: A New International Arena for Climate Debate 
Key US scientists, such as Hansen, who was director of NASA's Goddard Institute for 
space studies, and Schneider, Hansen's co-researcher - who now believed in global 
warming - took a leading role in stimulating a rise in public interest in climate change 
in the 1980s (Christiansen, 1999). In 1981, Hansen attempted to raise the profile of the 
issue by sending a pre-print report, which argued that the present warming trend was 
linked to anthropogenic climate change, to the New York Times (Mazur and Lee, 1993, 
p. 694). It appears that he was aware of the potential impact of the research. The 
majority of scientists were becoming more convinced that the anthropogenic greenhouse 
effect was responsible for the warming experienced during the 1980s, therefore adding 
to the weight and subsequent influence of scientific opinion (Paterson, 1996a). The 
issue was also advanced by international journals such as Science (see for example, 
Hansen, 1981). The publication of articles in leading journals suggesting that climate 
change would cause critical human impacts was a further stimulus to scientific and 
political interest in the topic (Woodwell, 1987). Prominent individual scientists were, 
therefore, supported by a critical mass of their colleagues who were simultaneously 
pushing the issue, providing weight behind the protagonist perspective on climate 
change (Hart & Victor, 1993; Paterson, 1996a). 
The well-publicised speech by Hansen, to the US Senate in the summer of 1988 
persuaded politicians to consider the threat of anthropogenic climate change more 
seriously. Not least because Hansen was emphatic that `the greenhouse effect is here', 
pronouncing a `99 per cent' certainty that the recent warm weather was a result of 
climate change (Christiansen, 1999, p. 196, see also Hare, 1988). It was no coincidence 
that Hansen's speech was scheduled for the hottest day in the year in Washington D. C., 
at a time when there was also a serious national drought, the worst since the 1930s. 
Thus, the hearing attracted the mass media, drawn by the prospect that an important 
statement relating to the drought would be made by Hansen (Mazur and Lee, 1993, 
p. 697). Mazur and Lee claim that the meeting had been deliberately scheduled for the 
warmest period in the year to gain greater media coverage. Indeed, the American public 
were growing increasingly restless because of the severe drought affecting 40% of the 
country (Christiansen, 1999). The following day reporters claimed that global warming 
was occurring. The New York Times published a front-page article which stated that `the 
earth had been warmer in the first five months of this year then in any comparable 
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period since measurements began 130 years ago' (Shabecoff, 1988). Hansen's 
networking among the mass media and politicians, prior to his high profile presentation, 
contributed substantially to the impact of his speech and the take-up of the issue. One 
month prior to Hansen's hearings the New York Times published several articles linking 
the drought to global warming (See for example, New York Times, 14th June 1988; 17th 
June 1988; 22°d June 1988; 23d June 1988). Furthermore, because Hansen had 
previously given low-key presentations and was generally regarded as being a cautious 
scientist - `a proponent of the "wait and see" approach' - his statement was especially 
influential (Gribbin, 1990a, pp. 3-4). Today Schneider, is also a prominent and vocal 
protagonist both in the UK and USA. However, in the late 1980s Schneider initially 
played down Hansen's testimony, possibly because he was uncertain about the science 
at that time (Schneider, 1988). 
With a growing mass of support, the Villach conference (1985) was convened by the 
World Climate Programme and the WMO (Agrawala, 1998a; Kellogg, 1987; Rowlands, 
1995). Villach fostered an alliance between key members of scientific and political 
establishments, which led to the issue being placed more securely on the political 
agenda, especially in USA and UK. The conference emphasised the need to move away 
from a stress on further research and towards political action. Specific economic, social 
and technological research measures to deal with the issue were advanced (Paterson, 
1996a, pp. 30-31). The ultimate outcome of Villach was to strengthen the resolve to 
secure political action against climate change. For example, an Advisory Group on 
Greenhouse Gases (AGGG) was established to investigate policy actions to reduce 
greenhouse gases (Agrawala, 1998a, p. 609). 
The Toronto Conference (1988) entitled `The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for 
Global Security', sponsored by the Canadian government, with support from the UN 
and the WMO, was the next important international conference (Global Climate Change 
Digest, 1988). It emphasised political urgency, pointing to the need for governments 
and industry to reduce CO2 emissions. It also established the World Atmosphere Fund 
financed by a levy on fossil fuel consumption in industrialised countries. For the first 
time the fossil fuel industry was pinpointed as a major contributor to the climate 
problem. Thus there were increasing calls for its active participation in reducing the 
potential affects of climate change. Against a backdrop of environmental concern, 
political and scientific support for action on climate change seemed strong. World 
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leaders were, therefore, forced into action as they could no longer ignore the issue. 
Margaret Thatcher, then the British Prime Minister, stated, in words that echoed 
Revelle's speech in 1956, that humankind had `unwittingly begun a massive experiment 
with the system of the planet itself (Thatcher, 1988, quoted in Paterson, 1996a, p. 34). 
Thatcher's adoption of the issue reflected not only the general scientific belief in the 
reality of climate change but also the influence of key individuals, both scientists and 
non-scientists (Hart and Victor, 1993; Paterson, 1996a). For instance, Sir Crispin 
Tickell, then the UK Ambassador to the United Nations, and author of Climatic Change 
and World Affairs (1977) helped to convince her of the significance of anthropogenic 
climate change and the urgent need for restorative action. James Hansen also influenced 
her through a number of presentations (McCormick, 1991, p. 63). Furthermore, George 
Bush Senior focused on climate change in his presidential election campaign in 1988. 
He pledged his support for action on the issue and promised to hold an international 
conference on the subject once in office. However, this was probably a tactic used by 
Bush to continue discussions regarding anthropogenic climate change and thus delay 
action. 
With governments and scientists engaging in increasing dialogue there was a growing 
need to secure consensus on the causes, seriousness and implications of climate change. 
Governments were also keen to become involved in an international process of climate 
change research. A combination of increasing scientific support for the theory of 
anthropogenic climate change and strengthening political interest in the issue thus paved 
the way for a decisive initiative - the formation of the IPCC in 1988 (Hart and Victor, 
1993; Paterson 1996a). 
Oppenheimer (1989) credits the collective efforts of discussions at Bellagio and Toronto 
in 1988 with providing the catalyst to the formation of the IPCC. These workshops 
appealed for `an agreement on a law of the atmosphere as a global commons or the need 
to move towards a convention' (Jäger, 1988 cited in Paterson, 1996a, p. 31). It is also 
clear, however, that the motives for establishing the IPCC were largely political, in that 
the new institution created a means to draw governments worldwide into a process of 
decision-making about climate change (Agrawala, 1998a, p. 617). More specifically, 
Vogler claims that the creation of the IPCC represented `a successful attempt by 
governments (notably the US government) to assert control over the climate change 
research process' (Vogler, 1995, p. 204). Both Nitze (1989, p. 44) and Bodansky (1993, 
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p. 464) also stress the role of the US government in promoting the IPCC as an attempt to 
respond to a problem that was at once both scientific and political. 
Indeed, opinions within US government circles were themselves divided during the mid 
1980s over the issue of climate change. The Environmental Protection Agency and 
some within the State Department supported the creation of a climate change 
convention in the face of opposition from other branches of the administration which 
held that too much scientific uncertainty still prevailed to justify action (Hecht and 
Tirpak, 1995). Specific political action against climate change was thus not an option at 
this stage. General agreement could, however, be secured for a compromise position 
that would see the establishment of an intergovernmental assessment mechanism - the 
IPCC. This initiative suited the various US government agencies involved, bought time 
and promoted international involvement; ultimately, too, it made a future convention a 
more realistic possibility (Agrawala, 1998a). 
During early 1987 the WMO seemed the natural choice to sponsor the international 
assessment process, but it did not have sufficient expertise to cover some areas of 
climate change, such as policy responses. Consequently, the UNEP became involved, 
leading to the establishment of a joint intergovernmental assessment body. Negotiations 
between the WMO and UNEP led, in turn, to calls for all interested countries to be 
involved with and represented on an `Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change' 
(Obasi, 1988). The formal creation of the IPCC, under the auspices of the WMO and 
UNEP, followed in November 1988. 
The new panel was composed of eminent climatologists nominated by their national 
governments, under the chairmanship of the Swede, Bert Bolin (Rowlands, 1995, p. 75). 
The British representative, John Houghton, was selected to chair the Science Working 
Group (WGI). The scientific stature of Bolin and Houghton was important in 
encouraging a wider involvement of scientists and governments from around the world 
in the work of the IPCC, especially in the early stages `when the Panel had no brand 
name recognition or prestige benefits to offer' (Andresen and Agrawala, 2002, p. 45). 
The growing involvement of a core group of eminent scientists was thus vital in 
boosting the `scientific credibility and political legitimacy' of the IPCC (Andresen and 
Agrawala, 2002, p. 44). 
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These twin requirements of scientific credibility and political legitimacy also explain 
the enthusiasm of leading figures within the IPCC for securing the extensive 
involvement of scientists from developing countries in the work of the panel. The remit 
for the IPCC's formation provided specific financial support with which to engage 
scientists from the developing world. In part this reflected a recognition that many such 
countries were most likely to suffer severely from the effects of global warming 
(Kandlikar and Ambuj, 1997). But involvement was also intended to dispel a wider 
sense of disconnection from the issue of climate change expressed by some leading 
political figures in the developing world. Ultimately, a truly global agreement about the 
causes of climate change and the structure of a co-ordinated response would be 
necessary, involving developing as well as developed countries. It was also evident 
from the outset that the involvement of some developed states, not least the USA, in any 
preventative policy against climate change was likely to be dependent on some 
commitment to future action by rapidly developing states such as China, India and 
Malaysia. 
In practice, the uneven geographical distribution of scientific expertise concerning 
climate change made it difficult to give the prominence hoped for to authors from 
developing countries when preparing IPCC reports (Kanlikar and Ambuj, 1997; 
Shackley, 1997). In response a Special Committee on the Participation of Developing 
Countries was established in 1989 (Paterson, 1996a, p. 44; Rowlands, 1995, p. 75). 
Overall, however, Andressen and Agrawala (2002, p. 45) claim, the involvement of 
representatives from the developing world accelerated formal intergovernmental 
negotiations about climate change. A perception that the panel was more representative 
than any previous body was perhaps a key factor in securing more political weight for 
its scientific statements than achieved by any other studies (Paterson, 1996a). 
Alternatively, Shackley argues (1997, p. 77) this may have reflected the status and 
external influence of a rather smaller group of scientists and policy makers who made 
up the active core of the IPCC. The impact made by the IPCC's statements was also a 
function of the strength of their message. In this respect the exclusion of many - but not 
all - prominent climate sceptics, whose opinions might have tempered the panel's 
published conclusions, is a further potential factor (Paterson, 1996a). 
The initial aim of the IPCC as a vehicle for fostering research and shaping wider 
opinion in a co-ordinated fashion was to prepare an assessment of the scientific and 
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economic dimensions of climate change for the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. The resultant 
reports reviewed and assessed published scientific literature on climate change, its 
impacts, costs and possible policy responses (Andressen and Agrawala, 2002). The 
IPCC also offered an evaluation of scientific and technical issues for the UNFCCC. 
Successive IPCC reports are widely seen as presenting `a clear expert consensus on 
what is known and with what certainty'. The IPCC is thus characterised as the `principal 
messenger' between scientists, governments and the public regarding the importance of 
climate change (Shackley, 1997, p. 77). Similarly, Paterson (1996a, p. 43) identifies the 
IPCC as the `primary forum for coordinating policy research related to climate change 
and ... a 
forerunner to establishing formal negotiations towards international treaties'. 
Subsequent events have, however, revealed the problems inherent in this progress from 
`scientific' to `political' coordination. In part, such difficulties reflect not only the 
difficulties of framing and coordinating international policy, but also the nature of the 
IPCC itself. As acknowledged earlier there was much that was political in the creation 
and structure of the IPCC. The end result is a body that is well respected because its 
publications and statements are widely perceived to be based on sound science. But the 
IPCC has not secured - and indeed could not secure - total scientific consensus as an 
undisputed basis for the creation of a policy response. Moreover, the process of 
authorship of some IPCC reports has been subject to scrutiny and criticism, reflecting 
charges that the detailed presentation of content has been influenced by political 
considerations as well as scientific evidence (see also Section 2.5.1). 
It is also important to acknowledge the politicisation of the wider international context 
within which the work of the IPCC would be considered. In this respect, the formation 
of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in 1989 marked the emergence of 
climate change as a truly internationalised political issue. Anthropogenic emissions 
were recognised as being chiefly produced by developed nations, yet it was evident that 
developing nations would suffer the most from their effects; not least because they were 
less well equipped to deal with the consequences. Indeed, the formation of AOSIS 
reflected the concern of many of its members that their very `existence is threatened by 
sea-level rise' (Jamieson, 2001, p. 287). Developed nations were, therefore, argued to 
have key responsibilities to help developing countries, both in curbing climate change 
and in providing aid to mitigate its effects (Keesings, 2001). The response of President 
George Bush Senior, however, was to emphasise the need for scientific facts and further 
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research, rather than to offer any assistance to developing nations. Although policy 
actions were planned and scientific consensus was emerging, it is clear that there was 
still an emphasis on scientific research. By focusing on research and directing more 
money into the subject Bush could postpone political action, which he perceived to be 
against America's economic self-interest (Carpenter, 2001, p. 314). It appears that this 
response from the USA, at this early stage in the politicisation of climate change, 
established the tone of future American participation in climate diplomacy. Despite 
appeals to the precautionary principle, the scientific uncertainty of the subject was now 
being used by some politicians as an excuse not to respond to the problem. Partly as a 
result, scientists' statements about climate change have become stronger through the 
1990s, to try to force governments into effective action. At the same time, however, the 
scientific understanding of the subject was itself increasing. The Second World Climate 
Conference (1990), backed by the recent Working Group I (WGI) IPCC report, declared 
that if increases in greenhouse gas concentrations were not limited, the predicted 
climate change would place stress on natural and social systems to a degree not seen in 
the past 10,000 years (Environmental Defence Organisation, 2001). This led to serious 
international political concern and highlighted the need for a climate convention. 
The establishment of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) (1992) 
appears to have been a weak response by governments to the need to `address the risk of 
climate change' by attempting to stabilise `greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system' (Arts, 1998, p. 100, see also Environmental Defence Organisation, 
2001). Key international climate scientists, such as Bert Bolin and Sir John Houghton, 
Chief Executive of the UK Meteorological Office and co-chairman of WGI of the IPCC, 
(see, for example, the statement by Houghton et al, 1992, p. iii), were pushing for 
stringent emission reduction targets (Rowlands, 1995). However, the FCCC was only an 
agreement to the principle of emission reductions and it set no legally binding targets. It 
was not until 1997 with the introduction of the Kyoto Protocol that there was a real shift 
towards regulation - although there were no immediate moves to establish penalties for 
non-compliance (O'Riordan and Jordan, 1997). Moreover, despite the FCCC's 
invocation of the Precautionary Principle to argue that scientific uncertainty should not 
be used to justify policy inaction, such excuses for deferring political action remain 
common. 
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Although uncertainty still undoubtedly existed in climate science, James McCarthy, 
chair of the Advisory Committee for ICSU, (1996) claimed that debate over the reality 
of climate change no longer existed among `worthy' scientists; the only contention now 
being `the rate at which it is happening' (McCarthy, 1996, quoted in Gelbspan, 1998, 
p. 23). Indeed, the majority of the scientific community accepted that global warming 
would have severe implications. Yet some contrarians still disputed it, arguing that the 
climate system would adjust to compensate for the anthropogenic emissions, thus 
reducing the terrestrial implications (see for example, Lindzen, 1995). 
In 1997 more than 160 states, which were the parties to the FCCC, adopted the Kyoto 
Protocol (see Table 2.1). This legally binding convention obliged developed nations to 
achieve specific limits on greenhouse gas emissions by the years 2008-2012 (UNFCC, 
1997). The protocol's emissions targets were hailed as an important first step towards 
the Framework Convention's objective of avoiding climate change. However, the Kyoto 
Protocol was criticised by both pro- and anti-environmental NGOs. Moreover, the 
attempts to finalise its terms at subsequent meetings of the parties quickly ran into 
trouble. Crucially, meetings at The Hague in 2000 failed to reach an agreement on the 
implementation rules that were prerequisites for most industrialised nations' ratification 
of the Protocol. The Hague conference ended inconclusively because of disagreements 
between the EU and USA over terms for achieving the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions. Consequently, decisions were postponed until 2001 (Pearce, 2000). In the 
meantime, the new US President George W. Bush requested that NAS produced a report 
analysing climate science. It supported the IPCC reports (2001 - WGI, WGII, WGIII), 
claiming that `temperatures are in fact rising [and these] are most likely due to human 
activities' (NAS, 2001). This, however, had little effect on the public stance of the Bush 
administration. Like his father Bush Junior emphasised the uncertainty of the science 
and, therefore, insisted on further research before any effective action. Again this is 
counter to the FCCC's endorsement of the precautionary principle. In practice, Bush's 
stance strongly reflects the influence of businesses interest opposed to emission 
reduction targets, rather than actual uncertainty in climate science (Carpenter, 2001). 
Indeed, the domestic political context in the US is even such that Bush felt confident in 
taking on international opinion and withdrawing from further discussions of the 
Protocol. In the USA's absence, the Kyoto Protocol was eventually signed at the Sixth 
Conference of the Parties in 2001, committing signatories to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions to the targets set four years earlier at Kyoto. However, a still greater level of 
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flexibility in the achievement of those targets was permitted than had been discussed in 
2000. As Oliver Belgium, the EU's chief negotiator, stated, he would `prefer an 
imperfect agreement that is living, to a perfect agreement that doesn't exist' (Pearce, 
2001). Contention still exists over emission reduction targets and exact responsibility 
for action. On the 4th June 2002 the Kyoto Protocol had been signed by 84 Parties and 
had been ratified by 74 Parties (UNFCCC, 2002). President Bush and the majority of 
the Senate remain opposed to US ratification, declaring that scientific uncertainty is still 
too great to justify its targets (CoP 6,2001; Environmental Defence Organisation, 
2001). It is likely that the uncertainty in the science has been overemphasised by vocal 
sceptic scientists, such as Michaels, Balling, Singer and Idso and by anti-environmental 
NGOs like the Global Climate Coalition (GCC) which are supported by specific 
business interests. Thus, the US government has yet again used the weak excuse of 
scientific uncertainty to protect the economic interest of influential and powerful 
corporations. 
With climate change becoming a legitimate issue for debate outside the scientific 
community, it is necessary to understand how the issue actually became politicised. 
What factor or factors caused the issue to enter the political realm? Were individual 
climate scientists significant in forcing the issue onto the agenda, or did mass scientific 
support do more to push the subject forward. The following section 2.4 will investigate 
the origin of the initial politicisation of the debate; whereas section 2.5 will provide a 
critique of key theories that attempt to explain the unfolding debate. 
2.4 Understanding the Politicisation of Climate Science: The Context 
for Politicisation 
Section 2.3 indicated the prominence that climate change had achieved on political 
agendas by the late 1980s. Although the emergence of modem environmentalism had 
begun the politicisation of the issue in the 1950s, it was not until the 1980s that global 
warming achieved prominence within society and on political agendas. However, the 
political visibility that the issue secured at the start of the 1980s was short-lived. It was 
not until the late 1980s that human-induced climate change achieved a more lasting 
place on the political agenda. Exactly how the greenhouse effect became politicised and, 
in particular, which factors propelled the issue onto the political agenda in the UK and 
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USA, deserve closer attention. Section 2.4 presents various suggestions as to why the 
issue became part of policy makers' agendas. 
2.4.1 Push by Key Scientists 
The presence of climate change on the political agenda can arguably be traced back to 
the late 1950s when key scientists, chiefly Wilson, Revelle, Houghton and Bolin, began 
establishing interest and support to advance discussions of climate change (see section 
2.3. and 2.5). For instance, the concluding declaration of the Toronto Conference - 
`humanity is conducting an uncontrolled globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate 
consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war' (Paterson, 1996a, p. 34) - 
echoes Revelle and Suess's declaration in the late 1950s, thus highlighting the early 
attempts to gain wider societal support for climate change research and policy (see 
section 2.2.4). From the 1960s the issue could be characterised as becoming slowly 
politicised, reflecting the growing belief of a critical group of scientists in 
anthropogenic climate change. 
The rise of environmentalism promoted by NGOs and the natural weather problems of 
the 1960s and 1970s provided a `backdrop for the increased confidence with which 
scientists made claims about potential climate change', intensifying the politicisation of 
the issue (Paterson, 1996a, p. 33). Wilson, who had been a key scientist in establishing 
an interest in climate change within a broader community in 1971, recognised the link 
between climate change and general environmental degradation, thus stimulating the 
uptake of the issue by NGOs (Kellogg, 1987). Wilson also made sure that statements 
from SMIC were accessible to NGOs. Climate scientists could, therefore, gain support, 
raise awareness and interest in the issue and further advance climate change on the 
political agenda from an early stage in the recent debate (see section 2.5). 
The 1980s, however, can be pinpointed as the decade when the issue really established 
itself on political agendas. Climate science had developed. Scientists were more aware 
of, and better able to utilise, broader communication links and were, therefore, able to 
project strongly both their stance and the consequences of global warming. Protagonist 
scientists were convinced that human-induced climate change was responsible for the 
warming experienced during the 1980s and recognised the need for political action. 
Some commentators have suggested that political interest in the issue should be 
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ascribed to the influence of key individual scientists at this time (Hart and Victor, 1993; 
Mazur and Lee, 1993). 
Throughout the 1980s, Hansen and his colleague Schneider also persistently attended 
conferences, congressional hearings and provided journalists with information about 
climate change, thus forming the contacts necessary to advance their arguments. Hansen 
is credited with being the `primary scientific contributor who raised nearly the first and 
persistently the strongest public alarm' about global warming in the USA (see section 
2.3.4). His words were also reported in the UK (Mazur and Lee, 1993, p. 694, see also 
Gribbin, 1990b, Paterson, 1996a). 
In Britain, Houghton too was edging climate change into the policy arena during the 
1980s. He actively cultivated political and media contacts to raise interest in the subject. 
By the late 1980s, he had become friendly with Margaret Thatcher and, together with 
Sir Crispin Tickell, was able to persuade her to set up the government-funded Hadley 
Centre, as a new focus for UK research into climate change (see section 2.5). 
2.4.2 Push by Pro-Environmental NGOs 
The politicisation of climate change can also partly be attributed to NGOs shifting the 
focus of their campaigning from local to global environmental problems. Global 
warming was therefore taken up as a lobbying issue. As early as 1963 the US pro- 
environmental NGO, the Conservation Foundation, published what seems to have been 
the first report on the issue from an NGO source (Kellogg, 1987). At this time, 
developed countries economies were thriving and, perhaps as a result, western societies 
became increasingly concerned over environmental problems (O'Riordan, 1981; 
Pepper, 1984). The economic boom had taken care of many peoples' material needs, 
thus they turned their attention to meeting non-material goals, such as combating 
environmental degradation and anthropogenic climate change by joining NGOs. 
Furthermore, anxiety among the lay public rose about the possible consequences and 
implications of a steadily growing worldwide population. Thus, concern increased over 
the limited stock of finite resources such as coal, oil and gas. The strengthening public 
interest in environmentalism from the 1960s helped the `campaign' against climate 
change gain further support and influence political agendas. Pepper (1984) and Lowe 
and Goyder (1983) claim that the economic boom increased public interest in 
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environmentalism because people are more inclined to react against highly materialistic 
values, changing their focus from materialism to post-materialism. Conversely, during 
recession the enthusiasm for the environment diminishes. At times when economic 
growth, employment and national security are threatened environmental issues are 
displaced from the hierarchy of importance (O'Riordan, 1981, pp. 19-20). 
Public concern for the environment, however, appeared to be transitory. Downs' `issue 
attention cycle' may explain this wavering interest in climate change. He claims that 
when an important subject initially achieves prominence there is enthusiasm (albeit 
short-lived) about society's capacity to deal with the perceived problem (Downs, 1972). 
However, growing realisation of the complexity of the issue and the likely scale of costs 
of corrective action and demand on resources causes interest to dwindle. Lowe and 
Goyder (1983, p. 31) also note how `new issues arise which can exert a more novel and 
powerful claim on public attention'. This perspective suggests that the decline in 
attention regarding climate change is the result of other prominent issues emerging. 
Mazur and Lee (1993, p. 696) argue that the appearance of the Nuclear Freeze 
movement in 1982 (to halt the world-wide production of nuclear weapons) removed 
specific attention from climate to nuclear winter climate scenarios. Edwards claims, 
however, that the nuclear winter topic `elevated the general issue of anthropogenic 
climate change to front-page news' (Edwards, 2001, p. 49). As a result of the nuclear 
freeze movement, however, new research areas relating to climate change arose, thus 
creating the opportunity for climate scientists, such as Schneider, to investigate nuclear 
winter scenarios upon the climate (Joyce, 1984). The improved relationships between 
Gorbachev and Reagan and the agreement on arms limitation eventually reduced the 
prospect of nuclear war, and moved attention, by default, back to anthropogenic climate 
change (Edwards, 2001, p. 50). 
The 1980s saw a renewed economic boom, which arguably shifted public attention back 
to environmental issues. An UK opinion survey highlighted that in the late 1980s 35 per 
cent of people regarded the environment as the most important issue of the time 
(McCormick, 1995). This was a product of changing societal perceptions of global 
environmental problems. NGOs once more achieved a rise in membership (Table 2.2). 
Unlike the 1960s, however, more NGOs showed an interest in global warming, 
directing their efforts towards the new international environmental problem. For 
example, activist members of the Union of Concerned Scientists shifted their resources 
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from the Nuclear Freeze issue to anthropogenic climate change. McCormick (1995, 
pp. 157-58) also highlights how pro-environmental NGOs broadened their focus from 
nature protection to wider environmental concerns. At the same time, they incorporated 
more politically influential methods to achieve their goals such as activism and 
lobbying. Thus by 1990 an evident shift had occurred from the focus of `regional and 
local issues to an ensemble of new problems with world wide-scope, especially climate 
change, ozone depletion, destruction of the rainforest and mass extinction of species' 
(Mazur and Lee, 1993, p. 681). 
The politicisation of climate change can thus be attributed in part to the wider growth of 
interest in environmental issues as an international problem. Capitalising on the public 
interest in the environment, other pro-environmental NGOs intensified their lobbying 
for C02 emission reductions from fossil fuel combustion. With growing public interest 
translating into an increase in membership numbers, pro-environmental NGOs became 
better organised, were able to mount more extensive campaigns and greater access to 
the media. For instance, between 1984 and 1989 Friends of the Earth (FOE) were able 
Table 2.2: Increases in membership of major environmental groups 1971-89 
1971 1980 1985 1989 
Greenpeace 10,000 50,000 320,000 
FOE* 1,000 12,000 27,000 120,000 
WWF* 12,000 51,000 91,000 202,000 
Ramblers 22,000 36,000 50,000 73,000 
National Trust - 950,000 1.32m 1.75m 
RSPB* 98,000 321,000 390,000 433,000 
Sources: McCormick (1991, p. 152); Garner (1996, p. 64) 
*Friends of the Earth 
*World-Wide Fund for Nature 
*Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
to increase their staff members by 900% and Greenpeace by 570% as an outcome of 
their enhanced campaigning (Garner, 1996, p. 65; McCormick, 1991, p. 155). This 
further heightened their public profile and their influence within the policy making 
process. 
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The achievement of a critical mass of interest in climate change by the end of the 
decade prompted pro-environmental NGOs to form a coalition to increase their political 
effectiveness. Thus in 1989 the Climate Action Network (CAN) was established. Over 
250 organisations joined CAN (initially only Northern NGOs, but subsequently 
incorporating Southern NGOs), including Greenpeace, WWF and Friends of the Earth. 
These pro-environmental NGOs still hold the common aim of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions (Climate Action Network, 2001). By the end of the 1980s, NGOs had 
generally gained sufficient ground within the political arena to be permitted to attend 
intergovernmental conferences and contribute to report agendas (Jasanoff, 1997). The 
inclusion of environmental NGOs is illustrated by the 1990 Bergen conference on 
climate change when organisations were allowed to participate, and consult politicians 
during the conference in an `attempt to bring democracy to the Bergen Process' (Brown, 
1990, p. 27). By 1992 environmental NGOs had even greater influence at conferences. 
The UNFCCC granted them the right to contribute to policy procedure, in the form of 
critiquing drafts that emerged from negotiations and presenting their views in official 
meetings (Jasanoff, 1997; Gough and Shackley, 2001; Rowlands, 1995, p. 239). 
Accordingly, their efforts have been recognised in Article 7.6 of the FCCC. 
However, the dramatic expansion of environmental groups came to an end in the early 
1990s. For example, FOE experienced a 10 per cent reduction in income during this 
period, with Greenpeace experiencing a similar fall, some of which may have been 
related to the economic recession at the beginning of the 1990s (Garner, 1996). By this 
time, however, climate change was firmly placed on the political agenda. It appears, 
therefore, that economic expansion initially in the 1960s and again in the 1980s, was a 
significant factor in stimulating the rise of environmental concern and gave the 
opportunity for the issue to gain heightened public attention through NGOs uptake of 
climate change. 
2.4.3 Heightened Political Interest in Climate Science 
Against a backdrop of environmentalism, climate change gained greater publicity as the 
world hit an energy crisis in the 1970s through to the early 1980s. Industry and publics 
were concerned about the potential exhaustion of fossil fuel resources. However, 
climate scientists and environmental NGOs which had recently adopted the issue saw 
this as an opportunity to generate further interest in climate change by emphasising the 
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possible impact of alternative fuels to oil, such as synthetics, upon the concentration of 
atmospheric CO2 (Christiansen, 1999). This was perhaps the first evidence of a revival 
of interest in renewable energies. Governments were, therefore, prompted into action to 
investigate environmental concerns. Mazur and Lee (1993, p. 695) argue that the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and NAS issued reports to examine the 
energy-related concerns about global warming in 1983, which brought heightened 
media attention and raised public anxiety over the potential severity of climate change. 
However, it was probably the effect of these reports coupled with the influence of key 
individuals that increased the profile of the issue. Nevertheless, governmental concern 
was transitory. Indeed, environmental issues are often the last to be politically 
recognised because they do not retain public interest during economic recession and 
have a short-lived issue attention cycle. They are, therefore, highly susceptible to being 
displaced by other higher priority objectives. With the recovery of cheap and plentiful 
oil supplies by 1984, interest dwindled in synthetic fuels and associated climate 
problems (Mazur and Lee, 1993, p. 694). Politicians now focused on seemingly more 
urgent matters of the time, such as the prospect of a nuclear war. 
The discovery of the thinning ozone layer over Antarctica, during the mid 1980s, again 
focused political interest upon environmental problems. Connections were drawn 
between climate change and ozone depletion, thus raising concern about anthropogenic 
climate change. The issues were, therefore, frequently tackled together, moving climate 
change back into the political arena. For instance, the American Congress addressed 
both subjects concurrently. Although ozone depletion had greater priority within 
political agendas between 1985-7 the apparent success of the Montreal Protocol to 
phase out production of CFCs in 1987 encouraged diplomats to place climate change on 
their agendas (Paterson, 1996a, p. 30). The political response to ozone depletion 
provided apparent guidelines for policy makers on how to respond and deal with 
anthropogenic climate change. The Villach conference for example, called for global 
agreement on the future treatment of the atmosphere and expressed the need to move 
towards a convention similar to that developed for ozone. However, by the end of the 
1980s and beginning of 1990s, policy makers realised that climate change could not be 
tackled as quickly as ozone depletion. As Elliot (1998, p. 60) notes: `If Benedick [the 
Chief US negotiator] was able to refer to the Montreal Protocol as the impossible accord 
it was nothing compared to the difficulties of addressing climate change'. 
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The political importance in climate change was further increased in the 1980s by mass 
media hype in the USA and UK linking natural environmental catastrophes to 
anthropogenic climate change. Natural disasters dominated the decade. Record-breaking 
temperatures were recorded within North America and unusual weather patterns 
occurred throughout the world. For instance, China suffered floods and droughts; 
Africa, India, Brazil and Bangladesh experienced floods; droughts occurred in the 
USSR and hurricanes hit the Caribbean (Christiansen, 1999; Paterson, 1996a; 
Rowlands, 1995). Statistics also showed that the 1980s was then the hottest decade 
globally on record. With the mass media relating these natural weather events to 
anthropogenic climate change, policy makers became more responsive to the problem 
(Mazur and Lee, 1993; Paterson, 1996a; Rowlands, 1995). The politicisation of climate 
change can thus be attributed to a broad range of factors that collectively pushed the 
issue onto policy agendas. Climate scientists' individual entrepreneurial skills, backed 
by the weight of the scientific community, alongside a rise in public interest in 
environmental issues, and a push by pro-environmental NGOs together ensured that the 
issue secured a more prominent place within the political arena by the 1980s. Yet, the 
case shows that the scientific community could not single-handedly establish the issue 
on the political agenda. Thus, climate scientists were interacting and networking with 
NGOs, policy makers, the media and, to some extent, the public. This highlights the 
need to investigate the relationship between climate scientists and these `outside forces'. 
2.5 Explaining the climate debate 
The politicisation of climate change altered the nature of the scientific process. 
Increasingly, research became directed towards influencing climate policy (O'Riordan 
& Jäger, 1996). Faced with highly uncertain issues such as climate change, policy 
makers turned to climate scientists for information. The relationship between scientists, 
science, politics, economics and society therefore changed, with sponsorship of climate 
research becoming a more controversial issue. Three key commentators provide 
different perspectives on how these relationships can be understood. Their views 
provide a constructive contrast concerning the practice of climate change scientists. 
Examining the means and motives of climate scientists through these important 
commentaries will provide part of the foundation for the construction of a theoretical 
perspective in Chapter Three. 
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Hart and Victor (1993) stress the role of individuals in advancing climate change as a 
political issue. They claim that certain `elite' scientists have been individually 
influential in the debate. Paterson (1996a), by contrast, stresses the impact made by 
climate scientists as a collective community. Scientists actively working together, 
creating a critical mass, are argued to have been more influential on the policy-making 
process than any individual scientists. Boehmer-Christiansen (1994a & 1994b) suggests 
a conspiratorial egotistical approach whereby protagonist climate scientists, previously 
regarded as independent and influential in their own right, have over-stated their 
position on the subject to gain further research funding. Paterson and Boehmer- 
Christiansen also recognise the importance of specific authorities like the IPCC. They 
note that such bodies have a vested interest in sustaining themselves and their research, 
because they produce and control a large degree of climate knowledge and are to a 
degree `empowered' by their expertise. However, the perspectives of Boehmer- 
Christiansen and Paterson are very different (Haas, 1990; Paterson, 1996a). 
2.5.1 Theoretical Perspectives 
All three views imply that scientists are politically active, but their interpretations of the 
principal role played by scientists in the climate change debate differ. Hart and Victor 
(1993) suggest that scientific `elites', that is leading scientists and administrators 
(Mulkay, 1976), are influential figures in climate policy and should be seen as 
independent actors in their own right. They act as entrepreneurs taking advantage of 
`temporary opportunities' to further their own agendas (including opportunities to gain 
financial support for research) in the political arena by recognising occasions when they 
can utilise their contacts, emphasise their expertise and highlight the seriousness of the 
issue (Hart and Victor, 1993, pp. 643-4). Thus they believe that scientists become 
influential mainly because of their career position and personality, enabling them to 
gain respect, network and be entrepreneurial. Hart and Victor identify Robert White, 
(Chief of the US Weather Bureau), Roger Revelle (Director of the Scripps Institute of 
Oceanography) and Thomas Malone (Chairman of the National Academy of Sciences' 
Committee on Atmospheric Science) as important scientists involved in both scientific 
and political realms between 1957 to 1964. Paterson and Boehmer-Christiansen 
consider a wider time scale, yet specifically focus on the two decades when climate 
change became politicised. Thus, developments post 1974, the date at which Hart and 
Victor end their study, need also to be considered to contextualise fully the climate 
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debate. Without consideration of a longer time scale Hart and Victor's work offers only 
an incomplete contextualisation of the role of elite individuals. 
Although Paterson identifies the importance of mass scientific support, claiming there is 
a `community' of scientists working together for societal responses, he also recognises 
well-respected figures as influential in popularising the issue from as early as the 1970s. 
These individuals, such as Chair of the Climate Board of Canada, Kenneth Hare, had 
international contacts and participated in transnational conferences. They are not, 
however, recognised by Hart and Victor. Neither of these accounts appears to identify 
Carroll Wilson as a key scientist. He is seen as a significant figure by Hart and Victor, 
but not a member of the `elite'. It could be argued, however, that he is an elite scientist 
because of his significant involvement in the study of climate change during the 1970s. 
He identified the need to link environmental concerns with climate change to gain more 
funding and policy attention. Through organising SCEP and SMIC he managed to 
reconstruct the climate issue as a threat to the `valued resource' of the environment. 
Most importantly, he also succeeded in integrating the reports into the UNCHE (Hart 
and Victor, 1993, p. 666). Furthermore, he selected a supporting steering committee that 
included the eminent scientists Roger Revelle and Thomas Malone, who helped to 
establish a critical mass of scientists to support the ideas generated by SCEP and SMIC. 
Wilson also made sure that the subsequent reports adopted an environmentalist tone to 
attract the interest of NGOs. The influence of Wilson and the support of the elite 
scientists was evident to the extent that more funding was allocated to climate research 
(Hart and Victor, 1993). Although his lack of prior involvement eliminates him from 
Hart and Victor's list of elite scientist, Wilson's contribution to raising the profile and 
gaining both political and scientific support for the issue should not be understated. 
Furthermore, neither Paterson nor Hart and Victor consider the Russian scientist 
Budyko as an eminent figure. He had played a significant role in the development of 
climatology by calculating the heat balance of the earth's surface (Asahi Glass 
Foundation, 1998). Yet there appears to be a good cause for according him influence, as 
a reflection of his scientific research, rather than his entrepreneurship. Thus, previous 
studies have some limitations as they do not thoroughly consider other international 
individuals. This lack of recognition extends to Hansen's influence and 
entrepreneurship during the 1980s and Schneider's subsequent efforts to increase public 
awareness of climate change. 
44 
Chapter Two: Concerns about anthropogenic climate change 
Ultimately, however, Paterson argues that the total weight of scientific opinion is more 
important than any individual scientist's actions in establishing the issue on the political 
agenda. He suggests that it is through their collective endeavour that climate scientists 
achieve influence. This is specifically seen through Working Groups I and II of the 
IPCC. Paterson refers to an epistemic community model of scientists (cf Haas, 1992). 
He thus stresses the shared characteristics among the group - normative and principled 
beliefs, causal belief, notions of validity and a common policy enterprise drawing on 
their consensual statements, for example on causal beliefs - that make climate scientists 
influential. By contrast Hart and Victor's line of argument implies that elite 
entrepreneurial scientists led the IPCC. They argue, therefore, that the IPCC provides 
only an illusion of a community. It is better understood as a constructed group formed 
and controlled by the key scientists. The IPCC became politically empowered by a 
process that really began in the 1970s. Key scientists established international scientific 
and political interest in the subject, leading to its politicisation in the late 1980s. The 
critical mass of scientists that form the majority of the IPCC justify the key opinions of 
the few important scientists that drive the group. However, the reports produced by the 
IPCC, by which we judge this group are often largely the work of the lead authors such 
as Houghton and Bolin, and policy makers rather than the whole scientific group. Thus, 
the community could be said to be influenced and compelled by the knowledge and 
influence of particular scientists who act as goal-seeking individuals within the IPCC. It 
appears that these key persons have created an illusion of a cohesive community of 
scientists, thus, policy makers and the public assume there to be an epistemic 
community, which co-operates amongst itself and delivers group consensual 
agreements. These key scientists have established strong international contacts, appear 
well respected among their peers and are charismatic and politically driven having 
pursued their own agenda since the 1960s and 1970s. Viewed in this way, the IPCC is 
not a consensus community but a quasi-constructed deception, controlled and 
influenced by key scientists. 
Both Paterson, and Hart and Victor can be criticised for not recognising sufficiently the 
involvement of NGOs. In the early 1960s the Conservation Foundation help raise the 
domestic political profile of the climate issue by producing reports which effectively 
increased the US government's interest in climate change leading to the subsequent 
production of a White House study on global warming (Rowlands, 1995). The influence 
of NGOs has further been increased by their subsequent inclusion in international 
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conferences such as those associated with the FCCC (Gough and Shackley, 2001). 
Paterson also downplays the significance and important of the Toronto and Villach 
conference which promoted an alliance between key members of scientific and political 
establishments (see section 2.3.2). 
Boehmer-Christiansen's (1994a, 1994b) position could be seen as a powerful criticism 
of both the preceding ideas. She argues that far from being influential and independent 
operators, concerned for the greater good, scientists are at best opportunistic agents 
driven by the need to get money, and, at worst, may function as politically naive pawns 
who are used or bought by other interests. Such arguments have themselves inspired 
criticism for being too one-sided (Shackley and Skodvin, 1995). Boehmer-Christiansen 
suggests that the members of the IPCC have constantly reframed its position to get the 
best grants. Initially, they overemphasised the threat of the enhanced greenhouse effect 
to stress their own policy relevance, then by achieving consensus on the issue they 
managed to consolidate their position. Once the issue reached the political agenda, the 
IPCC highlighted uncertainties ensuring that their expertise remained applicable 
(Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994a, 1994b). For instance, the IPCC chairman, Professor 
Bolin, is charged with contradictory behaviour in first emphasising the dangers of 
continuing with a `business as usual' approach with respect to reducing greenhouse 
gases, yet then calling `for more research funds rather than any specific emission 
reduction targets' (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994b, p. 190). Equally, the Executive 
Director of the World Meteorological Organisation, Professor G0P Obasi, appealed - 
with full UK backing - for further research to reduce uncertainties. This gave 
governments time to delay action by supporting further research (Boehmer- 
Christiansen, 1994b). Although Paterson points out that the IPCC is politically driven 
and `goal seeking', he stresses that this is because the scientists involved are motivated 
by their understanding of the seriousness of the issue. He argues that this is a 
characteristic of an epistemic community and endemic among active policy-orientated 
expert groups. Paterson contradicts Boehmer-Christiansen's claims that the IPCC 
stressed the uncertainties in climate science to maintain its own influence in the new era 
of politicised climate science. Instead, he claims that once climate change became 
accepted on the world stage other actors within national bureaucracies actually reduced 
the IPCC's role and influence (Paterson, 1996a). However, the IPCC is still regarded as 
the primary body of official climate science and knowledge. Its reports remain key 
advisory papers to the UNFCCC. It appears that the influence of the IPCC has not 
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necessarily diminished, but interest in the issue has decreased (see section 2.4.2). 
Furthermore, Paterson mentions the involvement of other groups in the climate debate 
such as the GCC, which he believes have helped to reduce the influence of the IPCC. 
An alternative reading, however, might conclude that the GCC's intervention has 
injected a renewed ferocity into the climate debate, encouraging a stronger stance on the 
part of the IPCC (Houghton et al, 2001). 
Boehmer-Christiansen argues that uncertainty in climate science has provided a basis 
for governments to impose unsatisfactory environmental policy, and simultaneously call 
for extensions in research, thus creating a `win-win' scenario for the scientific 
community and governments. However, governments would be strongly criticised if 
they endorsed policy without firm scientific evidence of both their necessity and the 
seriousness of climate change. Thus, in this case a `win-win' scenario could be 
translated as a `no-win' situation for society. Hart and Victor make a similar point with 
their observations that in the early 1970s politicians could appear conscientious about 
the environment because of the high public concern and thus gain further support; yet 
would not act, claiming that the problem was not immediately threatening (Hart and 
Victor, 1993). 
Boehmer-Christiansen does not clarify the relationship between the IPCC and the wider 
scientific community. Thus, it is implied that all share the same motivations (Shackley 
and Skodvin, 1995). Both Paterson and Boehmer-Christiansen emphasise the consensus 
within the IPCC. Paterson claims that IPCC members have `shared notions of validity' 
(Paterson, 1996a, see also Haas, 1992). For example, they generally agree on the 
various methods used to indicate the changing global average temperatures. However, 
controversy exists regarding the best method to gain scientific results. As Paterson 
points out, debates have existed over the `hegemonic status' of GCMs within climate 
modelling although this is also related to access to research funding (see for example, 
Lunde, 1991 and Shackley et al, 1998). Furthermore, the opinions of 1PCC scientists 
vary regarding the seriousness of the issue. Certain members of the IPCC, such as 
Lindzen, are very sceptical about global warming (Lindzen quoted in Pearce 1997). 
Thus, the IPCC includes members holding a broad set of opinions and cannot really be 
considered as a consensus group (see, for example, O'Riordan and Jordan, 1999, pp. 82- 
83). 
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Boehmer-Christiansen's theory, like that of Hart and Victor and, to a degree, Paterson, 
suffers from a lack of recognition of the broad number of players involved in the debate, 
such as pro- and anti-environmental NGOs. The latter may exert a considerable 
influence upon the climate debate. Indeed, some climate scientists, such as Michaels, 
Singer, Idso, and Seitz are asserted to have become paid agents of powerful sponsors 
(Beder, 1999; Gelbspan, 1998). Anti-environmental NGOs have sponsored such 
scientists to promote their scientific stance, gain support and thus minimalism the 
impact of protagonist scientists claiming the seriousness of the issue and the need for 
related policy. Scientists and their NGO sponsors may thus have an important role in 
furthering the interests of powerful corporations which have a vested interest in seeing 
that CO2 emission reduction policies are weakened or, ideally, go unratified. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The involvement of international scientific and international institutions has changed 
the context in which climate research is undertaken. Climate research now has 
important political dimensions, even though the science is still uncertain. Politicians 
rely on climate scientists for information. Thus, climate research is now more explicitly 
intended to inform policy (O'Riordan & Jäger, 1996). Recognising this change in 
relationship, there is a need to explore the actual association of climate science and 
scientists with social, political and economic forces. Is it really the case that IPCC 
members and other climate scientists are using the issue as a means to direct more 
funding into the area for personal motives (Boehmer-Christiansen 1994a&b)? Vested 
interests create a further dimension to this complex relationship between climate 
scientists and science and the broader issue. What roles do institutions with vested 
interests play and how influential are such bodies? Indeed, to what extent has 
sponsorship of climate research become an issue? 
To reflect upon all these points requires a broader conceptualisation of the role of 
science and scientists within society. All these commentators, Boehmer-Christiansen, 
Hart and Victor and Paterson, imply a need to question the integrity and objectivity of 
climate science and scientists. Furthermore, the industrial sponsorship of research has 
led to claims that tainted science is being produced (Beder 1997,1999; Gelbspan, 
1998). We might, therefore, question the status of climate science now that it is 
involved in policy decisions. A detailed investigation of this issue, however, requires a 
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greater and more theoretical understanding of the potential constitution of relationships 
between scientists, institutions and the broader societal context. It is to this task that the 
next chapter turns. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Theory: Comprehending the Climate Debate 
3.1 Introduction 
The politicised climate debate suggests a connection between climate science and 
scientists on the one hand, and society on the other. It points to the involvement of 
contextual actors - social, political and economic - in the production of climate science. 
This recognition both calls into question traditional theoretical representations of 
science as a separate sphere of human endeavour and focuses attention on the need for 
more detailed study of the place of climate science and scientists within modem western 
liberal societies. This chapter aims to begin this exploration of the ways in which the 
production of scientific knowledge is embedded within political, economic and social 
structures, by advancing a theoretical framework for the study of climate science that 
follows in Chapters Five and Six. 
Consideration of the impact that external forces may have upon the scientific agenda - 
perhaps particularly through their influence upon the availability and distribution of 
funding for scientific research - must be set against further attention to the roles played 
by scientists themselves. It may be true, as some commentators have claimed (such as 
Beder, 1997,1999; Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994a, 1994b, 1997; Gelbspan, 1998; 
Karliner, 1997; Rowell, 1997), that identifiable commercial and political actors have 
sought to influence debate about climate science through sponsorship of specific 
research and particular scientists. Indeed, given the status of climate research as 
contentious and politicised science with important implications for economic and social 
policy, it would be odd if no such engagement could be detected. Its presence does not, 
however, prove that claims for the intellectual autonomy of science should be entirely 
discounted. Attempted influence in specific cases does not necessarily translate into the 
complete determination of the content of a scientific field by external paymasters. 
Hence the need to know more about the attitudes and practices of climate scientists. 
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It is also the case that the expertise which scientists themselves possess confers a 
potential ability to influence the wider political and economic agenda. This does not 
mean that policy-makers are bound to follow the logic of scientific arguments, but the 
very existence of climate change as a policy issue stems initially from scientific 
research. It is evident, moreover, that national and international policy makers have 
drawn subsequently upon the work of climate scientists to inform their decisions, and 
that the character of climate science has itself changed over time, from work that is 
relatively abstract, to research that is increasingly applied. Acknowledgement of the 
policy relevance of climate science, however, only complicates further our efforts to 
understand the relationships between science and society. On the one hand a status as a 
source of expertise may be seen to reinforce the case for scientific independence and 
authority. Yet, as noted above, it is precisely this link between science and policy that 
provides the rationale for the alleged attempts by particular commercial and political 
interests to influence the production and interpretation of climate science. 
Any attempt to document these relationships in practice will be stronger if we first 
refine our theoretical understanding of the potential links between science and society. 
Hence the current chapter advances a critical exploration of existing theoretical 
constructions of the potential relationships between society and the production of 
scientific knowledge. This review is not intended to provide an exhaustive critique of 
such theories; rather it considers a series of mainstream models. In so doing it helps to 
focus attention not simply upon the contested understanding of relationships between 
science and society, but also upon the constitution of `society' itself. Implicit in the 
discussion so far has been the need to consider the nature of relationships between 
economic and political actors, given that their interests in relation to the content and 
conduct of climate science may not be identical. Theoretical constructions of this 
relationship between the economic and political, and its implications for the sponsorship 
of science thus form an important element of what follows. 
3.2 The Place of Science 
3.2.1 Science and Society as Separate Realms? 
Early theories suggested that science was largely separate from and, therefore, 
uninfluenced by, society. Normative studies presented the production of scientific 
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knowledge as being objective and uninfluenced by societal or contextual forces, or by 
vested interests. Science, as a sphere detached from society, was thus motivated solely 
by the pursuit of greater knowledge. Such thinking is still widely reproduced today and 
offers an idealised view of science. It has, however, been subject to increasing critical 
scrutiny (for example, Irwin and Wynne, 1996; Lyotard, 1979), reflecting a growing 
understanding of the links between science and society in practice. 
Classic statements of the ideal of the production of scientific knowledge as neutral and 
value-free have been made by Merton (1973) and Polanyi (1962), amongst others. The 
latter argued that: 
scientific research is motivated not by any practical considerations but by the pure 
search for knowledge ... 
[the] primary motive for doing science is curiosity and a 
passion to know ... 
[and] to increase our understanding of the world (Polanyi, 
1962, p. 54-73). 
Merton (1973) argued that scientists have a strong and distinctive ethos, based on 
sharing information in the pursuit of truth. Such evidence has a vital role in the 
construction of new scientific knowledge, for, Merton indicated, scientists are sceptical 
about their research results unless these are fully supported by further evidence. Merton 
acknowledged that many scientists are driven to pursue their careers out of self-interest, 
yet he believes that the ethos of science binds scientists to conform collectively to the 
rules and expectations of science (Merton, 1973; see also Hess, 1997). Bridgestock 
(1998, p. 37), echoing Merton, suggests that scientists feel obliged to conform outwardly 
to an ethical, unselfish image, no matter what their individual ambitions, objectives and 
sources of funding. The progressive-positivist model similarly presents scientists as 
neutral and the producers of value-free research; it is for this reason that their work is 
used to inform the actions of external decision-makers. Scientific legitimacy thus rests 
on its image as a non-ideological sphere that is respected within society (Lipschutz and 
Conca 1993, p. 132). All these models, however, seem to present an over-simplified 
account in denying the contested link between the production of scientific knowledge 
and societal and political values. 
A somewhat different normative model of science is presented in Kuhn's (1962) 
paradigm shift theory. But Kuhn too sees science as an essentially self-contained 
enterprise in which internal factors influence - if not determine - the development of 
concepts and preferred theories. Each scientific view is grounded in a community of 
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scientists who are committed to a particular worldview. This is the normal condition of 
science, which is only occasionally overturned by the accumulation of contradictory 
evidence. The latter eventually raises such tensions between what is known about the 
state of the world and existing attempts to explain it, that radical revision of scientific 
understanding is required -a paradigm shift - leading to the creation of a new world 
view (Sardar, 2000). Typically, it is argued, established scientists are trained to think 
within the framework provided by an existing paradigm and, therefore, find it difficult 
to conceive of the world in any other way (Hess, 1997; Kuhn, 1962; Lipschutz and 
Conca, 1993). Scientists habitually work within a paradigm and consequently look for 
data that support and refine existing theoretical constructions. They arguably have a 
vested interest in maintaining an established paradigm because it provides the academic 
foundation on which their existing work and, thus, their academic reputations and 
careers are based. Once a paradigm is established within science to serve as the basis for 
further enquiry, it is presented to society as self-contained expertise (Lipschutz and 
Conca, 1993; Sardar, 2000). This display of authority, allied to a normative 
interpretation of society, is argued to enable scientists to retain their autonomy. 
However, it is Kuhn's argument that scientists may initially ignore evidence that does 
not `fit' an established paradigm (Kuhn, 1962). 
Kuhn's theory offers a perspective on the internal dynamic of science. It also recognises 
that debate and contention characterise the process of science. Yet he shares with 
Polanyi and Merton an internalised view of science, which does not address the wider 
social context within which scientific research is undertaken. Relationships between 
science, polity, and economy, and contest regarding the constitution of society thus still 
remain to be considered. 
In practice it is clear that some scientists may well be aware of the implications of their 
work, not least because of its close association with policy-making in many instances. 
Moreover, as Etzkowitz (1993,1994) notes, scientists may utilise their knowledge for 
profit. This pursuit of explicit financial, political or career goals seems at odds with the 
characterisation of science as a value-free quest for greater knowledge. Hence Forge 
(1989) asserts that scientists' `goals' are related to their values. This realisation may, 
however, only serve to introduce an alternative and more calculating logic for claims of 
scientific objectivity, directed at preserving the privileged status of science as a way of 
understanding the world. A less cynical reading of a goal-driven science might be that 
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its practitioners pursue the research which they see as producing the greatest public 
benefit. While a praiseworthy enterprise, this still compromises the ideal of science as 
value-free. In a field such as climate science there may be particular tensions between 
the ideal of neutral science and a reality of wider societal engagement. Some scientists 
may genuinely believe that they are undertaking value-neutral research, yet also feel 
driven by a need to warn society about the potential dangers of climate change. The 
former belief is perhaps not surprising given the individual researcher's socialisation 
into a broadly normative position by the scientific community in general. Yet this does 
not prevent their research being compromised by the constraints imposed by particular 
funding sources, or their results being (mis)used by interested parties to argue for a 
particular policy response. The fervour with which some scientists defend their position 
of `neutrality' may suggest a failure to think beyond the established normative rhetoric. 
But it perhaps also indicates a lack of self-belief and a degree of indifference and 
suspicion towards the external political world that their research may inform. There 
seems almost to be a psychological need for some scientists to believe that they are 
doing value-free research. 
If we accept that the attempt to present science as a non-ideological sphere is itself the 
outcome of a particular - and powerful - ideology many of the established `certainties' 
about the status and conduct of science begin to melt away. Any attempt to determine 
the extent to which scientists themselves have been consciously complicit in the 
perpetuation of the `myth' of scientific neutrality seems likely to lead only to 
frustration. It is important, however, to look beyond normative theories to consider how 
science might be connected to, and influenced by, societal forces. 
A useful point of departure is offered by Breyman's (1993) argument that the scientific 
community is influenced by the same factors as other large institutions: `competition for 
funding and honours, bureaucratic strife and turf battles, fraud and egotism' (Breyman, 
1993, p. 133). Presented in this way, science and scientists display the same limitations 
as are evident in other social institutions. Indeed, it would be surprising if this were not 
the case. Furthermore, the `growing vulnerability of science and the evolution of the 
new ecological paradigm' has led to charges that scientists have been tainted by their 
close association with the policy-making process (Breyman, 1993, p. 133). This is 
because the distinction between ends (presumably selected politically) and the means 
(presumably selected scientifically) becomes blurred; even to the `extent that politics 
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comes to shape science and science becomes politicised' (Breyman, 1993, p. 134). 
Breyman claims that this type of `politicised science' is: 
science that has been tarnished in the rough and tumble of the policy process, 
compromised by the schemes of non-scientists. It is not exactly corrupted science, 
that sort bent to the will of political or corporate overlords, but it has been 
delegitimized to some extent nevertheless.... [It is characterised] by those instances 
when technology breaks down or is challenged (Breyman, 1993, p. 134). 
If the reality of science is of an activity that is `tarnished' and `delegitimized' then we 
have departed significantly from the benign image of scientists as disinterested 
searchers for `truth'. Yet even if scientific practice falls a long way short of such ideals, 
normative theories retain some value in the development of a theoretical and 
methodological framework. This is precisely because they help to focus attention on the 
extent to which, and the ways in which, scientists depart from the ideal. Thinking in this 
way also highlights the need to look beyond scientists' common self-characterisation of 
neutrality - whether naive or consciously calculating - to identify the ways in which 
they are influenced by societal forces. Normative models provide a base against which 
to assess the validity of alternative theories. But it is clear that we cannot sustain the 
notion that science and society are separate realms. It is particularly important to 
question the notion of scientific objectivity when we are dealing with an environmental 
issue - or indeed any issue - that is highly politicised, controversial, scientifically 
uncertain and attracts strong and sharply opposed vested interests. 
3.2.2 Science and the Wider World 
If we accept that the scientific process does not take place within a vacuum, we need to 
consider alternative constructions of the relationships that link science and society. The 
quote from Breyman above reminds us of the potential presence of political and 
commercial actors. A more specific attempt to identify such influences upon the 
conduct and content of science is presented in Figure 3.1. The key elements within the 
network of relationships outlined here are `business', `the state' and `science'. These 
interests are seen to be bound together through ties of mutual dependence that reflect the 
desire of business and state for the knowledge produced by science, and the need of 
science for funding that originates chiefly with state and business. The latter tie reflects 
a reality expressed by Wible (1988) who notes that.. 
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scientific research requires the efforts, time, and talents of some of the very best 
minds and research teams in the world and the expenditure of significant sums of 
material and financial resources... there is an economic dimension to almost every 
aspect of science (Wible, 1988, p. 1-3). 
Figure 3.1 is also intended to draw attention to the presence of other actors - including a 
range of NGOs and media interests - which may maintain some degree of independence 
as consumers and sponsors of scientific knowledge. Moreover, individual scientists will 
construct their own particular and more limited network of connections, rather than 
necessarily becoming involved in all the links outlined in Figure 3.1. For instance, a 
university scientist may receive research funding from the state - via a research council 
- and from business - in the form of commercial sponsorship. Whilst working on a 
project a scientist may also make media appearances to explain and publicise the 
research. It can be seen, therefore, that in such a case the broader context of scientific 
work has four major dimensions: 
1. The internal academic environment - this is a reflection not only of the individual 
scientist's interaction with colleagues interested in similar research, but also of the 
institutional presence of universities and other academic organizations which 
employ research scientists. As employers, universities may encourage scientists to 
focus their research in particular areas. 
2. The funding received from government, which is often directed towards the 
development of policy-relevant research. 
3. The funding received from private business, usually in the expectation that the 
research will yield findings of potential commercial value. 
4. The media, which may offer fees that contribute to the scientist's personal income, 
and which offers the scientist public exposure that enhances individual profile and 
career prospects, but potentially at the risk of this knowledge being misused or 
misrepresented. 
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These four areas are all inter-linked; influencing, and being influenced by, the scientist's 
work in different ways. In theory, government funds and consumes policy-relevant 
science to advance the welfare of the population as a whole. Politicians and civil 
servants make use of expert scientific advice as one amongst many inputs in the 
construction of effective policy measures. In practice, however, government 
sponsorship may be influenced by a desire to secure more specific goals. Business also 
makes use of scientific expertise and the outcome of research and development work, 
often with the ultimate aim of increasing profit margins. The university, for its part, 
expects the publication of research results through academic papers, as well as relying 
on individual scientists to win grants for work to be undertaken within the institutional 
context. The media depend on scientists in their coverage of certain events, both to 
inform their reporting and to give it authority and legitimacy. All these influences may 
make a positive contribution to advancing a scientist's career, status and prestige. At the 
same time, however, external actors and agencies may threaten the objectivity and 
legitimacy of scientific research. 
A more sophisticated understanding of such relationships requires that we explore the 
ways in which the possession of expert knowledge and financial resources, respectively, 
may be taken to confer power upon scientists on the one hand, and business and the 
state, on the other. At the outset it is useful to consider Litfin's (1994) study of the 
science and politics of stratospheric ozone depletion, an aspect of global environmental 
change with some clear affinities with climate change. Litfin's study draws particularly 
on discourse theory and highlights the claim that `accepted knowledge is deeply 
implicated in questions of framing and interpretation and that these are related to 
perceived interests' (Litfin, 1994, p. 6). From this she argues that knowledge itself 
confers a degree of power. More specifically: 
As political problems have become increasingly entwined with questions of 
scientific evidence and proof, the ability to interpret reality has itself become a 
major source of political power (Litfin, 1994, p. 8). 
In the case of both ozone depletion and anthropogenic climate change scientists have 
assumed a central role in advising decision-makers. They hold a potentially powerful 
position because they were the first to identify these environmental phenomena, the first 
to construct them as problematic and then to suggest related policy measures. Moreover, 
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individual scientists, particularly the most prominent and senior, may act as gatekeepers 
of knowledge. Within the scientific realm they exercise considerable control over what 
is published and what is not, consequently assuming power as influential agents in the 
production and dissemination of knowledge. Such individuals may also play a leading 
role in establishing contacts with policy makers. At the same time, however, they must 
be able to present themselves as legitimate representatives of the wider body of 
scientific opinion if they are to have credibility as the `voice' of science. 
Such thinking echoes Lukes (1974) who in outlining a two-dimensional view of power 
stresses the importance of agenda setting; that is both setting the terms of the debate and 
preventing `undesirable' issues from getting into the bargaining area. This use of 
`tactical' power was refined by Bacharach and Lawler (1980), who highlighted as one 
aspect the existence of `expert power'; that is the power of professional experts to 
influence decisions. In the late 1980s when climate change was becoming more firmly 
established on the political agenda, it could be argued that climate scientists temporarily 
succeeded in setting the agenda, requiring a response in shape of the establishment of 
the IPCC. 
As the position of climate scientists within society has changed, giving them greater 
access to policy makers and potential influence over policy formation (as outlined in the 
1987 Brundtland Report: WCED, 1987, p. 326; see also Elliott, 1998, p. 121) scientists 
have thus become potentially more influential. Such influence is not, however, beyond 
challenge. In this respect it is useful to draw a distinction between the present emphasis 
on the influence of science and Litfin's argument that scientific expertise grants power. 
Within the politicised climate science debate it is clear that scientists are not all- 
powerful, but rather that they have a partial influence upon the political process. This 
echoes Arts' (1998, p. 58) characterisation of `political power [which] is a more or less 
permanent ability to influence policy outcomes, whereas political influence refers to an 
episodic effect on decision-making'. 
As noted above governments increasingly take account of scientific expertise in 
considering how to react to the risks associated with potentially dangerous issues such 
as anthropogenic climate change. Potentially, ignoring such risks could have grave 
consequences, leading not just to environmental damage, but also to significant 
economic, social and political disruption. However, more immediate interests may 
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dictate a less active response to warnings about climate change. This may reflect 
constraints associated with the third phase of power outlined by Lukes (1974); this is to 
argue that people's social horizons are limited by underlying assumptions and attitudes 
that follow from their upbringing, education and the messages received from the media 
in advanced industrial societies. In the contemporary context most of these attitudes and 
assumptions are consistent with the continuing operation of a carbon-based economy 
and the majority of the population finds it correspondingly difficult to conceive of an 
alternative existence. Such a mind set may, however, be deliberately reinforced by the 
way in which particular vested interests - particularly private business - attempt to 
advance their own agenda, which reflects the rejection of any policy responses that 
appear to threaten short-term curbs on economic growth and profitability. 
It would be possible to conceive of debate over climate change policy being conducted 
in exclusively financial terms, reflecting different interpretations of the costs associated 
with specific policy responses. In practice, however, both those arguing for and against 
decisive initiatives to counter climate change have attempted to recruit scientific support 
for their point of view. This reflects the legitimacy that science as a privileged good in 
modern western liberal societies is assumed to confer upon an argument. As Barnes 
(1985, p. 100) notes, access to technical expertise is itself a source of power for political 
and commercial elites as they are able `to use that expertise both to arrive at decisions, 
and perhaps even more importantly to legitimate and justify them once made'. If a 
stance can be presented as the outcome of reflection upon the `disinterested' opinions 
and advice of scientists it is less easy to dismiss as a nakedly self-interested argument. 
Yet the very fact that science can be taken to perform this legitimating role increases the 
temptation for outside interests to set their own stamp upon the process of production of 
scientific knowledge. The power of science as expert knowledge is the very reason why 
it may be subject to attempted subversion, often involving the alternative power 
conferred upon elite actors by their command of financial resources. It is worth recalling 
at this point the frequency with which Figure 3.1 identifies funding as a crucial link 
between science and other actors. 
In the present case it is, of course, true that alternative readings of the scientific 
evidence have their origins in genuine uncertainties about the existence and extent of 
climate change and its causal mechanisms. However, such differences of interpretation 
also have implications for the construction of policy responses that will impact on 
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specific commercial interests, in particular. Thus the charge has been laid that such 
interests have been motivated to exploit a perpetual hunger on the part of scientists for 
funding, to sponsor research that clouds or distorts the scientific agenda in ways that 
serve the sponsor's own sectional ends. 
Beder (1997,1999), amongst others, has alleged that the stance of certain vocal climate 
sceptics reflects the fact that they have been `bought' by businesses which have an 
interest in undermining the legitimacy of concerns about climate change. These 
scientists are argued to gain substantial financial benefits as a result of advancing a 
particular scientific stance. As might be expected, the individuals concerned dispute that 
they are being bought in this crude fashion, or that their research results are influenced 
by the source of their funding. But it is clearly the case that the sponsorship of particular 
scientific arguments can advance the interests of important businesses in sectors such as 
energy and motor vehicle production if it enables them to refute protagonist arguments 
about climate change. 
Ultimately, it seems, scientific expertise is used selectively to meet the interests of 
political and economic actors, rather than having any consistent power to determine the 
actions of such actors. Science can be used to justify government resistance to 
commercial pressures and to legitimate legislation that changes commercial practice. 
However, policy-makers and powerful commercial interests often reject scientific 
expertise, or counter scientific arguments that threaten the existing status quo through 
the sponsorship of alternative scientific viewpoints. 
At the same time, it is likely that some leading - and very vocal - climate scientists are 
well aware not only of the scientific and policy implications of their work, but also of its 
commercial value and the consequent potential for personal financial benefit. Indeed, 
this may be a consideration driving their decision to adopt a high public and media 
profile regarding climate change. If scientific expertise is to be bought and sold it is 
arguably high-profile scientists who are the most worth `buying', if the objective is to 
influence public and political opinion. 
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3.3 Science as viewed by Political Economy 
The discussion so far has served to confirm the identity of the main actors that we need 
to consider in any attempt to understand the relationships between the science and 
society. More than this we have begun to sketch out a rationale for engagement between 
scientific, political and commercial actors that is more complex than that outlined in the 
initial discussion of Figure 3.1. This is important, for it is the exploration of this 
rationale and its implications for the conduct and content of science that will be subject 
to empirical scrutiny in Chapters Five and Six. At the same time, it is evident that new 
questions have been raised about how we should best understand the logic of the 
attitudes and actions ascribed to particular actors in our discussion. This in turn points to 
the need for further theoretical discussion of the nature and functions of our key actors 
and the ways in which they might be bound together in contemporary capitalist society. 
Some of the most sophisticated discussion of the constitution and operations of 
capitalist society derives from authors and analysts whose ideas have been influenced 
by Marxist political economy. It seems appropriate here to turn our attention in this 
direction, not least because Marxist discussions of the nature of capitalism offer 
arguments concerning the engagement between science and society that provide an 
important counter-point to ideas of the independence and integrity of science with 
which we began this chapter. For reasons that will become clear, however, the following 
discussion deals only briefly with the more determinist Marxist readings of science as 
an activity wholly subordinate to the interests of the dominant capitalist class. Instead, 
the focus is on readings of capital, the state and science that are better regarded as neo- 
Marxist in that they acknowledge the centrality of capitalist interests in contemporary 
Western societies, without assuming that a base defined in economic terms is the 
necessary determinant of the nature of societal superstructure. It is a neo-Marxist 
perspective that seems best to meet our needs for an effective theoretical lens through 
which to focus the research aims introduced in Chapter One. 
3.3.1 Science and the Economic Base 
As noted above, the political economy perspective emphasises the relationship between 
the conduct and content of scientific enquiry and the interests of capitalism. Indeed, it 
suggests that science is a dimension of the societal superstructure which is necessarily 
62 
Chapter Three: Theory 
determined by the economic base (Gamble et al, 1999). Under capitalism, therefore, 
scientific research reflects what is deemed useful knowledge by the dominant capitalist 
class (Hessen 1971; Rose and Rose 1976). Such a relationship might account for a 
willingness to invest in the production of certain types of environmental science, both 
on the part of business itself and by the state as the agent of the capitalist class. Some 
forms of applied environmental knowledge have the direct potential to generate 
commercial returns for business; if, for example, they record the existence and 
properties of natural resources capable of profitable exploitation (see for instance, 
Wade, 2003). Furthermore, a desire for such applied knowledge may make it 
worthwhile for capitalist interests to secure the production of some forms of basic 
environmental scientific knowledge. Basic understanding of the form and functions of 
environmental systems may, for example, be necessary if applied researchers are to 
understand the principles which explain the distribution of exploitable reserves of key 
resources and thus predict their occurrence and value. 
However, such a narrow capitalist logic for the funding and production of scientific 
knowledge seems at odds with the observed diversity of research in contemporary 
environmental science. Specifically, there appears to be a tension between an overly 
determinist approach to explaining the conduct of science and the existence of scientific 
research that seems, at least on the surface, to be opposed to capitalist interests in that it 
highlights the environmental damage done by economic activity and the pursuit of 
capital accumulation (Pepper, 1996; Schnaiberg, 1980). Moreover, with respect to 
climate change, it is difficult to reconcile the evident debate and diversity of opinion in 
the field with the theoretical assumption of a coherent capitalist interest dictating the 
course of the production of scientific knowledge. It is important, therefore, to 
acknowledge the recent re-evaluation by leading Marxist theorists of the apparent 
certainties of determinist arguments. Often this has involved renewed attention to the 
subtleties and ambiguities evident in Marx's own writings, which have too often been 
lost in subsequent analysis (Miller, 1991). Two aspects of this process of review should 
be highlighted here. The first focuses on the portrayal of science per se, while the 
second reflects debate about Marxist characterisations of the state. 
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3.3.2 Towards a Neo-Marxist Perspective on Science 
Past research that explores the history and philosophy of science has led the way in 
arguing that the theory of historical materialism is too reductionist in its portrayal of 
science (Bunge, 1991; Sohn-Rethel, 1975). Hence Abraham (1995), for example, is 
clear that some degree of cognitive autonomy should be attributed to science (cf 
Aronowitz, 1988; Rothman et al, 1996; Yudin, 1997). This is not to deny that the drive 
for capital accumulation has been, and continues to be, an influence upon the 
development of scientific knowledge. It does not follow, however, that scientists and 
scientific knowledge in capitalist societies necessarily and exclusively serve capitalist 
interests. This `reformist' approach to Marxist studies of the societal position of science 
can be traced at least as far back as the work of Bernal in the 1930s (see Bernal 1949, 
pp. 334-428, for collection of his writings during this period; see also Bernal 1939). He 
saw in Marx's writings a belief that science and technology were historically 
progressive forces. But while they were often used by capitalism to advance its own 
ends, Bernal argues that Marx ultimately conceived of scientific knowledge as 
politically neutral. It could thus be directed towards the liberation, rather than the 
exploitation, of the working class, and might therefore prove to be an anti-capitalist 
force (Bernal, 1949). There are echoes of such thinking in more recent work on science 
and society. Stachel (1995), for example, notes that Marx identified historical contexts 
in which scientific labour was largely independent of any systematic or formal control 
by capital. On this basis, Stachel argues that the potential exists for the transformation 
of the current situation in which the work of scientists `is increasingly organized under 
the direct control of capital' (Stachel, 1995, p. 78). He goes on to claim that such 
liberation could be achieved by advancing a sense of common cause between 
intellectual and manual labour in resisting capitalist exploitation. It is not necessary here 
to engage fully with the content or implications of Stachel's argument. What is relevant 
is his restatement of the idea that science is not necessarily subordinate to the 
determining control of the economic substructure. 
If we follow the argument that science may be conducted to achieve ends other than that 
of increased capital accumulation this allows us to return to the notion that increased 
scientific understanding may be pursued as a goal in its own right. Yet this is not simply 
to repeat the normative conceptions of science reviewed in Section 3.2.1. We should 
retain the thought that knowledge for knowledge's sake is unlikely to be the only, or 
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even the dominant, ethos that defines the nature of scientific activity. The discussion 
above points instead to a case for stepping back more carefully from too close an 
adherence to dogmatic theory about the character and existence of relations between 
science and the wider forces of political economy. Rather than providing universal 
answers to our questions about the nature of science, such theory is perhaps best viewed 
as raising issues that demand empirical investigation into the nature of the relationships 
between science and society in particular contexts. Thinking in this way is also 
consistent with other strands in recent Marxist debate. While the latter focus primarily 
on the characterisation of the state, they have clear implications for the present concern 
with science. This is true not least because, as previously noted, the state performs an 
important role as sponsor and paymaster for scientific activity in most contemporary 
capitalist societies. 
3.3.3 Rethinking the Role of the State 
As previously noted, an approach grounded in Marxist political economy presents the 
modern state as an element of the superstructure, subordinate to the interests of the 
underlying capitalist base. The state is therefore viewed as an instrument of the ruling 
class (Plekanov, 1961, see also Gamble et al, 1999). On the face of it, this seems 
consistent with Marx's assertion that `the executive of the modern State is but a 
committee for managing the affairs of the whole bourgeoisie' (Marx, 1973, p. 69). This 
latter characterisation of the state need not, however, imply total subordination of the 
political to the economic. Indeed, a logical argument can be advanced that for the state 
to perform effectively the role of manager of bourgeois interests attributed to it by 
Marx, it must enjoy some degree of autonomy from the economic base. This argument 
stems from an understanding of capital as fundamentally incapable either of 
reproducing itself, or of securing conditions necessary for its own reproduction. It 
follows, therefore, that for the continuation of capitalist society there is a need for, or a 
dependency on, `managerial intervention'. These interventions, which serve the general, 
long-term interests of capital, are performed by the state, which is seen to act as `the 
ideal collective capitalist'; a characterisation ultimately traceable to the writings of 
Engels (Hay, 1999, pp. 154-55). 
This central proposition about the managerial role of the state has inspired considerable, 
if not wholly productive, debate as to how and why the state discharges this function. 
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Writing from an instrumentalist perspective, Miliband (1977) argues that the modern 
state acts as manager in the general interests of capitalism because its theoretical 
neutrality as an institutional ensemble is overtaken in practice by the ability of the 
capitalist class to influence the way that the state discharges its functions. In particular, 
Miliband emphasises the extent to which capitalist interests influence, and in some 
instances provide, the personnel of the state. The latter are granted considerable 
importance, for their decisions are deemed to ensure that the state acts in the interests of 
capitalism (see also McLellan, 1998). By contrast, Poulantzas, especially in his earlier 
writings on this topic (1974), asserts the causal priority of structures over the agency of 
individual state managers. Hence, a capitalist economy creates a capitalist state, but one 
possessed of the necessary relative autonomy to discharge its managerial functions. 
More recently Block (1987a, 1987b) has advanced a more sophisticated interpretation of 
the relationship between state managers and the capitalist class. The two, he argues, 
exhibit a division of labour, but are at the same time linked by a mutual dependency. It 
is this relationship which ensures the coincidence between the interests of state 
managers and the long-term collective interests of the capitalist class. It is not simply 
the case that the capitalist class requires managerial intervention to secure its survival. 
State managers are just as dependent upon the long-term continuity of capital 
accumulation, as this provides an essential foundation for the generation of state 
revenue and, more broadly, for the maintenance of public support for existing policies. 
State personnel, therefore, work to ensure the long-term continuity and growth of 
capitalist regimes because ultimately this strategy offers the best means of ensuring 
their own survival. 
Much of the detail of the specific cases advanced by the participants in this debate about 
the nature of the state is beyond the scope of the present thesis. It is sufficient here to 
note that they articulate broadly comparable arguments that the state acts as a manager 
or custodian of the general interests of capital. Crucially, too, they assert that to perform 
this role, the state must enjoy some degree of autonomy; whether this is considered to 
be relative (as is the case in the work of Miliband, 1977 and Poulantzas, 1978), or 
potentially total (as argued by Block, 1987a, 1987b). The case for autonomy stems from 
a recognition of the likely tensions between actions and decisions that support the 
immediate pursuit of business opportunity and profit by individual capitalist interests, 
and those which are necessary to maintain the long-term health and stability of the 
capitalist system as a whole (Schwarzmantel, 1994). As Miliband (1977, p. 88) notes it 
66 
Chapter Three: Theory 
may be apparent that `reform must in the long run be accepted if the social order is to 
perpetuate itself, yet the impetus for change is blunted by the knowledge that `the price 
to be paid in the short run is often real and unpalatable'. 
To ensure that such reforms are effectively pursued, and that controversial short-term 
costs are paid, the state must therefore be endowed with the necessary authority and 
independence to overcome protest and opposition. Moreover, such opposition should 
not be assumed to reflect only the grievances of subordinate or marginalised class 
interests. Miliband (1977, p. 88) also suggests that: 
much, if not most, of the reform which power holders have organised in capitalist 
societies has generally been strongly and even bitterly opposed by one or another 
faction of the "ruling class", or by most of it. 
This tension between specific and general interests, and between long-term and short- 
term goals would thus appear to explain the observed, yet seemingly paradoxical, 
discontent of the bourgeoisie with the actions of state systems that ultimately act in their 
particular interests. 
The managerial role of the state has conventionally been defined by its functions, which 
include the provision of a material infrastructure; a legal system that both defends the 
rights of private property owners and outlaws practices that work against capital 
accumulation; and the regulation of conflict between the class interests of capital and 
labour. The latter, in particular, may involve securing apparent concessions to labour 
interests - for example, state organised and enforced income redistribution and welfare 
provision - that in the long-term serve also to meet capitalist interests in the 
continuation of established economic and social structures. The importance often 
attributed to the capital-labour relationship in analyses of capitalist economies should 
not preclude considerations of the relationship between capital and the environment, 
which may also be characterised by mutual antagonism (Barry, 1999; Gorz, 1987; Hay, 
1994; Schnaiberg, 1980). 
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3.3.4 The Environment, Capital and the State: A Context for the Production of 
Scientific Knowledge 
Consideration of the capital-environment relationship must, firstly, recognise that 
capital accumulation invariably entails consumption of natural resources and 
environmental damage (Barry, 1999). This is the most obvious source of opposition 
between the two interests (Schnaiberg, 1980). Human control over nature is, however, 
far from absolute. Nature may exhibit the power to `bite back' in ways that threaten the 
survival of economic and social systems. Specifically, the exhaustion of natural 
resources, and mounting pollution and other forms of environmental damage, may 
undermine the continued profitability and viability of economic development under 
capitalism (and, it must be acknowledged, under state socialism: Hannigan, 1995, p. 22). 
It follows, therefore, that a key dimension of the managerial function of the state 
discussed above, should be to attend to the negative environmental impacts of 
capitalism (Redclift, 1986). This assumes that individual businesses are likely to be 
reluctant to change their products and behaviour voluntarily in ways that entail obvious 
and immediate reductions in profitability and competitiveness. As a result it falls to the 
state to implement environmental protection policies where current practices constitute 
a direct threat to the long-term survival of economic systems, or where environmental 
degradation raises the prospect of growing social and political instability, which in turn 
threatens capitalist accumulation (Barry, 1999). 
It is, of course, possible to counter the argument outlined above. Recent years have seen 
increasing claims that business itself may perform a vital role in defusing environmental 
problems (Jacobs, 1994). The premise of ecological modernisation theory, for example, 
is that business-driven technological innovation may deliver new products and 
processes that yield both commercial and ecological benefits (Mol, 1997). The need for 
a politically-directed structure of environmental regulation and management is not, 
therefore, beyond dispute. Accepting that environmental management is a potentially 
important state function does, however, indicate a logic for state investment in a much 
broader range of `useful' scientific knowledge than that implied by reductionist Marxist 
models of the capitalist state. 
Scientific research which catalogues or predicts the extent to which economic activity 
modifies and damages environmental systems, as is the case with much work on climate 
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change, indicates the scale of costs generated by economic activity (Mabey et al, 1997) 
(see for example, McCarthy et al, 2001 - Contribution of Working Group II to the Third 
Assessment Report of the IPCC). In so doing it may appear to be working against 
capitalist interests, particularly if it inspires arguments that such costs should be paid 
directly by those who cause them, potentially reducing business profits, or that costs 
should themselves be reduced, even where this involves curbing economic activity and 
commercial growth (Barry, 1999; Gorz, 1987; Hay 1994). A more considered reading, 
however, suggests that knowledge of the environmental damage caused by economic 
activity may actually serve the interests of capitalism in several different ways. 
Sponsorship of such science may, therefore, be wholly consistent with the role of the 
modern state as the defender of the long-term survival of capitalism. 
Where environmental change and damage are sufficiently extensive, serious and 
irreversible as to jeopardise future economic growth and social and political stability, it 
is to the ultimate advantage of capitalism to receive advanced warning of this threat 
(Barry, 1999; Hay, 1994; Schnaiberg, 1980). Potentially, at least, this allows scope both 
for reforms to prevent any damage that is not already inevitable, and for strategic 
planning to enable society to cope better with the consequences of such environmental 
change that cannot be prevented. It follows that such environmental knowledge, even if 
it leads to additional economic costs and dislocation in the short term, may be essential 
to the long-term survival of the capitalist system. Given the role allocated to the state as 
the ultimate guardian of capitalist interests it is logical that it should sponsor scientific 
research into the impact of development upon the environment. The state may also 
permit, even encourage, the sponsorship of such research by other agencies, even those 
with an immediate agenda that is pro-environmental and anti-capitalist (see for example, 
the Economic and Social Research Council, 2004). 
Other perspectives concerning the state as a collective capitalist appear consistent with 
the apparent diversity in practice of the science sponsored as useful knowledge. The 
very need for a managerial state reflects, at least in part, the fragmentation of capitalism 
into many different interests and competing units. This fragmentation, in turn, makes it 
likely that there will be no single reading common to all key economic and political 
actors of what constitutes useful knowledge (see for example, Miliband, 1969, p. 51, cf 
the constructionist perspective advanced in Hannigan, 1995, p. 23). Indeed, the existence 
of sectional and competing interests may lead to sponsorship - both commercial and 
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political - of competing forms of useful knowledge. This may be evident in 
disagreement concerning the priority to be attached to particular topics for scientific 
research. However, in areas where existing scientific knowledge is particularly 
uncertain or contentious, and where such scientific debates have direct implications for 
specific external interests, it is more than usually likely that this will lead to sponsorship 
of a range of scientists advancing different interpretations of a single issue. 
Superficially, at least, such arguments seem consistent with previous observations 
regarding the funding and form of environmental science, in general, and work on 
climate change, in particular. Some sections of capitalism - whether defined in terms of 
specific industries, or even particular companies - may perceive it to be in their 
immediate interest to reinforce the logic outlined above for state sponsorship of 
scientific research that highlights potential environmental degradation (Barry, 1999; 
Schnaiberg, 1980). Businesses may, for example, perceive their commercial interests to 
be particularly vulnerable to specific environmental changes. For example, coastal 
fishing interests may be anxious to know more about the threat that estuarine industrial 
pollution may present to the future value of their fishing grounds (see, for example, 
Academy of Natural Sciences' Estuarine Research Centre, 2002). In the present case of 
climate change, the insurance industry has particular cause for concern about its 
profitability and financial security as these may be undermined by a growing level of 
claims resulting from damage to life and property caused by climatic instability 
(Paterson, 1999). One line of defence against such difficulties may be the promotion of 
scientific research to clarify the reality and scale of the environmental threat. 
By contrast some commercial interests may regard specific aspects of environmental 
damage or change as creating new and profitable opportunities. It is apparent, for 
example, that the production and installation of equipment to detect, reduce, or prevent 
pollution has itself become a lucrative business. Again this is evident with respect to 
climate change. On the one hand there is money to be made in developing and 
supplying energy management systems and energy-efficient equipment. On the other, 
concerns about climate change seem likely to transform the economics of renewable and 
emission-free energy production (Rowlands, 2000). Such is the potential for profitable 
new business that some commentators (such as Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994a, 1994b; 
Morris, 1997) have suggested that vested interests may even sponsor science that is 
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`useful' in that it misrepresents the causes of climate change, or overstates its likely 
scale and implications. 
The argument so far has shown that it is possible to outline a capitalist logic for the 
sponsorship of science that documents the damage inflicted upon the environment by 
economic activity; that seeks to clarify the precise causes of this damage; that makes an 
informed projection of the future extent and consequences of damage; and that provides 
a basis for reform initiatives intended to minimise the negative feedback upon human 
systems and thus secure the conditions for continued capital accumulation. Yet the very 
existence of such science and its potential use in reform policy may in turn inspire other 
sectional interests within capitalism to become involved with environmental issues. This 
may be particularly evident in the case of those interests and industries which see in the 
proposed environmental reform policies a major and immediate threat to their own 
specific profitability and livelihood. `Polluter pays' policies, for example, may be an 
effective means of curbing environmental damage (Jacobs, 1993) that would otherwise 
interfere with long-term prospects for economic growth (Mabey et al, 1997). In the 
short term, however, it is often perceived to impose additional costs on particular 
businesses. 
Policy action against climate change could affect business activity in general through 
impacts such as higher energy costs. Changes in the energy market are, however, likely 
to have particularly adverse effects on the short-term fortunes of specific sectors, 
including energy-intensive heavy industry, the producers of carbon-based energy and 
motor vehicle manufacturers (Barry, 1999; Hay, 1994). Hence it is unsurprising that 
leading businesses from these sectors have been active in promoting arguments 
opposing immediate or radical action against climate change. Such activity involves 
direct political lobbying, both at a national and international level, in an effort to block 
the definition and implementation of climate change policy. But energy-related 
commercial interests have also emerged as sponsors of climate science. Often, critics 
allege (for example, Beder 1997,1999), this is sponsorship with a particular goal in 
mind; to promote the production of knowledge that will discredit or cast doubt upon 
prior scientific arguments regarding the existence, causation and the extent of the 
detrimental effects of climate change (cf Evans and Packham, 2003; Monbiot 2003; 
Pritchard, 1996; Williams, 1996). 
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The short-term commercial interests of the energy lobby are clearly served by 
arguments either that the anthropogenic component of climate change is small , or that 
any climate change which does occur is beneficial (see, for example, Burt, 2003). More 
specifically, however, it is important that such arguments are seen to have scientific 
foundations (see Chapter Two). The legitimacy that society habitually accords to 
knowledge deemed `scientific' has been important to the energy lobby in its efforts to 
gain support for its stance on climate change (Beder, 1997,1999; Lubbers, 2002; 
Rowell, 1996). Mere assertion that the problem of climate change has been exaggerated 
would constitute only a weak foundation from which to launch an attempt to influence 
state policy. By comparison, the presentation of such an argument as a scientific `truth' 
seems much more likely to be credible (Pepper, 1996). 
The attempt by sectional - and sometimes opposed - groups to buy scientific 
knowledge suggests a paradox in relations between science and society. The 
sponsorship of science in support of a particular interest group is often desired precisely 
because of the apparent legitimacy it confers upon the stance and actions of the group. 
Yet the very act of selective up-take and sponsorship of particular strands of scientific 
knowledge - and particular perspectives upon contentious issues - seems at odds with 
the notion of a singular scientific `truth'. Moreover, the explicit recruitment of science 
by identifiable interests exposes the fragility of claims for a privileged position for 
science as the independent purveyor of proven knowledge. 
3.4 Conclusions and Implications 
By conceding greater autonomy to the state than more reductionist interpretations of 
Marxist political economy would allow and by recognising the likely existence of 
specific sectional interests within capitalism, it is possible to set out a neo-Marxist 
perspective on the production of scientific knowledge that seems more consistent with 
the diversity of activity and opinion within the climate change debate. Yet questions 
remain both about the character of the actors and agencies identified above, and the 
nature of the relationships that link them together. 
Some of these questions are beyond the immediate scope of this thesis, particularly 
those that relate to the conception of the state advanced above. It is evident, for 
example, that the assumption that the state acts as the guardian of the long-term interests 
72 
Chapter Three: Theory 
of capitalism appears to attribute to the state a considerable degree of foreknowledge. 
Yet it is not clear how the state arrives at this particular ability to know the interests of 
capitalism better than do capitalists themselves. Perhaps this serves to reinforce the case 
just advanced for the importance of scientists - and other `experts' - as predictors of 
future threats of socio-economic instability. At the same time, a case such as climate 
change reveals the extent to which long-term management strategies may be disputed, 
not simply by economic interests, but also within the framework of state institutions. 
There is no political consensus about the policy measures necessary to combat climate 
change as a threat to the continuity of capitalism. A change of political personnel, as 
involved in a change of government, may therefore lead to significant policy shifts that 
have no basis in any revision of scientific opinion. 
Moreover, the idea that the state focuses on securing the long-term seems at odds with 
the limited time horizons that inform most decisions taken by individual governments. 
An international perspective also reveals the extent to which state authorities differ in 
their stance towards an issue which is necessarily global (see for example, Carter, 2001, 
pp224-253; Faure et al, 2003, pp320-321). Is it possible that different policy stances - 
such as are currently being pursued by the USA and the UK - are all somehow working 
to protect the long-term interests of capitalism? 
If there are doubts about this issue, this places a larger question mark over the 
characterisation of the state in the neo-Marxist accounts discussed above. Is it 
necessarily the case that the state performs the role attributed to it of ideal collective 
capitalist? This is not simply to question whether the state can always execute this role 
effectively in practice. It also raises the prospect that by intent the state may pursue 
goals other than the long-term defence of the interests of the bourgeoisie as a class. If 
we accept this possibility then it opens up the prospect that the state may find other uses 
in scientific knowledge beyond those outlined above. 
This last observation takes the argument back to concerns about the production and 
consumption of science that are central to the present thesis. The rejection of an 
idealised notion of science as an independent and value-free realm of activity creates a 
need for a theoretical framework that will inform the following exploration of the case 
of climate science. A neo-Marxist approach is favoured here because it retains a view of 
science as an activity strongly influenced by capitalist interests, without the 
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reductionism of accounts that attribute ultimate power to a unitary economic base. 
Rather we have been able to advance a more specific set of arguments as to why both 
business and the state - as distinct and perhaps diverse interests - should adopt roles as 
sponsors and consumers of science. In turn, this variety of different sponsors has been 
invoked as a factor that might help to explain and sustain a diversity of scientific 
activity and opinion. 
It follows that the thesis should seek confirmation of the extent to which the theoretical 
logic for funding climate science by a range of different interests appears to be borne 
out in practice. This will involve attention to the sources of research funding available 
in the two main communities of climate researchers, in the UK and the USA - and to 
the implications of the relative scale of funding available from different sources with 
different interests, in influencing the agenda for climate research. 
The main focus of what follows is, however, upon the perceptions of scientists 
themselves regarding their relationships with financial sponsors. As noted above, such 
relationships are potentially complex. One the one hand we might expect scientists to 
exhibit some sense of dependency on external funding sources. This can be compared 
with external perceptions, which have even gone so far as to call into question the 
legitimacy of some research. Yet the possession of expertise - and attendant influence 
within academia and academic publishing - arguably also gives scientists themselves a 
degree of influence upon the research and policy agenda. Associated with this is a role 
in determining the allocation of future funding. The thesis will therefore explore how 
this balance between influence and dependency is perceived, attending to potential 
contrasts between individuals adopting different positions on the science of climate 
change, those working in different institutional and national contexts, and those with 
different career and media profiles. 
The study of perceptions leads on to questions about behaviour. Are there strategies that 
scientists adopt in an attempt to defend their autonomy and integrity, whilst maintaining 
research income and the academic profile of their work? Are different strategies adopted 
by climate sceptics and protagonists, and how are these regarded by their counterparts in 
the other `camp'? Such questions also return to the possible implications of the 
availability of alternative funding sources. It seems important to explore scientists' 
awareness of the range of funding available to them and their perceptions regarding the 
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accessibility and legitimacy of particular sources. This potentially has much to tell us 
about relationships between sponsors and researchers and the different ways in which 
they may be constructed in the case of climate sceptics and climate protagonists. Given 
our expectation of funding from a range of sources it also seems possible that this may 
itself have implications for scientific freedom. Is there scope for scientists to `play the 
system'? Perhaps, for example, by searching amongst the range of potential paymasters 
for a sympathetic sponsor to fund research that is inspired primarily by the scientist's 
own intellectual curiosity. 
Before proceeding to address such questions the thesis must first introduce the means by 
which the necessary information will be obtained. As Chapter Four discusses in more 
detail, the following empirical investigation draws in part upon published records of 
funding and publication activity. Its primary focus, however, is a series of interviews 
with climate scientists themselves, and associated social commentators. Only in this 
way can we gain insights into the perceptions of the central actors in the current 
investigation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Framework and Strategies for Examining the Practice of UK and US 
Climate Change Scientists 
4.1 Introduction 
The theoretical exploration in Chapter Three of potential relationships between science 
and scientists, on the one hand, and wider economic and political forces, on the other, 
highlights the need for more detailed empirical exploration of the context in which 
climate science is produced. Only in this way can we begin to resolve some of the 
questions raised about the nature of the relationships between science and its political 
and commercial sponsors, and about the influence that scientists as `experts' may 
themselves exert upon the definition of priorities for research and associated funding. 
It has previously been argued that ties between science and society rest on a mutual 
dependency; on the part of science for external funding, and on the part of society for 
the understanding that innovative science generates (Figure 3.1). Attention to flows of 
funding and to activity to disseminate scientific information, both through academic 
publications and via the wider media, will thus feature in the empirical element of the 
current study. This chapter outlines a methodology that aims to investigate a series of 
key issues related to research funding and dissemination. We need to know more about 
the scale of funding devoted to climate science; about the individual sources that 
provide this funding; about the agendas set by particular funding agencies that inform 
their support for climate research; about scientists' relationships with funding agencies 
and their perceptions of the availability of funding; and about the extent to which 
scientists perceive their academic freedoms to be restricted either by the need to 
compete for funding, or by pressures to conform to the agenda of external sponsors. At 
the same time we must explore the potential influence accorded to scientists as experts 
in an important field of research with profound societal implications. This will involve 
consideration of the extent to which the course and content of scientific debate is shaped 
by scientists themselves through decisions made about the publication of particular 
arguments about climate change, and the ways in which the scientific debate about 
climate is presented to policy makers and in the mass media. What is attempted here is 
not, however, a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the framing of climate science 
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(cf Shackley and Wynne 1995a, 1995b), but rather an approach to specific questions 
regarding publication as a means of legitimising, or discounting, particular strands of 
opinion concerning climate change. 
The research design adopted here has two major elements. First, the study analysed a 
range of secondary sources, including articles in academic journals and the broadsheet 
press, books, official publications, NGO output, World Wide Web material, and 
television and radio broadcasts. Such material is useful in providing an overview of the 
subject area, but it also yielded more specific information about the range of potential 
funding sources for climate science, some indication of the scale of funding that the 
different sources provide, and the ways in which funding is targeted towards particular 
research objectives. In addition, the study of published scientific output - both academic 
and via the wider media - provides an indication of the ways in which the different 
strands of opinion in the climate debate present their case, the extent to which they are 
all able and willing to state their argument through conventional scientific channels, and 
the different claims to expertise and influence over the policy agenda put forward by 
sceptics and protagonists. 
This analysis of existing texts is complemented by the second main element of the 
study, which employed an interview-based approach to explore the opinions and 
perceptions of individuals closely involved in the climate debate. After an initial pilot 
study, a detailed qualitative investigation using in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
with climate scientists and social commentators with a particular interest in climate and 
energy issues, was undertaken during the spring and summer of 2000. By interviewing a 
number of individuals it was possible to explore something of the range of opinions, 
attitudes and motivations current amongst climate scientists. Discussions with social 
commentators added a further dimension, revealing the opinion of informed outsiders 
about the constitution and practice of the climate science community and the nature of 
debate about climate change itself. The results of these interviews and the 
accompanying analysis are presented in Chapters Five and Six. 
As a deductive thesis the theoretical perspective developed in the preceding chapter was 
fundamental to this methodology (and the thesis as a whole). As King et al (1994, p. 29) 
point out: 
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No empirical investigation can be successful without a theory to guide its choice of 
questions. Theory and data collection are both essential aspects of the process by 
which we seek to decide whether a theory should be provisionally viewed true or 
false. 
The theoretical discussion outlined in Chapter Three helped to inform the basis of the 
empirical evidence by contributing to the formation of the interview questions. The 
research results are then used not only to report on the state of climate science, but also 
in an evaluation of the adequacy of the initial theoretical position (May, 1995, p. 22). 
The current chapter provides a description and justification of the methods used 
throughout the thesis. Section 4.2 outlines the broad methodological strategies adopted 
here, involving an emphasis on qualitative methods - specifically the use of semi- 
structured interviews. This section also offers some observations upon the likely 
validity of the material obtained in this fashion and the need for cross-comparison with 
other sources as a means of increasing confidence in the outcome. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 
provide a more detailed commentary on the process of identifying suitable interviewees 
and the construction and administration of the interview schedule. Section 4.5 details 
the analytical procedures employed in the collation and interrogation of the interview 
material. Section 4.6 draws the chapter to a conclusion. 
4.2 Methodological Strategies: Justifying the Methodology 
4.2.1 Implications of Thesis Aims 
The methodological framework adopted for this project reflects the specific need to gain 
insights into the experiences and perceptions of climate change scientists working in 
two of the major global research clusters in the USA and the UK. Much of the research 
thus rests on the adoption of a format which provides individual scientists with freedom 
to talk quite openly about their individual experiences and perceptions. However, the 
overall needs of the project are served only if contacts with individuals form part of a 
carefully structured series so that the project engages with actors holding a range of 
different scientific positions on climate change, and, indeed, political opinions about 
associated policy. A degree of comparability in the format of individual interviews is 
also necessary to enable informed and critical scrutiny of the ideas and opinions raised, 
not only between interviewees, but also with material derived from published sources. 
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4.2.2 Why Qualitative Analysis? 
The value of adopting a methodology that rests primarily on qualitative foundations is 
confirmed both by an initial review of other studies which seek similar insights into the 
experiences and perceptions of individual respondents (see, for example, Baxter and 
Eyles, 1999; Drake et al, 2001; Lahsen, 1998; Newall, 2000; Phyne, 1999; Shackley et 
al, 1998; Rothman et al, 1996) and by wider discussion in the literature on research 
methods (for example, Gask et al, 2003; Lahikainem et al, 2003; Meehan et al, 2000). 
As May (1995, p. 91) notes, qualitative research can generate rich data sources regarding 
`people's experiences, opinions, aspirations and feelings'. By comparison, it seems 
unlikely that any quantitative methodology could `adequately describe or interpret' the 
`complex and dynamic' world of climate scientists (Hoepfl, 1997, p. 3; see also Hare et 
al, 1978). The use of qualitative techniques offers the prospect of obtaining data that are 
`typically rich with detail and insights into participant's experiences of the world, and 
may be epistemologically in harmony with the reader's experience' (Stake, 1978, p. 5). 
Such an approach is particularly useful here if it can be used successfully to encourage 
individual scientists and commentators to offer accounts of their own behaviour - and 
that of other scientists - in specific contexts (cf Hoepfl, 1997). These accounts may 
usefully be considered in relation to the production and reproduction of larger 
discourses about the nature of science and its relationship with society. The present 
thesis itself, however, does not engage in the more detailed textual analysis associated 
with discourse theory (cf Gee, 1999; Potter, 1997; cf reflexive constructionist discursive 
studies of scientists' accounts Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Mulkay et al, 1983) 
Qualitative approaches embrace many different techniques, all of which have the 
potential to generate a mass of interpretative information, including opinions, values 
and individual insights. This initial choice must, therefore, be followed by efforts to 
identify the specific techniques that are most appropriate here. 
4.2.3 Why Semi-Structured Interviews? 
Given the focus of the present research on the ideas and opinions of individual scientists 
it seems appropriate to employ interviews as the principal means of obtaining 
qualitative information. This format seems likely to achieve the desired end of 
encouraging interviewees to offer detailed accounts and opinions without any undue 
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feelings of constraint - as might arise in focus group exercises. Interviews also allow 
the researcher to probe for more information as specific themes arise and to invite 
respondents to expand on any initial accounts offered (Correia and Wilson, 1997). This 
focus on the individual is, of course, something of a two-edged sword. Care must be 
taken in constructing any general case or explanation based on narratives that are valid 
only for the particular actor being questioned (Walker, 1985). An intensive, interview- 
based approach also sets limits on the number of participants that can be included in any 
study, typically shifting attention to a small number of key individuals. 
Some of these potential difficulties can be overcome by care in the way that 
interviewees are selected, and in the comparative analysis of material derived from 
individual interviews, often - as in the present case - within a wider context of ideas 
and information derived from other sources (see section 4.2.4). To facilitate this process 
of comparison a degree of standardisation in the interview proceedings is required. The 
adoption of a semi-formal interview structure is also consistent with the present study's 
aim of interrogating key theoretical positions through the use of interview material 
(Fielding, 1988). At the same time it is important not to lose completely the flexibility 
of the interview format which allows respondents both the freedom to challenge ideas 
put to them and to raise themes that reflect their own individual perceptions and values 
(May, 1995). This desire for some measure of both consistency and flexibility points to 
the use of semi-structured interviews as a primary means of data collection here. This 
would allow for a common agenda to be discussed with all respondents - informed by 
the theory outlined in Chapter Three - while retaining the flexibility necessary to enable 
adaptation to individual circumstances and to allow discussion to pursue unexpected 
paths and cues (Correia and Wilson, 1997). 
4.2.4 Data Quality and Reliability 
The facility for comparative analysis offered by a series of semi-structured interviews 
also reinforces their value as evidence in any investigation. On the one hand such 
analysis makes it possible to distinguish between aspects of the accounts and opinions 
offered that are specific to particular individuals and those which reflect shared 
discourses and underlying factors in common. At the same time such comparisons allow 
the researcher to assess the degree of confidence which should be placed in material 
derived from individual sources, whether judged as a record of specific events (such as 
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the scale of funding awarded to particular scientists to support their research) or as an 
account of individual behaviour (in relation, for example, to strategies adopted to secure 
research income). Other studies have highlighted the importance of obtaining and 
comparing the perspective of different individual actors within a single context. Within 
a specific organisational hierarchy this may involve a research methodology that 
exposes a vertical cross-section, with data being obtained from investigation at each 
hierarchical level (for example, Leonard-Barton, 1990). As discussed below, 
considerations which relate to the position of individuals within the institutional 
hierarchy of academia have some potential relevance in the present case; but the 
primary concern is with obtaining and comparing the perspectives of scientists with a 
range of different opinions on climate change. 
In many instances it is also valuable to set the perspectives of `insiders' against those of 
informed external commentators. Hence, the extension of the constituency of 
interviewees to include selected non-scientists with a particular interest in the field of 
climate change. The process of comparison and evaluation can also usefully incorporate 
a range of secondary material, including the media coverage, web sources and 
publications from government agencies and NGOs noted in Section 4.1. This extension 
of triangulation to incorporate data from different sources and settings is thus 
fundamental to the present thesis in helping not only to contextualise, but also to 
interrogate and evaluate the interview material (cf Baxter and Eyles 1997; Cano, 2003; 
Cousins, 2000; Trochim, 2003). It may prove valuable, for example, to set climate 
scientists' assertions about the availability and distribution of research funding against 
the published record of the sums devoted to climate-related topics by the principal 
funding organisations. Similarly, any suggestions of bias in the dissemination of 
particular scientific viewpoints can usefully be tested by an examination of the actual 
record of publication by key researchers. 
Secondary sources themselves should also be subjected to critical scrutiny. Questions 
about special pleading and the selective use of evidence that are raised by analysis of 
interview material apply with equal force to written material and secondary sources. It is 
important to consider the position of the `author' of any document (or interview), its 
intended purpose and audience, and the likelihood of biases and omissions. The 
identification of these individual traits is almost certain to be assisted by comparison of 
a series of different sources and perspectives. 
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The intention in all such instances is not, however, simply to establish who is, and is 
not, a valid or reliable witness in the sense that their account is consistent with 
information derived from other sources (cf Hammersley, 1990,1992; Silverman, 1997). 
It is, of course, important to be able to distinguish as clearly as possible between those 
accounts that offer credible accounts of individual behaviour - by the interviewee and 
others - and those which offer only unsubstantiated assertions. This is particularly the 
case in the present context where we are potentially dealing with behaviour - actual or 
imagined - that is seen as bad practice when set against an idealised conception of 
scientific practice. It should be remembered that assertions of bad practice made by 
individual interviewees do not, of themselves, constitute evidence that such malpractice 
has taken place. Ultimately, however, where comparisons reveal discrepancies between 
the accounts offered by individual sources the aim here is not so much to discover 
which account is `correct', but to clarify the extend of any such differences between 
accounts and to explore why these might arise. 
4.2.5 Dealing with Output 
Semi-structured interviews necessarily produce a large quantity of data. To manage the 
research results and ensure that important information is not missed or misheard it is 
standard practice for interviews to be recorded on tape and subsequently transcribed to 
produce a full written record. Thorough transcription involves checking and re-checking 
the recorded material against the written text to ensure that none of the information is 
inaccurately written down. The full output can then be edited so that the answers given 
by interviewees are coherent - so long as this does not distort the impression given in 
the aural record. 
This process yields a large quantity of data in a semi-structured format, which, 
therefore, requires further organisation. This can be achieved by a process of 
categorisation, which will facilitate comparisons both between individual data sources 
themselves, and with the broader theoretical structure of the thesis. Given the overall 
aim of understanding the practice and perceptions of US and UK climate scientists 
attention was focused on themes emerging from the interviews which had a particular 
bearing on individual's thoughts, opinions, motivations, perceptions and reasons for 
action. It was also deemed important to cross-tabulate such material with information 
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about scientist's individual social identities. This points to the need for an analytical 
method that can not only handle the mass of available information, but also begin to 
make sense of it. In the present case it is important not to lose the uniqueness of the 
individual accounts offered by interviewees, while at the same time arranging the data 
so that they can be used to address the questions raised earlier in the thesis. 
Two principal means of analysis are currently in common use; one involving the manual 
categorisation and interrogation of data, the other achieving similar ends with the aid of 
a specific computer package. The former can be a laborious option. Hence, the choice 
was made to use the NUDist (Non-numerical Unstructured Data, Indexing, Sorting and 
Theorising) software programme as a tool to speed up the process of data analysis (for 
further details see Section 4.5). 
4.3 Implementing the Methodology: Selecting an Interview Sample 
Research fields such as climate science, where multiple actors work within a single 
area, are characterised by considerable heterogeneity amongst their sub-disciplines. This 
presents a considerable challenge to any attempt to structure a study to examine their 
practice and relationships. As Smith (1996, p. 201) points out: 
individuals in groups inevitably coalesce into subgroups, which invalidates the 
sense of homogeneity suggested by the term "scientists" or "scientific community" 
... there 
is no single scientific world, even with a field of study, let alone across 
disciplines. 
Galison (1997, p. 782) also notes that individual scientific disciplines, as well as 
specialities within them, are inherently disunited to the extent that practitioners of a 
single discipline or sub-discipline `cannot be considered homogeneous communities'. 
Pinch (1981, p. 132) concludes, therefore, that `the inherent messiness of ... sociological 
research is due to the meshing of different fields and specialities'. 
It is indeed the case that scientific investigation of climate change is undertaken by a 
diverse group of researchers with different geographical backgrounds, specialities and 
disciplinary affiliations. They include meteorologists, mathematicians, physicists, 
chemists, oceanographers and biologists. Each field divides into a number of sub- 
disciplines and specialities, and the complexity is compounded by the existence of 
cross-disciplinary groupings. It is not entirely clear, moreover, where the external 
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boundaries of this population should be drawn. Social scientists, such as economists, 
whose primary concern is with the human implications of climate change do not form 
part of the present study. But there are, for example, some individual natural scientists 
who have made significant, if occasional, contributions to the climate change debate 
whose primary research interests are far removed from climate per se. This problem of 
defining the population from which a sample of interviewees should be drawn adds to 
the challenge of selecting individuals who will provide a cross-section of attitudes and 
opinions that is as representative as possible. 
4.3.1 Categorising Scientists and Selecting an Interview Sample 
It was evident from the outset that interviewing climate scientists from both the UK and 
the USA would provide interesting contextual differences. A trans-Atlantic perspective 
would provide comparisons between the effects that commercial and governmental 
forces have upon the production of knowledge in two key scientific arenas, which are 
also states with a recognisably different stance on climate change policy. Although the 
two countries broadly share a tradition of free-market capitalism and liberal democracy, 
there are some significant differences of detail, not least with respect to the role 
accorded to the state. The review of previous studies in Chapter Two (Boehmer- 
Christiansen 1994a and 1994b; Hart and Victor 1993; Paterson 1996a) acknowledged 
the potential differences between the practice of scientists in these two western capitalist 
countries. The potential pressure for climate scientists to gain research funding and 
publish work may vary, reflecting differences in the university systems between the 
UK, where the sector is state supported, and the USA, where there are many more 
private institutions. The USA is also characterised by an apparently greater interest in 
climate research on the part of fossil fuel producers, and business groups and think- 
tanks. This could have a particular effect on the practice of some US climate scientists. 
It might offer one explanation as to why there are more climate `sceptics' in the USA. It 
also has a bearing on the US government's decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 
These distinctions within and between the two national populations of scientists need to 
be addressed when selecting interviewees. 
To achieve a representative study further distinctions within the scientific population 
need to be considered. Beder (1997,1999) singles out climate sceptics as actors within 
the wider debate who have been `purchased' by fossil fuel companies to promote a 
position on global warming that serves many business interests. By contrast, Boehmer- 
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Christiansen (1994a and 1994b, 1997) argues that climate protagonists amongst the 
researchers involved with the IPCC have been guilty of compromising their scientific 
integrity in the pursuit of funding (see Section 2.5.1). It can be seen, therefore, that 
controversy over climate change is frequently presented as being conducted between 
two principal scientific camps: the protagonists and the sceptics, or contrarians. As 
Boehmer-Christiansen and Beder note, the names themselves are considered by some to 
suggest certain alliances or motivations. Thus, the interviewees need to be selected to 
represent both of these prominent opposing groups. Although the apparent polarity of 
opinion is undoubtedly an oversimplification, it nevertheless provides a useful 
organisational device. 
The acknowledgement of a two-fold division should not, however, be taken to suggest 
that there are equal numbers of protagonists and sceptics. In practice, the sceptics are 
the smaller group; a fact which itself merits further exploration. It is apparent that 
contrarianism is frequently evident in scientific areas characterised by considerable 
uncertainties. An alternative view of the wide range of scientific and political opinions 
within the climate debate is provided by Glantz (1988). His account of the debate about 
climate change distinguishes three groups of climate scientists, which he refers to as 
hawks, owls and doves. Hawks are those scientists who believe that anthropogenic 
climate change is underway; doves believe that global warming is a scare scenario 
which will fail to materialise; and owls are undecided about the issue. Yet simply 
dividing scientists in this way disguises the fact that particular individuals might support 
or oppose the theory of anthropogenic climate change for different reasons. Each 
grouping potentially includes individuals whose perspectives on the condition of the 
environment and the links between human and environmental systems may be rather 
different. 
This study will also take into consideration the career stage and status of the 
interviewees. One simple measure of this is to distinguish between professorial and non- 
professorial interviewees - that is between full professors and other faculty members in 
the US context. Traditionally, this distinction has also had age implications, as 
professors are generally older and more advanced in their careers. Given the increasing 
number of younger professors, this generalisation may no longer hold good. Yet 
professorial status remains a useful way of distinguishing between more and less 
established scientists. The importance of such distinctions may be reflected in 
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considerations such as whether interviewees in the early years of their careers feel more 
pressured to obtain funding to `climb the career ladder'. Professors, by comparison, may 
feel sufficiently well established to overcome such pressures; perhaps leading to more 
candid responses in the interviews. At the same time, however, established scientists 
may have a greater degree of commitment to the status quo and consequently offer 
defensive responses to the interviewer. 
As suggested when discussing the value of a trans-Atlantic comparison, the institutional 
context within which an interviewee is employed will also be considered. It is important 
to identify whether actors working in different types of government and academic 
institutions perceive different pressures and opportunities when it comes to securing 
funding for research and disseminating their findings through publication. It might also 
be the case that climate scientists working within government institutions will be more 
influential within the political landscape, because they are closer to government figures 
and policy makers. Thus, climate scientists working in the UK Meteorological Office at 
the Hadley Centre will be incorporated into this study. It must be acknowledged, 
however, that time and resources do not permit the present study to provide a detailed 
review of all potential institutional contexts. For example, interviews with scientists 
employed by the commercial sector might have provided an interesting contrast to the 
material included here. It does appear, however, that this would be a numerically small 
group, as climate scientists are generally only employed by companies to undertake 
specific research contracts, rather than being permanent staff members. 
The suggestion that certain societal interests may purchase vocal scientists to promote 
specific arguments raises the possibility that a scientist's involvement with the media 
may affect their funding, personal income, opinions and influence. Consequently, some 
further divisions need to be introduced into the interview sample. These reflect, firstly, 
the extent to which individual scientists are involved with the media, and, secondly, the 
extent to which they are prepared to voice controversial opinions. Such considerations 
will make it possible to investigate the motives which lead some individuals to become 
involved with the media. Potential motives range from a sense of genuine concern about 
climate change and a consequent feeling of duty to inform the public, to a desire for 
personal prestige. It is also possible that the media itself courts the involvement of 
scientists prepared to voice contentious opinions. 
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The divisions outlined above formed the framework for the construction of a list of 
potential interviewees. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 highlight these factors in organisational 
terms, such as trans-Atlantic position and stance on climate change. The gaps in some 
elements of the matrix, particularly for UK sceptics, reflect the difficulty of identifying 
individuals who fulfil these criteria; which is, of itself, revealing. Sorting the 
interviewees in this way clearly identifies the range of individuals who would ideally be 
contacted to produce a broadly representative study of climate change scientists. 
Other divisions within the interview sample were also considered, including salary as a 
reflection of career stage, and gender. The former was ruled out because of difficulties 
in obtaining such information. While gender is significant, climate change scientists are 
overwhelmingly male, thus making it particularly difficult to identify female 
interviewees. Contact was made with one potential female interviewee, but it proved 
impossible to arrange an interview at a mutually convenient time. Further details about 
how the interviews were contacted are given in Section 4.4. 
4.3.2 Selecting Social Commentators 
As noted above, it was recognised that the value of interviews with scientists might be 
enhanced by a parallel series of contacts with social commentators, who would be able 
to provide informed, but external, perspectives on the climate debate and the practice of 
climate change scientists. This constituency of commentators was defined as those 
individuals who had written extensively about climate science and scientists. In line 
with the system of categorisation adopted for scientists themselves, interviewees were 
selected from amongst social scientists and other commentators so as to reflect a range 
of opinions sympathetic to both climate protagonists and sceptics. The trans-Atlantic 
dimension of the research was also preserved. This partly reflected a feeling that 
commentators from the USA and the UK would be best equipped to discuss the practice 
of scientists working in their own respective countries, but was also born of a desire to 
explore potentially important national contrasts in the wider context of discussion of 
climate change. Given the role of social commentators within the thesis research design, 
as a source of contextual information and opinion, rather than a primary focus of 
investigation, the number of interviews sought was small. In total three social 
commentators from the USA were interviewed, together with two from the UK (Fig. 
4.3). 
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4.4 Interviewing: Qualitative Methods in Action 
4.4.1 Anchoring the Interview Questions 
As this thesis is deductive in nature it follows that the collection of the data was driven 
by the theoretical perspective. As May (1995, p. 20) argues `theory informs our thinking 
which, in turn, assists us in making research decisions and sense of the world around 
us'. More specifically, the construction of the interview schedules, for both climate 
scientists and social commentators, reflected themes that run through Chapter Three: the 
nature of the relationship between science and society, and the consequent importance 
of research funding (as a reflection of the potential dependence of science on society) 
and research dissemination (as an indication of the potential influence that scientists 
derive from the possession of `expert' knowledge). The three themes of science and 
society, funding and publication are thus used to structure the interview schedule into 
three main sections. 
Table 4.1 presents details regarding the ways in which some specific questions for the 
climate scientists were derived. Column A outlines a series of initial thoughts as to the 
range of questions which should be posed. Overall, however, this would have created an 
interview schedule that was too structured, complex and lengthy. Initial questions were, 
therefore, grouped in the way shown on the table to derive a shorter series of broader 
and open-ended questions (Column B). This gave a more manageable interview 
schedule and also one which allowed sufficient flexibility for interviewees to talk more 
freely and define their own priorities in relation to the key themes. At the same time the 
initial reflection about the range of questions and topics to be covered provided prompts 
that could be used by the interviewer to ensure that the different facets of the key 
themes were discussed. 
Table 4.1 also highlights the links between the empirical and the theoretical aspects of 
the research. Discussion in Chapter Three identified the need to consider different 
potential relationships between science and society. After exploration of alternative 
perspectives Chapter Three advanced a neo-Marxist construction of this key 
relationship. This recognises that the dependency of science on external funding must 
necessarily establish connections between research activity and the interests of powerful 
economic and political actors. A neo-Marxist perspective, however, stops short of 
assuming the total determination of scientific activity by external funding sources. This 
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points to the need to know more about the relationship between scientists and potential 
funding sources in specific circumstances. We need to explore further scientists' own 
perceptions regarding the availability of funding for particular forms of research; the 
extent to which they feel pressured to obtain research funding; the strategies adopted in 
the search for funding; and the potential implications of competition for funding on 
academic freedoms and objectivity. Pursuit of these more specific questions should 
yield both empirically interesting information about the practice of climate scientists, 
but also help to test the broader validity of a neo-Marxist stance on the issue of science 
and society. 
Table 4.1: The derivation of interview questions: selected example 
Column A Column B Column C Column D Column E 
Initial questions Interview Related Implication of Thesis Aims 
questions theoretical question in 
perspective relation to theory 
Who funds/has Question 14* Q aims to address Q should yield What accounts of 
funded your The funding issues regarding insights into the funding process 
research? process of the dependence of perceptions of the are offered by 
research... could scientists on differences in individual 
Are there particular you tell me external funding motivation that scientists? 
reasons why you whether your that derives prompt sponsorship 
have established a present research ultimately from the of scientific How aware are 
relationship with was specifically economic research by specific individuals of the 
this/these specific developed for the substructure - but economic and funding available 
body/bodies? research grant you it implicitly retains political actors. from different 
received, or did a recognition of the sources? 
Do you think that you approach a potential for Also related to 
the funding number of bodies? funding being important questions What accounts do 
awarded to you forthcoming from about scientists' scientists offer of 
reflects any Which research different sources perceptions of the influence that 
specific motives/ bodies fund/have for different dependency on funding bodies have 
expectations on the funded you? reasons - leading specific funding upon the practice 
part of the funding to different types sources - and its and content of 
body? Do these bodies of research being implications for the climate change 
only fund this type sponsored. conduct of their science? 
Are there other of research? research - as 
bodies that might If this is perceived opposed to a 
fund your research to be the case does potential for greater 
for different it confer choices autonomy that 
reasons? upon scientists might follow from 
about the way that the availability of 
Do the attitudes/ they conduct their funding from a 
expectations of the research and the range of sources 
sponsor affect the type of funding inspired by 
way you conduct which they accept? different motives. 
your research? 
How do perceptions 
of dependency and 
autonomy vary in 
particular 
circumstances? 
* Refers to section of interview proceedings 
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Prior theoretical discussion also points to the need to consider not only the scale of 
external funding for research, but the range of sources from which it derives and the 
potential differences in motivation which prompt specific economic and political actors 
to sponsor scientific work. Neo-Marxism moves beyond a reductionist assumption that 
all activity within a capitalist society is ultimately determined by a single `substructure'. 
Rather it outlines a logic for difference in the specific interests and functions of the 
political realm of the state as against the commercial realm of business. By extension, 
business and the state may have different motives for investing in scientific research, 
and may be interested in sponsoring different sorts of science, or scientists with 
differing perspectives upon contentious and policy-relevant issues. Indeed, in cases such 
as climate science there is both a theoretical and an empirical basis on which to suggest 
that specific branches of business, or arms of government, may have their own 
individual agenda, which may be reflected in sponsorship of a contrasting range of 
scientific projects. Again this needs further exploration, both to confirm the extent to 
which expectations about this diversity of interests and initiatives are borne out in 
practice, and to identify its potential implications for scientific practice. This requires 
that the interview schedule encourages discussion of scientists' perceptions of the range 
of funding sources available to them, and the extent to which specific sources are 
identified as promoting a particular agenda with respect to climate change. Discussion 
might then be taken further to consider the potential implications of diversity in the 
interests of sponsors of climate change research. Does diversity, for example, encourage 
perceptions of relative academic freedom amongst scientists if they can `play the 
system' to find a sympathetic sponsor for their research? Or is the end result perceived 
to be the channelling of scientific initiative down a limited number of routes that reflect 
the interests of the most powerful and generous sponsors? 
Examination of these relationships between science and society also requires that 
consideration be given to the potential influence of scientists themselves upon the 
agenda for research and funding. Some measure of the role played by scientists can be 
derived from their success in disseminating their research findings, both within and 
beyond the academic sphere. Involvement in policy-related initiatives is also a potential 
indicator of scientific influence. But it is also valuable to use the interviews to explore 
scientists' perceptions regarding their wider role. Do interviewees feel that they, as 
individuals, or as part of a larger constituency of scientists, are able to influence the 
scale of funding for climate science and the specific ends to which it is devoted? And to 
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what extent do they feel that they possess an `expert' status which confers influence in 
shaping the policy response to climate change? 
In many instances these are not questions that would be likely to obtain a particularly 
forthcoming answer if they were posed directly. This reinforces the logic of the 
approach outlined above of constructing an interview schedule based on a limited 
number of broadly-defined questions that can be used as the starting point for a semi- 
structured discussion that can be guided using the interviewer's more detailed - and 
theoretically informed - agenda. In practice, it was decided that the interviews should 
begin with opening questions that did not directly address the specific themes of the 
research. Rather interviewees were asked to introduce their own research area. This 
strategy was designed to put interviewees at their ease, but it also had the aim of 
soliciting potentially useful contextual information about the state of climate change 
science and the context within which scientists operated. The interview then proceeded 
in a more structured fashion to address the themes of science and society, funding and 
dissemination. Potentially contentious or threatening issues were raised towards the end 
of the interview, in the hope that some rapport would have been established between the 
parties by this stage. The specific content of each interview was different in detail, 
reflecting both the interests of individual interviewees, and the use of information 
derived from earlier interviews to stimulate discussion in later sessions. Interview 
questions were also modified as appropriate in the different national contexts of the 
USA and the UK. 
The schedule used for interviews with social commentators followed a broadly similar 
structure, although, of course, much of the focus of discussion shifted from the 
interviewee's own scientific research to their perceptions of the way in which science 
was conducted. Each interview with an external commentator did, however, include 
attention to their own writings on science and society. This allowed more detailed 
understanding of their argument, its source material and the theoretical and political 
stances that underpinned it. Experience showed that the interviews with commentators 
required a more flexible structure than those with scientists, reflecting a greater 
diversity in role and employment history. Appendix A reproduces the schedule used for 
an interview with an individual employed by a pro-free market NGO. 
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4.4.2 Interview Administration 
The administration of the interviews followed a standardised procedure. All were 
conducted in the interviewee's own office, whether in the UK or the USA. This 
reflected the hope that by travelling to the respondent's domain they would be 
encouraged to participate actively in the interview process, thus generating full answers 
to the questions posed. The strategy of conducting interviews in familiar surroundings 
for the interviewee is also intended to allow respondents to relax and, again, encourage 
freer and fuller discussion. 
An initial round of interviews was planned to assist with the development of the 
interview design. This pilot phase consisted of four interviews with UK scientists 
working in fields related to climate change. These initial interviews proved an essential 
aid in testing and refining the interview schedule to ensure that had a coherent structure 
and that individual questions were both understood by respondents and generated an 
informative response (Fischer, 1997) (see Appendix B for pilot interview proceedings). 
As a result some changes were made to the detail of the interview schedule. For 
example, section 3, question 13 (Appendix B) was enhanced to provide clarification 
because the pilot interviewees misunderstood the question, generating conversation that 
did not really relate to the intended purpose of the query. The new question 13 can be 
seen in section 3 of Appendix C. It was also found to be necessary to add further 
questions to the schedule (see question 9, Appendix Q. These were aimed at getting 
more specific and detailed answers from interviewees that explored their stance on the 
work of the IPCC. In some instances, therefore, the pilot study revealed the value of 
asking direct questions, despite previous concerns that this might prove too brusque. 
The pilot interviewees also provided an opportunity for the present author to practice 
and refine her skills as an interviewer. 
An additional benefit from the pilot interviews was the opening offered to network with 
climate scientists, making contacts for full interviews, or establishing leads - or 
referrals - to facilitate approaches to potential interviewees. Thus some of the full 
interviews were first set up either by a pilot interviewee themselves emailing a 
suggested contact, or - more frequently - by offering a lead to be followed up by the 
author. The second round of full interviews involved contacting 59 individuals who 
were grouped according to the categories outlined in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Interviewees 
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were first approached by email, using a carefully constructed letter that aimed to explain 
the focus of the study being undertaken. This also gave the contact the opportunity to 
explore the research further by visiting the specially designed project web page 
(www. geog. leeds. ac. uk/people/a. matthews/). Appendix D reproduces the letter sent to 
these individuals. A large number of people were contacted initially because it was 
anticipated that many would decline the request for a lengthy interview. However, the 
response was gratifying and yielded more than enough potential participants for a study 
on the present scale. In total 19 individuals were interviewed: 10 protagonist scientists, 
4 sceptical scientists and 5 social commentators. Their distribution within the more 
specific categories outlined above can be seen on Figures 4.1,4.2 and 4.3 (interviewees 
are listed for convenience in Appendix E). Some categories remain un- or under- 
represented; this reflects the character of the wider population and thus the difficulties 
of identifying potential interviewees who fulfilled all the criteria. 
The full interviews raised new issues about the need for care in administering the 
interviews and the use made of the results. Lahsen (1998) identifies the threat of libel 
suits when studying particularly powerful persons, such as climate scientists who have a 
high media profile. She notes that `Libel suits are an important weapon among 
participants in the climate debate whose status, power and influence depend on their 
public and scientific reputations' (Lahsen, 1998, p. 64). This, in turn, reflects the 
observation made by the well-known climate scientist Stephen Schneider (1990, p. 201) 
that `the most precious intangible a scientist ever owns is his or her reputation'. Even 
without a threat of litigation all researchers should abide by an ethical code of conduct 
both when interviewing and when analysing and reproducing the words of interviewees 
(May, 1995; see also research ethics and confidentiality, ESRC, 2003-2004). Prior to 
the interviews permission was sought to take a tape recording of the proceedings and 
the assurance was given that the recording could be switched off if the interviewee 
wished to communicate information or comment off the record. Those actors already in 
the public eye were accustomed to speaking to a third party in this way and were, 
therefore, aware of the consequences. Individuals with less experience of public 
exposure may have been less aware of the potential consequences of speaking openly. 
Two measures were taken, therefore, to avoid possible embarrassment or complications. 
Following standard ethical practice, as recognised by the Economic and Social Research 
Council (2003-2004) in research on scientific issues, it was decided that all interviewees 
would remain anonymous. References made in the interviews to other named 
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individuals were also anonymised. Interviewees were given the further reassurance of 
an opportunity to view a transcribed copy of their own interview and to edit or clarify 
its contents. Thus, all involved in the study would be assured of the accuracy of the 
record of the interview and the risk of ill-feeling between interviewer and interviewee 
minimised. 
4.5 Methods of Interview Analysis 
4.5.1 The Mechanics of Analysis 
Dey (1993, p. 24) notes that qualitative data analysis `is a process that involves 
describing the data, breaking it down into bits, looking at how these bits interconnect 
and generating a new account by reconceptualising them'. In the present case the 
analytical process had to reflect the need for closeness to the data; typically, indeed, 
qualitative data analysts are expected to `immerse themselves in their data, get close to 
it and get the feel of it' (Stroh, 2000, p. 262). The analytical process also involves 
making conceptual connections, searching for and explaining structures in the data. 
Patterns in the data, regularities, variations, exceptions, differences, commonalties and 
connections between interviews need to be drawn out. It was also important to be 
systematic about analysing the data if valid, coherent and intelligible accounts were to 
be produced from the initial substantial resource of material generated in the semi- 
structured interviews (Dey, 1993). 
As analysis is a lengthy and complex process, the scale of which inevitably increases as 
the number of interviews mounts, it was necessary to find an efficient and productive 
way of handling a large amount of empirical data that would not compromise the 
previously stated need to engage closely with the material. This pointed to the adoption 
of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS), rather than the 
use of traditional manual methods. Before the introduction of specialist computer 
packages in the late 1970s and early 1980s manual methods of analysis, often involving 
the use of coloured highlighters and index cards, were ubiquitous (Bagnall, 2003). 
Computer packages, however, have created easier and, usually, faster methods. 
4.5.2 Why NUDist? 
CAQDAS can be divided into two forms of packages, code and retrieve and code-based 
theory-building software packages. A number of CAQDAS exist including, for theory 
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building: NUDist, AQUAD, HyperRESEARCH and Atlas/ti; and for code and retrieve 
purposes: HyperQual, Kwalitan, QUALPRO and The Ethnograph (Fielding, 1994). The 
two groups of packages are not, however, quite so distinct as this categorisation might 
suggest. Even the most sophisticated packages require continued analytical input from 
the researcher (Bagnall, 2003; Crang, 1997). Moreover, the way in which specific 
packages are used may vary given the circumstances of individual projects. Rather than 
exploiting their full range of capabilities, theory-building packages may be used, as is 
the case here, for simpler tasks involving data coding and retrieval. 
A general case can be advanced for the use of CAQDAS in relation to the present 
project. Computer-based systems are well-adapted to handle a body of complex, but 
similar, data sets. They speed the process of undertaking multiple searches through the 
information. This should increase the efficiency of the process of coding the text and 
assigning tags to particular segments that is a vital stage in structuring the interview 
material. CAQDAS also facilitates rapid retrieval of specific sections of the data 
(Coffey et al, 1996; Fielding and Lee, 1991). These capabilities are extremely important 
in highlighting the themes present in climate scientists' discussion of their own practice 
and the wider context in which they operate. Against this must be set warnings that 
unthinking use of computer software stifles creativity and alienates researchers from 
their data (Barry, 1998; Buston, 1997; Marshall, 2001; Richard, 1997). An awareness of 
these potential dangers makes them easier to resist. In practice, as in the present case, 
the initial process of transcribing, correcting and coding the interview transcripts 
frequently guarantees the necessary closeness to the data to allow sensitive analysis. 
There is thus little reason to reject the speed and efficiency of computer-based analysis 
in favour of a slower and more laborious process of manual coding and retrieval. 
The decision to use CAQDAS led, in turn, to consideration of the particular package 
that would best meet the specific needs of the research and the circumstances of the 
researcher. Thinking was informed by five key considerations. Firstly, the package 
adopted had to be capable of drawing out specific information from the data to help 
provide answers to the research questions posed by the current thesis. Secondly, the 
software had to be capable of representing the breadth of material contained in the 
interviews, rather than offering only a selective view of the interviewees' perceptions 
and ideas. It was also important to feel confident that the package could help to identify 
the extent to which content and opinion was common to a number of different 
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interviews, as well as highlighting unusual or distinctive individual perspectives. 
Thirdly, it was important to reflect upon more practical issues regarding the ease of use 
of particular packages. This related to the fourth issue; the need for confidence that use 
of a specific package would truly prove a labour- and time-saving device. Finally, the 
limited budget available for the thesis raised issues about the cost of the chosen 
package. 
This mixture of practical and academic concerns militated in favour of a pragmatic 
solution. This involved the use of the NUDist (non-numerical, unstructured data, 
indexing, sorting and theorising) package, which was, at the time, employed elsewhere 
in the School of Geography at the University of Leeds. Hence, if problems arose with 
the application of the package help would be at hand. The experience of others 
facilitated a speedy introduction to the use of NUDist for the present researcher. There 
were also cost savings, as it was necessary only to purchase a licence to use the 
package, rather than investing in new software. 
NUDist has the capabilities required for data storage, coding, and retrieval, so assisting 
in the tasks of data control, data sorting into theme areas and hence efforts to reveal and 
explore relationships within the data (Gahan and Hannibal, 1998; Stanley and Temple, 
1995; Stroh, 2000). Indeed, as a programme designed to assist in the development of 
grounded theory NUDist has potential powers which are not fully harnessed in the 
present case (Charmaz et al, 2003; Kelle, 1997; MacMillan and McLachlan, 1999). 
Previous studies have, however, successfully demonstrated the use of NUDist in the 
more `limited' role proposed here, that is as a code and retrieve programme (for 
example, Mechanic and Meyer, 2000; Phyne, 1999; Speller, 2000; Yuksel, 2003). 
4.5.3 NUDist in Practice: The World of Coding, Searching and Retrieval 
Qualitative studies use coding to categorise data rather than to quantify it. Hence coding 
is described by Calloway and Knapp (1995, p. 3) `as a process of simultaneously 
reducing the data by dividing it into units of analysis and coding each unit'. Kelle 
(1997, p. 12) echoes this, claiming that coding is the first process in analysis through 
which `the analyst tries to make sense of the data'. Ultimately, coding is designed to 
bring a degree of order and organisation to the analytical process and to the text under 
interrogation. NUDist uses `an elaborate - and largely prescribed - coding strategy' 
(Stroh, 2000, p. 246) based on the development of a system of thematically-defined 
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`nodes' which form the primary structure for data organisation. Nodes may be identified 
through the initial interrogation of the data in relation to key research questions, or 
derive, as is chiefly the case here, from prior theoretical insights (Tesch, 1990). 
Critically, also, NUDist allows the researcher to allocate any specific text unit to many 
different nodes, thus building up an overview of the potentially complex 
interrelationships between different themes. 
The system of nodes employed in the present study is outlined on Figure 4.4. As the 
figure shows these nodes formed two distinct groups. The first - dubbed `base data' - 
are designed to assign text in relation to the personal characteristics of the interviewee. 
The distinctions drawn reflect the considerations outlined earlier in discussion of the 
choice of interviewees (Section 4.3). Given the efforts that have been made to include 
interviewees from both the UK and USA, both climate sceptics and protagonists, both 
scientists themselves and social commentators, and those differing in career stage, 
institutional affiliation and media experience, it is important that in the subsequent 
analysis specific information and opinion can be linked back to individuals with 
particular personal characteristics. Figure 4.4 also shows the way in which the 
organisation of data within particular nodes can be facilitated by the development of a 
series of sub-nodes, thus forming a hierarchical `tree construction'. In several instances 
the choice of sub-nodes reflects the basic polarities inherent in the initial decision- 
making about the identification of interviewees. Nationality, for example, is adequately 
represented as a two-fold division into US and UK interviewees. Similarly, the tree 
structure repeats the simple distinction made earlier between protagonists and sceptics 
with regard to position on climate change. Other nodes required decisions to be made 
about how the range of interviewees could best be represented, without developing an 
overly complex system of sub-categories. Thus interviewees were, for example, 
allocated to a series of age groupings and their working environment defined by 
institutional type. 
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Fig. 4.4: Nudist Tree Construction 
1. Base data 
2. Themes 
1. Gender 
1. male 
2. Female 
2. Nationality 
1. US 
2. UK 
3. Age 
4. Career 
1.20s 
2.30s 
3.40s 
4.50s 
1. Scientist 
2. Social scientist 
5. Leaning 
1. Contrarian 
2. Protagonist 
6. Career stage 
1. Dr 
2. Prof 
3. BSc / MSc 
7. Media experience 
1. A lot 
2. Some 
3. Little/none 
8. Work context 
1. university 
2. Government 
3. Business 
4. NGO 
5. Other 
1. IPCC 
1. Involved with 
2. Peer review 
3. Positive comments 
4. Negative comments 
2. Government and legislation 
1. UK government 
2. US government 
3. Climate legislation and Kyoto 
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Fig. 4.4: Nudist Tree Construction (continued) 
3. Business 
1. Fossil fuel companies 
2. Utility companies 
3. Insurance industry 
4. Restratigising 
5. Business and funding 
4. Funding 
1. Personal funding 
2. State of funding 
3. Personal income 
5. Role of science and scientists 
1. Idealisation 
2. Social context involved 
3. Policy involvement 
4. Perception of scientists 
6. Environmental topics 
1. Global warming 
2. Ozone depletion 
3. Other 
7. Peer review 
8. Individuals 
9. Agencies 
1. Negative comments 
2. Positive comments 
3. Proposals 
4. Publishing 
1. Sceptics 
2. Protagonists 
1. Hedley Centre/Met Office 
2. NGOs 
1. Pro-environmental NGOs 
2. Anti-environmental NGOs 
10. Media 
102 
Chapter Four: Methodology 
The nodes representing interviewees' characteristics cross-cut with a second series 
designed to reflect the main themes of the research. The initial identification of these 
nodes primarily reflects ideas and insights derived from the theoretical perspectives 
discussed in Chapter Three, together with issues raised in previous explorations of the 
context in which climate science is produced (for example, Beder, 2002; Boehmer- 
Christiansen, 1997; Gelbspan, 1998). The choice of nodes was, however, confirmed 
through a careful first reading of the complete body of interview transcripts. This 
engagement with the interview material itself also played an important part in the 
identification of sub-nodes. Indeed, in some instances, the process led to the inclusion 
of sub-nodes that had not been previously anticipated. Earlier thinking had not, for 
example, explicitly raised the issue of the potential for personal financial gain - as 
opposed to additional research funding - for individual scientists as a result of adopting 
a particular stance on climate change. This was, however, raised by several interviewees 
and the decision was thus taken that it warranted inclusion as a separately specified 
dimension of the thesis' key concern with financial aspects of the relationship between 
science and society. The analysis thus benefited from the flexibility afforded by NUDist 
to extend the system of nodes and sub-nodes. 
Discussion in Chapter Three began by identifying different theoretical perspectives on 
the relationship between science and society. It was noted that although the idealisation 
of science as a separate realm is unsustainable in practice it remains potentially 
important as an apparent justification for the privileged status often claimed for science. 
Moreover, the idea that science represents a world apart is still inherent in much 
scientific training. It is important, therefore, to understand how interviewees regard the 
position of science in general, and their own status in particular, especially in relation to 
subsequent discussion of the ways in which science may be compromised by links with 
key commercial and political actors. The role of science and scientists was thus 
identified as a node (Node 5 on Fig. 4.4). It was further subdivided to focus attention on 
the specific issue of the idealisation of science as separate and disinterested, as against 
evidence of the ways in which scientific practice was influenced by external actors 
and/or a desire on the part of scientists to participate in the process of informing and 
making commercial or political policy. To complement this attention to wide-ranging 
discussion of scientific practice a further more specific node (Node 8) was established 
to bring together comments regarding the different scientific perspectives on climate 
change and the individual researchers advancing them. 
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From this starting point discussion, both in the present thesis and in previous analysis, 
has focused particularly upon finance as a fundamental link connecting science to other 
societal forces. Chapter Three reflected in some detail on the theoretical logic for 
external sponsorship of particular types of science. In rejecting a determinist link 
between a unitary sub-structure and scientific activity in favour of a more complex neo- 
Marxist understanding, discussion in Chapter Three raised a series of questions for 
empirical investigation. These could not all be encompassed under a single node. One 
series of questions revolve specifically around funding itself, leading to the 
identification of a node with this title (Node 4). This was employed to bring together 
ideas and opinions about the availability of funding from particular sources, scientists' 
perceptions of the pressures - both personal and institutional - to obtain funding, and, 
as noted above, any links between funding, research and personal financial gain. Two 
further, related nodes focus on the two main agencies identified as external influences 
upon, and sponsors of, science: Government (Node 2) and Business (Node 3). These 
nodes allowed attention to funding to be cross-referenced with wider discussion of the 
characteristics of government and business, their attitudes towards climate change, and 
their aims and agenda in advancing (or withholding) funding to specific sectors of 
climate science research. The recognition - which is both theoretical and empirical - 
that neither business nor government necessarily represents a single unitary interest is 
reflected in the creation of a series of sub-nodes. In the case of government the primary 
distinction to be drawn reflects the different stance of administrations in the UK and the 
USA. A further sub-node was also introduced that reflects the growing role of 
international diplomacy in the discussion of political responses to climate change. With 
regard to business, several of the sub-nodes reflect evidence of difference between 
particular sectors, such as energy providers and the insurance industry, in their attitudes 
towards climate science. Additional sub-nodes derive from previous attempts to 
categorise the behaviour of business in general with respect to environmental 
challenges. This recognises that sponsorship of science is only one option. Business 
may attempt to change its own behaviour - or at least give the illusion of change - in 
ways that affect their attitudes to the underlying environmental science. The potential 
role of other agencies, less as a source of substantial research funding, but rather as an 
influence upon the ways in which climate change is understood and discussed is 
recognised in Node 9. 
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Previous characterisation of the position of scientists themselves has rejected the 
assumption that recognition of their financial dependency on external actors necessarily 
implies the total loss of independence or status. This, too, requires further investigation, 
focusing on the potential foundations of scientific expertise and influence. The most 
significant institutional embodiment of scientific expertise with respect to climate 
change is the IPCC, which is arguably so important as to merit a node in its own right 
(Node 1). This decision also reflected the controversy which the IPCC's work has 
sometimes attracted given its strong links with political policy-making at both a national 
and an international level. The IPCC nodes is thus subdivided in ways that define 
interviewees' levels of involvement with the panel's operations, but also the divisions of 
opinion about the rigor of its science and the extent to which its work acknowledges the 
full range of scientific opinion. 
Beyond the work of the IPCC, however, scientists themselves make a potentially vital 
series of decisions about the allocation of research funding and the dissemination of 
research findings. These have an impact on both external perceptions of scientific 
expertise and the profile of specific scientific perspectives on climate change. These 
considerations are brought together in Node 7 `Peer Review'. This encompasses 
interviewees' thoughts about the influence of their peers as it relates, firstly, to 
consultation and review concerning research priorities and the allocation of funding, 
and, secondly, to publication in academic journals. The node is structured so that 
suggestions that both these processes operate in ways that discriminate against 
particular strands of opinion regarding climate change can be cross-referenced with 
wider perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of the peer review system. This node 
is also intended to bring together observations about the location of authority within the 
academic realm and the extent to which it is held chiefly by a small elite of senior 
scientists. 
It is also important to recognise the potential importance of the media (Node 10) as an 
alternative means of information dissemination; one that might be used particularly by 
interests and individuals aiming to influence public and political perceptions of climate 
change, or by those disenchanted with the process of peer review (see section 4.3.1). 
The dissemination of scientific results and opinion through the general media can 
reinforce the image of the scientist as expert. Yet there is an accompanying risk that 
scientific work is misrepresented in the media, contributing to a loss of public faith in 
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scientists' powers to explain relationships between human and environmental systems. 
The node, therefore, pulls together material about interviewees' attitudes towards the 
media, their differing degrees of involvement, and the motives that prompt some to 
develop a high media profile. 
4.5.4 Coding and Retrieving Data 
The process of assigning the text to relevant nodes has three main stages (Buston, 
1997). The first is the introduction of the complete data transcript into NUDist. This is 
followed by a stage of interrogation through which text units - typically a sentence or a 
paragraph - were assigned to appropriate nodes and sub-nodes. The final stage is that of 
the retrieval of data in an organised form for the research task in hand. 
As NUDist is a sophisticated software package many different search options are 
available. For this study, however, greatest use was made of the (string) text search 
option. This not only allows the efficient retrieval of text relating to specific nodes and 
sub-nodes, but also the rapid execution of a series of cross-referencing exercises. Hence, 
for example, it was easy to see whether climate scientists' differing positions as 
protagonists or sceptics regarding global warming influenced their perceptions of their 
peers, funding sources and specific means of information dissemination. Other base data 
nodes were also independently searched against key thematic nodes such as funding. 
This method of retrieval resulted in the collation of sections of different transcripts 
linked by particular themes as an initial structure for the presentation of the empirical 
material in Chapters Five and Six. NUDist rapidly retrieved the relevant data, formatted 
the text and provided reference information to identify the interviews from which the 
linked text units had been drawn. NUDist also allows the researcher to save the 
combinations of text units brought together by a specific search, providing a concrete 
resource for textual analysis. 
4.5.5 Reflecting on the Tree Structure 
The tree structured discussed above is not, of course, the only one that could have been 
developed to facilitate the current research. Greater refinement might have been 
introduced into the textual analysis by the inclusion of additional nodes, or the greater 
use of sub-nodes. This potential must, however, be set against the risk of creating an 
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analytical framework that is so complex as to be self-defeating. As Richards and 
Richards (1997) note there is little virtue in generating an information overload that 
merely obscures understanding of key links and relationships. A conscious decision was 
made, therefore, to limit the number of themes that would be identified as nodes in their 
own right. 
It was also the case that some key themes were difficult to contain within a single node. 
`Influence', for example, is an important notion that runs through much of the present 
discussion of climate science. Yet precisely because of this, influence proved difficult to 
categorise and accommodate within a specific node of a tree structure. Instead the theme 
of influence seems best to be captured through consideration of the ways in which its 
various dimensions are represented in other nodes, particularly business, government, 
funding, the role of science and scientists. 
Although the structure represented in Figure 4.4 proved a robust framework for 
analysis, hindsight suggests ways in which it could have been improved. Some of the 
distinctions drawn in the identification of sub-nodes, in particular, seem overly 
subjective. This is true, for example, of the simple divisions adopted in categorising 
interviewees' media experiences which were vague and based on personal judgements, 
rather than any specific measure of activity. The two-fold division of interviewees into 
climate sceptics and climate protagonists - noted earlier as an over-simplification - also 
caused some problems. While some interviewees readily identified themselves with one 
of these two positions, others did not want to be seen to be labelled in this way. Their 
allocation by the researcher on the basis of the interviewees' published work, as well as 
the attitudes revealed during the interview, thus introduces a note of tension. 
4.6 Elaborating on the Practice of Data Collection and Organisation 
This chapter has set out the thinking - both theoretical and practical - which informs the 
methods adopted in the empirical core of the thesis. It appears that answers to many of 
the key questions previously posed about the practice of climate science are best 
addressed through direct engagement with the ideas, opinions and understanding of 
actors directly involved in scientific research. It follows that semi-structured interviews 
with scientists themselves, and with a smaller number of informed social commentators, 
will be central to the research. Although this form of qualitative research necessarily 
raises questions about the number and representativeness of the individuals identified as 
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interviewees and about the credibility of the accounts put forward, no other method 
seems likely to offer a better or closer insight into the world of climate research and the 
perceptions of its practitioners. 
It is, moreover, possible to address some of the problems raised by interview-based 
research by care in its execution. This is reflected here in the efforts made to identify the 
range of different types of interviewee who should be included in any sample; in the use 
of a semi-structured interview schedule to give the best combination of flexibility and 
consistency in the conduct and content of individual interviews; in the pilot testing of 
the interview schedule; in the adoption of good practice regarding anonymity and the 
ethical treatment of interviewees; and in the systematic analysis of the interview 
material using a consistent framework of themes deriving from the theoretical 
foundations of the project. Furthermore, the interviews are embedded within a wider 
process of data collection and analysis, involving the extraction of information from 
sources including secondary studies, media material, web sites and official publications. 
These alternative sources not only add to the richness of the information available, they 
also strengthen the interrogation of the interview results. 
As noted at the outset of this chapter, the present research draws upon a range of 
secondary material, elements of which were employed both as sources of information in 
their own right and in establishing a context for reflection upon the interview data. 
Recent academic publications by interviewees and their peers in key journals, including 
Nature and Science, provided insight into the content of the unfolding academic debate, 
but also served as a means to test some of the assertions made by interviewees about the 
extent to which the full range of scientific opinion is represented in the published 
academic literature. Exploration of alternative means of information dissemination, 
particularly the burgeoning opportunities for electronic publication of research and 
opinion pieces, allowed further judgements to be made about the extent to which more 
contentious views are able to find an outlet. It would have been interesting, but very 
difficult in practice, to have made some assessment of the relative impact of different 
means of publishing scientific research and opinion, in terms of the size and 
composition of their audiences and the reliability imputed to different media by their 
readers. 
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Secondary sources were also employed as a source of official information about the 
activities of major state funding agencies in the UK and USA. Material published by 
research councils and related bodies was vital in defining the public face of such 
organisations. In particular, attention was paid to published statements of the scientific 
themes or subject areas identified by agencies as research priorities, and to the record of 
projects recently funded by specific agencies. Such information provided an invaluable 
counterpoint to the accounts given by interviewees of their experiences of seeking 
research funding from these same agencies and the assertions made that funding was 
disproportionately directed towards particular types of research, or those with more 
`conformist' views on climate change. 
A similar combination of conventional publications and web-based material was also 
employed as a means of exploring the perspectives on climate change and climate 
research advanced by selected NGOs. Specific organisations were identified which 
could be taken to represent different strata of opinion, ranging from NGOs with a 
primary interest in environmental protection, such as Friends of the Earth and 
Greenpeace, to those with a mission to combat restrictions on the capitalist free market, 
such as the Institute of Economic Affairs and the George C Marshall Institute. The 
activities of such organisations are important in their own right, in relation to the 
dissemination of particular scientific opinions and, to a lesser extent, their sponsorship 
of scientific research. Information about these NGOs also served a wider purpose in 
relation to the overall research design by again providing an alternative record of debate 
concerning climate change, which could be set against the accounts offered by 
interviewees. 
The existence of material produced by organisations such as Greenpeace or the Marshall 
Institute which publicly proclaim a particular agenda regarding the relationship between 
economic development and environmental protection highlights the need to treat with 
caution the opinions and assertions of all parties in the climate change debate. 
Exploration of web-sites and other publications allowed some assessment to be made of 
the extent to which scientific research - and the expert status of individual researchers - 
is used in practice in an attempt to validate particular points of view. 
Use made of interview data in the subsequent chapters was also informed by secondary 
information compiled about the academic history of individual interviewees. This 
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included particular attention to their record of publication on climate change and any 
recorded public statements about issues relevant to climate change per se, climate 
research, the regulatory role of government and the environmental responsibilities of 
business. In the case of individuals with a high public profile attention was also paid to 
expressions of opinion about them found in other sources, including the print and 
broadcast media. In some instances the impression gained in this way of the stance of 
particular individuals on climate change research appeared at odds with the evidence of 
the interview itself. This reinforced the need for careful examination of the interview 
transcripts against a range of other sources. 
The use of NUDist as a device for organising information derived from the full range of 
interviews also facilitated comparison of the accounts of particular issues offered by 
individual interviewees. Consistency in the accounts offered by individuals increases 
confidence in their underlying accuracy. However, there were also instances where 
comparison identified revealing discrepancies in opinion or experience. For example, 
most climate sceptics indicated some measure of frustration at the lack of official 
funding for research which questioned majority scientific opinion about the causes of 
climate change. Exceptionally, however, one of the most prominent sceptics professed 
to have experienced no such problems in obtaining funding. This suggests the need for 
further reflection on the extent to which individual reputation and media profile plays a 
part in the distribution of research funding. 
Overall, the process of triangulation was successful in highlighting some contradictions 
in the accounts of individual interviewees that would not otherwise have been apparent. 
It also allowed a distinction to be drawn between those views that were peculiar to 
individuals and those that were more widely shared by the interviewees as a whole, or 
within specific sub-sets amongst them. Where such diversity became apparent it also 
prompted further reflection regarding the extent to which it could be explained by 
known differences in the interviewees' scientific views, national and institutional 
context, career stage and external interests. In practice, however, this process of 
comparison could only be partial. For example, for reasons discussed earlier it was not 
possible to identify and contact a cross-section of UK scientists whose declared stance 
on climate change fully matched the range of opinions evident in the USA. In particular, 
the limited number of self-declared climate sceptics in the UK made it difficult to 
undertake direct trans-Atlantic comparison of some strands of opinion. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
The process of interviewing individual scientists - especially those with a high 
academic and public profile - was daunting, especially in its early stages. A minority 
expressed their opinions very forcefully and were confrontational in rejecting any 
alternative viewpoint raised during the course of the interview. In such circumstances it 
was particularly difficult to explore more sensitive issues about access to funding and 
the judgements made through systems of peer review. Given more time and greater 
resources it would have been beneficial to have recruited a larger number of scientists as 
interviewees. It would also have been interesting to have been able to undertake shorter 
follow-up meetings with some of my initial interviewees, asking them to reflect on 
issues raised by others during the course of the programme of interviews. 
For the most part, however, it is gratifying to record the interest shown in this research 
by the scientists contacted and their willingness to grant me time within their busy 
academic schedules. The use of semi-structured interviews was generally successful in 
defining a common agenda for all discussions with individual scientists and 
commentators. An initial stage of pilot testing helped to ensure that the questions posed 
were logically organised and readily comprehensible for interviewees. At the other end 
of the process the use of NUDist as a means of data organisation allowed me to bring 
together different perspective on key research themes, identifying the degree to which 
common ground existed between interviewees. The same process also served to 
highlight discrepancies within specific interviews, and between the accounts offered by 
particular individuals and their peers, or between interviewees and other secondary 
sources. This ability to translate the generality of interview material into specific issues 
for exploration and explanation is vital to the success of the account that follows. 
The structure of the following empirical analysis takes us back to the themes of research 
funding and dissemination identified at the start of the present chapter. Attention in 
Chapter Five focuses on scientific funding and the relationships created with external 
sponsors. This is followed in Chapter Six by discussion of the dissemination of the 
results of scientific research, potential differentials in the experience of climate 
protagonists and sceptics, and potential links between claims of scientific legitimacy 
and expertise. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Funding Climate Scientists 
5.1 Introduction 
The involvement of social, economic and political forces in the funding of climate 
science in economically liberal societies requires analysis because of its potential 
influence upon the practice of scientists. When an explicit relationship exists between 
the scientist and funder, scientific integrity can come into question. By interviewing 
climate scientists, it is possible to gain insight into how those involved in the climate 
change arena see their relationships with the external funding context. 
As noted in Chapter Three, scientific research as a whole is reliant on support from the 
economic substructure. As a result, government and academic scientists apply for, and 
obtain, money from institutions such as research councils, government departments, 
businesses and NGOs. These agencies fund science for its societal, academic and 
commercial value. Chapter Three, section 3.2.2, highlighted a [two-way] symbiotic 
relationship between scientists who carry out the research and the institutions that 
provide the funding. The former seek financial stability for their research, prestige and 
potential career advancement. They also gain a sense of academic achievement from 
increasing knowledge. The latter exploit the opportunity to purchase `useful 
knowledge'. Building on this theoretical statement of the relationship, this chapter will 
analyse the links between scientists on the one hand, and their funders on the other. 
Initially, this chapter will provide a contextual background for climate funding in the 
UK and US. This will be bounded within an institutional framework, focusing on 
governmental and academic institutions as the two principal contexts within which 
climate scientists undertake research. This will be set against the perceptions of 
individual climate scientists to explore the ways in which both contrarians and 
protagonists discuss the availability of funding. 
The chapter begins by outlining the institutional framework of the UK and US funding 
system, highlighting the procedures through which grants are obtained. It goes on to 
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explore the funding sources available for climate research in the UK and US and the 
relative size of the available budgets. Such empirical material concerning the funding 
system is an important starting point for greater understanding of the modem practice of 
climate science. It also provides firm evidence against which to compare the more 
impressionistic interview material, as well as providing an evaluation of the 
commitment by the UK and US to climate research. Although it is not, of course, a 
measure of their determination to reduce greenhouse gases. 
Section 5.4 considers the extent to which climate scientists are independent from the 
economic substructure of society, and therefore how influential they are within the 
climate debate. It therefore provides an insight into the pressures upon scientists to gain 
funding to undertake research. This section then investigates the effects that dependence 
on funding has upon the manoeuvres of climate scientists, reflecting on the extent to 
which objectivity is compromised to carry out research. This section, therefore, explores 
the perceptions of the scientific community about the objectivity and integrity of climate 
scientists' work. 
This discussion will be set against previous work by Paterson (1996a) and Hart and 
Victor (1993), who suggest that political decision-making on climate change is 
influenced more by a minority of high-profile, well-connected, expert climate scientists 
than by the generality of bench scientists (see Chapter Two, section 2.5.1). It will also 
reflect upon the arguments of Boehmer-Christiansen (1994a, 1994b, 1995,1997), who 
claims that IPCC protagonist scientists have altered their practice for specific gains, and 
in contrast, Beder (1997,1999), Rowell (1996) and Gelbspan (1998) who argue that 
sceptics' research is biased in being influenced by their funders - corporations that have 
vested interests in debunking anthropogenic climate change. 
5.2 Contextualising Research Funding 
Researchers are all dependent, albeit to differing extents, on financial support to fund 
their studies. Funding is required so that new knowledge and understandings can be 
generated within a field, helping the subject to stay at the forefront of research. Funding 
is more important in some disciplines than in others, with scientific projects habitually 
demanding more resources than research in the social sciences, arts and humanities. The 
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tradition of individual scholarship in arts and humanities accounts for some of the 
differences, which also reflect the dependence of science upon (often expensive) 
equipment, laboratory use and fieldwork (Higher Education National Report, 2001). For 
example, high specification computers are expensive yet essential tools for climate 
modelling (Shackley et al, 1998). Certain types of scientific research, such as 
pharmaceutical and biotechnological science, consistently attract significant funding in 
western societies primarily because of their potential to improve corporate profitability 
by generating commercially relevant knowledge (see Chapter Three). 
Funding for research in developed societies can be obtained from various authorities, 
including business, government, charities, research councils and NGOs. The grants 
which are awarded by these bodies determine `who can and cannot carry forward a 
research programme' (Spier, 2002, p. 103). However, their procedures and rationales for 
funding research are different. Commercially-funded research is likely to be more 
focused on particular short-term commercial goals, and innovative research, such as 
creating new products and solving specific technological and managerial problems 
(Ashford, 1983). By contrast, state funding often has broader objectives relating to 
policy formation and review, as well as longer-term societal, economic and 
environmental concerns. Thus, it appears that research which regularly obtains grants 
reflects and reinforces Western ideals and values. Although grants may derive from 
similar authorities within countries such as the UK and US, the institutions are not 
necessarily identical in their practice (see section 5.3.3). 
Since the 1980s, UK and US government funding has become more explicitly focused 
upon applied knowledge, with valuable knowledge being considered as that which is 
commercially and politically useful (Daly and Wakeford, 2002; Tudge, 2002). Industrial 
funding of research has also increased, although it is by no means a new phenomena 
(Ashford, 1983). As a result, only certain types of research are `bought' (funded), 
suggesting certain commercial and political expectations about its use and outcome. 
Boehmer-Christiansen notes that in the contemporary context `research is given 
objectives and targets' making it far more accountable to the sponsoring body 
(Boehmer-Christiansen, forthcoming, p. 10). In the UK the declared aim of the funding 
council with particular interests in environmental change and climate science - the 
Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) - is `to put NERC science to work' 
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(NERC, 2001). It is evident that the bulk of NERC's total funding is devoted to research 
which is claimed to have direct societal and political value. NERC distributes its funds 
according to strategic objectives which stress the importance of applicable science. 
Thus, `strategic themes' shape research agendas and direct funding to priority areas. 
NERC funding is divided into four categories according to strategic themes: non- 
thematic funding, thematic funding, core strategic funding and infrastructure funding. 
With the exception of non-thematic funding (basic science), research within these 
categories is designed to have the potential for both theoretical and applied work, the 
argument being that research is all the stronger for this approach. NERC's 1999-2000 
report highlights a large difference in funding between non-thematic and thematic 
strategic research, with 77% of their budget designated to thematic or strategic priorities 
(NERC, 2001). 
Other British research councils also emphasise the importance of social relevance. The 
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) now claim that 
`research committees will focus more tightly on the strategic relevance of grant 
applications' (see BBSRC, 2000, p. 4). A similar stress on strategic research is also 
evident in the US where 80% of all research funding is directly related to such 
knowledge. By comparison, the National Science Foundation (NSF), set up explicitly to 
fund basic science, receives only 20% of all federal support for academic institutions 
(NSF, 2001). It is also the case that within the EU proposals are assessed according to 
their political value: `policy relevance plays a major role in the evaluation process' 
(IGFA, 2000, p. 15). This suggests that societal value is accorded to the advancement of 
knowledge, both pure and applied. Moreover, research which could potentially have 
direct societal and commercial value is perceived by economically liberal societies to be 
more valuable, as it could contribute to the advancement of economic growth. 
It follows that particular research disciplines, and types of research within disciplines, 
obtain more funding because of their direct social or policy relevance. Whether research 
is basic or applied, therefore, significantly affects the amount of funding obtained, as 
well as the funding source (Higher Education National Report, 2001). In practice, 
however, the division between basic and applied science in modern western societies is 
not necessarily so easily defined. Applied knowledge originates from basic scientific 
principles. For instance, climate system research requires fairly basic work on one level, 
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which is later connected to applied science. Applied knowledge may also lead to basic 
science if the former produces previously unknown knowledge. It is, therefore, the case 
that there is often a strong connection between basic and applied science. As a result, it 
is perhaps more accurate to describe basic science as quasi-basic. 
5.3 The System: Money, Dependence and Pressure 
5.3.1 Outlining the System: Procedures to Obtain Funds in the UK and US 
The procedures to obtain state funding for generic scientific research in the UK and US 
involve three principal bodies: the government, research councils, and scientists. Closed 
tendering does not occur in academic research. Although the exact procedures differ 
between countries, the overall process is quite similar and can be divided into four 
principal stages: 
  Stage one: the state sees value in promoting research. Research Councils' overall 
objectives are to promote research and to take responsibility for distribution of state 
funding. As a result, there is a need for a regular dialogue between governments and 
research councils to define general priorities for research and the scale of available 
funding, which will determine the total annual grant to a research council. This is 
the main context for government involvement (refer to stage one, Fig. 5.1). 
  Stage two: research councils themselves are engaged in a process of justifying their 
continued existence. This means making sure that the value of previous research 
council funded work is as widely appreciated as possible. It also involves showing 
that they have some sense of strategic direction for the future, which is exemplified 
by the creation of thematic or strategic priorities. These are areas identified in 
general terms as foci for funding over a five to ten year period. The definition of 
these thematic priorities will reflect consultations with the government and analysis 
of policy priorities. At the same time, consultations will occur with the scientific 
community to identify themes and to elaborate on the areas of research they might 
stimulate (see stage two, Fig. 5.1). 
116 
Chapter Five: Funding climate scientists 
  Stage three: this leads to the definition of research programmes as a way of 
guaranteeing the research priorities. Again, there is academic consultation to define 
the form and content of the programme and the amount of funding available. Calls 
are issued for specific research proposals that will be undertaken under the auspices 
of the programme (see stage three, Fig. 5.1). 
However, research is also undertaken outside such specific programmes. The latter 
only account for a small proportion of the funded research. In many instances 
individual researchers are asked to respond to the research priorities directly; to 
show how their own particular projects relate to overall research council goals. 
  Stage four: By the stage of specific proposals the refereeing process starts to become 
more refined. Individual proposals are reviewed by designated experts in the 
relevant field. Their recommendations about whether a proposal should be funded or 
not are fed back to the research council's own committee which make the final 
decision (see stage four, Fig. 5.1). Usually there are far more good projects than 
there is money available to fund, meaning that competition for scarce resources is 
intense (Chubin, 2002). 
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Thus, the state funding of scientific research is a process that relies heavily on the 
knowledge of the broader academic community, those scientists who review and shape 
the research themes and research programmes, and who review the individual research 
proposals that follow. This implies technocratic control of the funding system by 
scientists. However, other influences, such as governments, are also present in this 
decision making process. The type of research to be funded is not solely informed by 
scientists as suggested, but also by business and other actors. Hence the emphasis 
placed on identifying the non-academic `users' of specific research at the proposal 
stage, which is intended to ensure that research meets the needs of a wider audience 
(refer to Fig. 3.1, Chapter Three). 
Many of these other actors, particularly business, themselves directly fund research, and 
invite researchers to work for them. In some instances this involves a process of closed 
tendering, where there is no open competition. This could be perceived as an alternative 
to state grants and, perhaps, a more straightforward route for established researchers to 
obtain funding. However, money derived from commercial sources potentially has 
indistinguishable from those of the corporations funding them. While claiming 
scientific detachment they are, in reality, no more than obedient employees of 
industry, which is governed not by an unbiased assessment of human need but by 
the hope of making money (Monbiot, 1995, p. 1). 
To understand how the funding systems operate in the UK and US requires an 
examination of the grant awarding bodies, who they are, how they function and how 
much they contribute to climate related research. Such information may go some way to 
explain the interviewees' perceptions (see below) regarding the practice of fellow 
climate scientists. For example, if climate scientists have become entrepreneurial, then it 
should follow that more funds would be available for climate research, as they have 
been successful in influencing funding resources. 
5.3.2 Funding Sources for Climate Research in the UK and US 
This section will identify the state agencies that fund climate studies in the UK and US. 
Comparisons will be drawn between the different amounts spent by the two countries. 
Reference will also be made to the funding allocated by the European Union (EU), 
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which potentially complements the funds budgeted for climate work by the UK 
government. 
Among the available funding sources, UK and US climate scientists also receive grants 
from the WMO, through the UNEP. The IPCC, however, does not directly fund climate 
research. Research shows that industry support climate research in both the UK and US 
(Leggett, 1999, Beder 1997,1999, Rowell, 1996). Contributions to the research funding 
of individual climate sceptics are recorded by Beder (1997 and 1999) - amongst others. 
However, summary figures outlining the total value of corporate sponsorship in this 
field have proved difficult to find. 
UK Climate Funding 
Climate scientists can obtain money from the various British government funded 
research councils, such as NERC, BBSRC, the Medical Research Council (MRC) and 
the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC). It is also possible to 
gain funds from the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). 
DEFRA also funds the UK Meteorological Office, in association with the Ministry of 
Defence (MOD). 
The UK government committed £200 million ($330m) over a three year period from 
1997-1998 to 1999-2000 to climate change related activities through bilateral projects 
(DEFRA, 2001, p. 68) DEFRA (formerly the Department for Environment, Transport 
and the Regions - DETR) funds the majority of climate change research, specifically 
including climate research and observation in which it invests about £12 million per 
year (DEFRA, 2001, p. 74). Amongst the research councils it is NERC which spends the 
largest percentage on global change research. In the financial year 1999-2000 NERC 
spent 28% (£64m; $98m) of its total budget on `global change' science in support of 
significant programmes of research linked to climate change (NERC, 2001; DEFRA, 
2001). In contrast, the BBSRC spent only 19% of its funds on climate change research, 
a total of £1.5m ($2.5m) (IGFA, 2000). 
However, government data on NERC funding for climate change science is 
contradictory. Although it is evident that NERC commits the majority of its funds to 
climate change research, the exact amount spent is recorded differently in various 
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sources. Figures from the IGFA, noted in Table 5.1, suggest that in 1999 NERC spent 
£51.1m on global climate research, whereas NERC and DEFRA quote a figure of £64 
million during the same time period. While these figures may only be estimates, it is 
probable that the context for the calculations was slightly different. 
Table 5.1: Total Funding for UK Global Climate Change Research (GCR) in Fiscal 
Year 1999 
Agency 1999 Funding for GCR 
£ million US $ million 
NERC 51.1 84.3 
DOE 23.0 38.0 
BBSRC 1.5 2.5 
MAFF 1.7 2.8 
Total (rounded) 77.3 127.6 
NERC as % of this total 66% 
(Source: KiFA, 2000). 
New government initiatives exemplify the UK's commitment to dealing with climate 
change. For instance, the EPSRC has recently launched a £2m programme on the 
impacts of climate change (DEFRA, 2001, p. 75). Furthermore, three research councils, 
NERC, ESRC, EPSRC, have formed the Tyndall Centre to undertake interdisciplinary 
research on climate change (DEFRA, 2001, p. 74). This growing investment in climate 
research throughout the UK highlights the increasing importance accorded to the issue 
by the UK's political and scientific elite. However, the amount spent on climate 
research is minimal, when compared, for example, with spending on defence of $31.8bn 
(MOD UK, 1999). 
Although Table 5.1 provides a measure of the amount spent on global change research, 
the actual figure specifically devoted to anthropogenic climate change research is far 
smaller. However, an exact funding total for this latter field is impossible to find. This is 
because particular research councils will fund research that is directed more towards the 
implications of climate change, problem solving and preventative action. The EPSRC 
research is focused on more applied research, designed to be of direct societal and 
political relevance. For instance, it supports research related to adaptation to climate 
change and emission reduction, including sustainable energy. By contrast, the BBSRC 
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concentrates more on basic science, focusing on the impact of climate change on the 
function and behaviour of plants, animals and microbes, and soil processes (DEFRA, 
2001, p. 76). 
US Climate Funding 
In comparison to the UK, the amount spent on climate research in the US is much more 
substantial. The US spends approximately $1.6bn annually on climate change research 
(IGFA, 2000). As a result: `the United States is responsible for half of the world's 
annual climate change research expenditure, three times more than the next largest 
contributor ... spending more than 15 nations of the European Union and Japan 
combined' (USGCRP, 2002). Indeed, over the past decade, the US has invested nearly 
$18 billion in climate change research. However, compared to America's defence 
budget of $259.9bn, the amount spent on climate change research is small (MOD UK, 
1999). The trend of increased spending on generic climate science is set to continue. 
The President's Budget in fiscal year 2003 provides $4.5 billion for global climate 
change-related activities, a $700 million increase on the current annual funding 
commitment (White House, 2002). In addition, Table 5.2 highlights an increase in the 
US budget specifically for climate research of 8% ($59.7m) between 1999 and 2001. A 
further rise of 2% ($13.7m) is projected between the fiscal years of 2001 and 2002. 
However, the latter increase is in fact lower than the US annual rate of inflation, which 
was 2.80% in 2001 (World Information, 2002). Thus, this increase is not so impressive 
when put into context. On April 6 2001, the Senate passed a bill to `restore funding for 
programs related to global climate change to the funding level of $4.5 billion [per year] 
over 10 years, primarily for existing programs addressing global climate change 
concerns' (Justus and Fletcher, 2001). Yet `addressing global climate concerns' does 
not necessarily mean that all the money is spent on atmospheric climate change 
research. Indeed, the Issue Brief goes on to note that from this budget around one fifth 
of the money will be spent on tax credits for renewable energies. Therefore, such large 
amounts designated for climate research have a broader purpose which includes a 
degree of climate system work, but also research that is more directed towards the 
implications of climate change. For example, the Department of Energy is considered 
among the global climate change research funders in Table 5.2, although its priorities 
are applied and directed towards problem solving and preventative action related to 
climate change. Indeed, the 2002 Human Dimension programme aims to develop data 
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and methods for use in assessing the benefits and costs of enhancing terrestrial carbon 
sinks. It will also focus on assessing the influence of the invention and diffusion of new 
technologies on greenhouse gas emissions, and carbon sequestration research 
(USGCRP, 2002). 
Table. 5.2: Total Funding for US Global Climate Change Research in Fiscal Year 
1999 
Scientific Research Agency 1999 FUNDING FOR GCR (million $) 
Department of A 'culture 55 
Department of Commerce/National 
Oceanic Atmospheric Administration 
63 
Department of Ener 114 
Department of Health and Human 
Services /National Institute of Health 
40 
Department of the Interior / U. S. 
Geolo ical survey 
27 
Environmental Protection Agency 17 
National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration - science 
240 
National Science Foundation 182 
Smithsonian Institute 7 
TOTAL 745 
(Source: IGFA, 2000). 
Table. 5.3: U. S. Global Change Research Program: Fiscal year (FY) 2001 - FY 
2002 budget by research program element by agency (discretionary budget 
authority in $ millions) 
NOAA 
science 
NOAA 
Obs 
DOE EPA NIH NASA 
science* 
NSF SI US 
DA 
Total 
FY01 44.6 9.0 70.3 0.0 0.0 61.9 100.4 2.0 0.0 294.2 
FY02 44.8 16.3 70.8 0.0 0.0 61.9 92.4 2.0 0.0 292.7 
FY01 7.8 1.0 12.6 0.0 0.0 55.9 16.8 0.3 18.1 112.5 
FY02 7.8 1.0 12.6 0.0 0.0 54.1 16.9 0.3 18.0 110.7 
FY01 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 56.3 10.3 0.0 2.8 75.1 
FY02 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 56.6 12.7 0.0 2.8 77.8 
FY01 4.8 1.0 12.7 0.0 0.0 46.7 16.0 0.3 14.8 100.3 
FY02 4.8 4.2 13.7 0.0 0.0 47.2 21.5 0.3 14.8 109.5 
FY01 0.0 0.0 12.4 3.0 0.0 32.8 30.1 3.8 20.8 119.9 
FY02 
E 
0.0 0.0 12.4 2.0 0.0 33.2 30.1 3.8 20.6 116.6 
FY01 5.6 0.0 8.0 20.0 51.6 0.0 13.7 0.6 0.0 99.5 
FY02 5.6 2.5 8.0 20.0 57.0 0.0 13.7 0.6 0.0 107.4 
FY01 68.5 11.0 119.1* 23.0 51.6 253.6 187.3 7.0 56.5 804.7 
FY02 68.7 24.0 120.6* 22.0 57.0 252.9 187.3 7.0 56.2 818.4 
Source: USGCRP, 2002 
* DOE Totals include $3.1 million for Small Business Innovative research/Technology Transfer 
*NASA observations not included 
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Funding for climate research in the US is distributed and co-ordinated through the US 
Global Climate Research Program (USGCRP), which supports climate research through 
10 US federal agencies: National Science Foundation (NSF), Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Department 
Of Energy (DOE), Department of Commerce/National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), Department of Defence (DOD), Department of Agriculture 
(DOA), US Geological Survey (USGS), Smithsonian Institution (SI) and the National 
Institute of Health (NIH) (see Table 5.3) (USGCRP, 2002). 
As noted earlier, President Bush plans to increase investments in climate research by 
$700m in total over the next 10 years. If global climate research funding in the US 
continued to increase at an average of 5% per year (the mean of fiscal funding 2001 and 
2002), there would be a rise in the climate research budget of only $50m in total over 
the next 10 years. Thus, Bush's pledge raises this figure by 1400%. 
5.3.3 Trans-Atlantic Comparisons in Climate Change Funding 
The fiscal climate research budget is larger in the US compared to the UK. In the fiscal 
year 1999 the US spent 83% ($617.4m) more than the UK. However, additional funding 
for climate research in the UK is potentially available from the EU. The EU spent 
around 63m Euros ($61.9m) on global climate research in the year 2000. This rose to 
72m Euros ($70.7m) in 2001, and it is estimated to reach about 81m Euros ($79.6m) by 
the end of 2002 (IGFA, 2000). Ultimately, the limited scale of EU investment in climate 
science does little to close the trans-Atlantic gap in funding, highlighting the relative 
strength of the UK governments' commitment to global warming research. 
As noted earlier, funding systems in the UK and US are slightly different, even though 
both countries operate under economically liberal principles. This is perhaps most 
evident in the recognition that the US government spends more on preventative climate 
action, compared with the UK, which focuses more on climate research itself. Tables 
5.1,5.2 and 5.3 provide evidence of how much money is spent on the implications of 
climate change, such as preventative measures, rather than climate research per se. 
Seventy-six per cent of the 1999 government budget for US global climate research was 
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spent on applied thematic research, rather than basic science. Also, approximately 13% 
of the US 2002 budget will be spent specifically on the human dimensions of climate 
change, with each agency spending an additional amount on the subject. In the UK, 
however, roughly 66% of the 1999 budget for climate related research was spent on 
basic climate science (presuming that NERC carries out most basic climate research in 
the UK). This is a substantial contrast to the US, where only 24% of the federal budget 
is designated to basic climate work. The NSF, which undertakes the majority of basic 
climate work yet also undertakes non-basic work, does not operate independently from 
other councils. For instance, the DOE, in partnership with the NSF, is supporting an 
iron-fertilization experiment, a project that is focusing on mitigation through carbon 
sequestration (USGCRP, 2002, p. 53). This suggests that some of the NSF's own money 
goes to non-basic work. In fiscal year 1999, NASA spent 32% ($240m) of its budget on 
global climate research, the greatest proportion of the total budget for any individual 
agency. The Smithsonian Institute spent the smallest share - 0.9% ($7m) - of the US 
global climate research budget. 
Differences in the allocation of state funding are potentially reinforced by transatlantic 
differentials in the availability of support from commercial sources. Such funding is 
more available to climate research in the USA. In particular, Beder (1997; 1999) and 
Gelbspan (1998), Rowell (1996) have argued that fossil fuel companies are a significant 
funding source for US climate science, disproportionately encouraging the work of 
climate sceptics. However, the exact figures spent by corporate organisations are 
illusive. It is apparent that fossil fuel companies fund conservative think tanks which 
have a variety of agendas, including questioning mainstream opinions on climate 
change science. Although figures are available for the individual think tanks, none are 
obtainable for the amount spent on debunking global warming. The Heritage 
Foundation, for instance, has a budget of over $25 million per year, with the majority of 
its money coming from donations from corporations such as automobile manufacturers, 
coal, oil, chemical and tobacco companies (Beder, 1997). While a percentage of their 
funds would be directed to climate studies, it is evident from the broad scope of their 
donors that other issues are also addressed. It is therefore difficult to estimate a figure 
spent by industry on climate change. 
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Beyond these general comments about funding, further information about money 
distributions and the particular types of climate research that actually receives money, 
(for instance, the amount spent on climate modelling), is unavailable. Data detailing the 
overall amount spent on basic and applied research in both the UK and US are 
inaccessible. Thus, estimates can only be made about the extent to which each country 
is working towards preventative measures and actual climate research. 
5.4 Climate Science: Funding and Pressure 
5.4.1 Universal Pressure to get Funding 
Since the 1970s there has been a change in the academic research environment in both 
the UK and the US leading to growing stress on the importance of output (publication), 
accountability, productivity and funding (Tudge, 1999; Tudge, 2002). In the UK, for 
example, there has been a recent modification to national policy which places new 
responsibilities on universities to account for their spending of public money. Research 
Assessment Exercises (RAEs) have been introduced to evaluate all university 
departments according to their input and output. Publications in prestigious journals, 
coupled with substantial income, earn higher ratings in RAEs. The importance of RAE 
ratings adds to the existing pressure from institutions on academics to obtain funding to 
remain at the forefront of rapid developments within science; to purchase equipment; 
and to support the necessary research staff, thus contributing to the rating of the 
university (US interviewee C, 2000). Gaining funding `brings prestige to the university' 
(US interviewee D, 2000; US interviewee N, 2000). Consequently, there is universal 
pressure on scientists to obtain funding (UK interviewee J, 2000). Indeed, pressure to 
some extent, is self-imposed, as some academics try to secure funding for the research 
they themselves want to undertake. All interviewees recognised this pressure to get 
funding. However, there were some specific differences in how this was reported by 
particular respondents. 
Within universities there appears to be more emphasis on individual responsibility for 
obtaining funding, rather than the collective process of bidding for funding. This 
contrasts with a more combined approach to research and funding evident amongst 
government scientists or institutions such as the Met Office. (UK interviewee G, 2000; 
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UK interviewee H, 2000; UK interviewee J, 2000). The latter reflects an emphasis on 
teamwork, rather than individual research within such bodies. Teamwork reduces 
personal freedom in order to secure a collective goal. There may be less individual 
pressure to produce research because any single individual is less accountable for the 
overall output (product). Thus, the pressure for funding, usually seen within a university 
context, also applies to government agencies, but in a slightly different form. 
In the UK, tenured salaried scientists working within prestigious universities can apply 
for a wide range of research grants, including some which are inaccessible to scientists 
from less high-profile universities. Similarly, researchers working within high profile 
institutions such as the MIT in the US, were considered more likely to persuade grant 
awarding bodies of the prospective quality and value of their research. This was noted 
by a US social scientist interviewee whilst commentating on a particular scientist: 
I just very much doubt that he has any problem getting funding, he's at one of the 
wealthiest universities in the world and he's a professor... 
Thus, scientists working within high status institutions may be under different types of 
pressure than those scientists researching in less well-known universities. Indeed, 
wealthier universities impose greater expectations upon their researchers. This quote 
also suggests that those scientists who are established and have a reputation find it 
easier to win grants (US interviewee D, 2000; US interviewee N, 2000). Personal and 
institutional reputations assisted them in winning grants. Perhaps, too, individuals enjoy 
a greater personal sense of security. Having reached the pinnacle of their career the 
immediate pressure to prove themselves is reduced (US interviewee D, 2000). 
By comparison, younger researchers amongst the interviewees felt more vulnerable and 
under greater pressure to obtain funds than more established scientists. The competition 
among young researchers was explicitly noted by two UK protagonists. They stated that 
scientists were more dependent and felt pressured to obtain funds early on in their 
careers. Only in this way could they establish and prove themselves as good researchers 
within a reputable university and develop status within their research field (UK 
interviewee H, 2000: UK interviewee I, 2000). Without a concrete reputation and 
prestigious university backing it is harder to obtain money. Some grant awarding 
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bodies, such as the NERC, have recognised this as a problem and for over 15 years have 
budgeted funds specifically for young researchers who are just beginning their careers. 
The interviewees highlighted a potential US/UK contrast in terms of the contributions 
made by funding to individual projects. In the UK only non-tenured researchers use 
grants to provide for their salary and research. UK scientists with a tenured university 
post usually earn a fixed salary from the Higher Education Funding Council (HEFC). 
However, if the scientist does not have a permanent HEFC position then they have to 
include provision for salary funding in their research grant application; a position that 
can only heighten their sense of insecurity. In the US, however, research funding may 
contribute to meeting the salary costs for tenured professors. Here, research funding 
pays some scientists' personal wage during the summer vacation, a period of around 
three months a year (US interviewee A, 2000). As one US sceptic points out this 
imposes equivalent pressures on scientists of all shades of opinion in climate research: 
`sceptics are also dependent on funding in the US, not only for their professional 
research livelihoods, but also their personal income' (US interviewee N, 2000). The US 
participant expanded upon this point, explaining that: 
Most of us depend on research funding because it is some form of our salaries - 
two-elevenths - three twelfths of your salary, it is significant (US interviewee N, 
2000). 
Significantly, therefore, both protagonists and sceptics claim that funding is important 
to undertaking their work. A British protagonist highlighted how obtaining research 
grants becomes a major driving factor for good career prospects (UK interviewee J, 
2000). This attitude was detected in all interviewees regardless of their present status, 
position on global warming, or nationality. They all stressed that scientists' livelihoods - 
which incorporated issues of personal pay, career, reputation and status (academic 
profiles) - are directly reliant on the degree of funding they personally obtain. Their 
professional livelihoods were also related to the number of publications that they 
produce (see Chapter Six). As Spier notes, `performance of an academic is measured by 
successful and cited publications' (Spier, 2002, p. 102). With such pressure upon 
scientists to attain funds, directed by their institutions and created by them, to what 
extent have UK and US scientists adapted their practice to achieve funding? 
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5.4.2 Funding and the Research Agenda - the Experience of Individual Scientists 
As an ideal, science proclaims itself to be a universal quest for truths about the world 
(Sadar, 2000). This long-established model reflects an original conception that 
achieving comprehensive knowledge was possible for the individual scientist. Such 
understanding was supposedly accomplished, confirmed and extended through the 
means of objective observation, experimentation and analysis. It is still the case that 
scientific training advances the ideal of objectivity as the stamp of good scientific 
practice (see Chapter Three, section 3.2). A lengthy scientific education is ostensibly 
intended to produce individuals who are strongly committed to the values and norms of 
science. It is not surprising, therefore, that interviewees articulated this viewpoint and 
perceived themselves to be objective. One key statement of this was a profession of 
positivist faith in evidence and scientific truth: 
... scientists are only convinced 
by their scientific material and data (UK 
interviewee F, 2000). 
Hence, the sole priority for some UK and US scientists is to research. As Monbiot notes, 
`many researchers could be described as idiot savants, brilliant specialists, but neither 
trained or expected to see beyond what they are doing' (Monbiot, 1995, p. 2). 
The notion of the all-knowing individual scientist has been over-taken by our growing 
realisation of the sheer scale and complexity of scientific knowledge. Any one 
individual can, therefore, only aspire to understand a fraction of the total knowledge 
generated through scientific research. Modem science is, thus, structured by disciplines 
and sub-disciplinary specialisms (see for example, Chapter Four, section 4.3). 
Moreover, the ideal of science as a search for universal truth offers little guidance 
regarding the direction of scientific research, either by individuals, or at a societal level. 
Thus, an individual might construct a rationale to determine the future direction of 
research which incorporates the random pursuit of topics, or a strategy determined by 
personal interest. In practice, however, precedence tends to be established that reflect 
internal and intellectual debate within science, or the identification of issues that seem 
to be of wider societal relevance. The latter attempts to recognise and prioritise `useful 
knowledge', representing a departure from the scientific ideal. However, it could be 
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argued that an emphasis within science on the pursuit of useful knowledge is a 
necessary and a beneficial departure from the ideal of science, providing a focus and 
purpose to research and to justify the commitment of external funding to support 
science. 
Pragmatic acceptance of the reality of scientific research and funding amongst 
interviewees is, therefore, to be expected. Many acknowledged that competition for 
funding often had an influence upon the identification and framing of research topics. 
Yet this was not seen as a betrayal of the ideal of objectivity in science, as the conduct 
of the research and the production of results preserved the initial commitment to truth 
and objectivity. This distinction between the necessary compromises to obtain funding 
and to adhere to objectivity was highlighted by one UK interviewee: 
I think most scientists are aware that most things that are found can be used in 
several ways. It doesn't mean it affects the work scientists do, I mean, most of 
them in their actual work, I'm sure, are objective; i. e. they see something and say 
what it appears to mean (UK interviewee K, 2000). 
Moreover, academics routinely fine tune research proposals so they appear more 
relevant to funding bodies, even though their own individual research agenda may be 
slightly different. Interviewees unanimously agreed that funding prospects are improved 
through the inclusion of key, well-funded, themes within research proposals. A US 
interviewee claimed that this was a `common sense strategy ... you try to get 
funding 
for work that is likely to get funded' (US interviewee D, 2000). Another respondent 
considered such behaviour as a consequence of the institutional structure of modem 
science: `The way science is funded more and more forces them [scientists] to be like 
that, they have to compete for funding' (UK interviewee K, 2000). As a result, well- 
funded subjects, such as climate science, may attract proposals from opportunistic 
scientists: 
individual researchers try to get funding and realise that there is a lot of money in a 
particular field, [so they think] how can I tweak my research to help tap into that 
research fund. I think people do that all the time (US interviewee A, 2000). 
A British interviewee also provided an example: 
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I've been to meetings in Imperial College where scientists were doing some work 
on world sea temperatures and climate change, and someone said to him, "That's a 
very small change you're expecting there' and he said, 'Well yeah, it is actually very 
small change', and then he said, 'Just between these four walls, I don't believe it is a 
very important change, I'm more interested in doing research in ocean temperatures 
generally, but I'll take the money for global warming research because that's where 
the money is (UK interviewee K, 2000). 
Thus, scientists gain funding to investigate issues that personally interest them (but 
within allotted boundaries) and publish accordingly. Moreover, they are able to defend 
their actions in terms of scientific objectivity because their research results will be true 
to their experiments. Interviewees, therefore, rejected any suggestion that pressures to 
obtain funding had led them to compromise objectivity. Scientists, therefore, retain a 
degree of freedom and influence within the superstructure of society by framing their 
own research and shaping the direction of their work. Thus, scientific research is not 
totally determined by the economic substructure. Although society may shape research 
agendas, there is often sufficient flexibility for scientists to pursue their own interests 
Judge, 1999, p. 53). 
5.4.3 Collective Attempts: Maximising Funding for Climate Science 
Individual strategies to gain funds exhibit a degree of commonality amongst scientists at 
all stages of their careers, including both the mass of bench scientists and the much 
smaller elite of eminent individuals. This supports perceptions that scientists can be 
individually calculating, `opportunistic' and `entrepreneurial' in an attempt to obtain 
research monies: `if there is a funding possibility they will jump into it' (UK 
interviewee K, 2000). However, climate scientists may also act together to re-direct 
further funding for the issue as a whole. Collective efforts by scientists may enhance the 
public profile of their field, as a UK interviewee noted: `anyone involved in any field 
will want to justify its continuation. So, the scientists will act together to justify 
continuation' (UK interviewee K, 2000). Indeed, protagonist climate scientists have 
been accused of over-emphasising and exaggerating the seriousness of global warming 
in a bid to justify additional financial support (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994a and 
1994b). Paradoxically, climate sceptics may also have contributed to this process 
through their repeated assertions regarding the uncertainty of climate science. 
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Past analysis of the process of bidding for funding for climate science has explored the 
construction of scientific influence. Boehmer-Christiansen (1994a, 1994b), and Hart and 
Victor (1993) observe the influential standings of a minority of high-profile and well- 
connected individual scientists. Other accounts argue that funding decisions are most 
influenced by the critical mass of scientific opinion highlighting climate change as a 
significant issue (Paterson, 1996a). All scientists have some insight into the nature of 
achieving funding for the issues, however, an influential minority play a 
disproportionate role in the direction of funding for climate science. They are active as 
referees for individual research proposals. They also form the funding boards that make 
higher level decisions about the distribution of support between research fields. 
Scientists who have such multiple roles are perhaps more knowledgeable about the 
institutional procedures involved and are more influential in directing further funding 
into the field of climate change (Daniel, 1993; Savage, 1999; Tustain, 2002). Indeed, the 
eminent UK climate scientist, former Chief Executive of the UK Meteorological Office 
and co-chairman of WGI of the IPCC, Sir John Houghton, together with Sir Crispin 
Tickell, former UK Ambassador to the United Nations, is credited with using his status 
and political connections to persuade the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, to 
establish the Hadley Centre as a British centre for climate research, in the late 1980s 
(Chapter Two, section 2.4.1). This example seems consistent with Hart and Victor's 
(1993) suggestion regarding the influence of a minority of well-connected individuals in 
advancing support for climate science. These individual scientists have high 
institutional profiles, greater access to policy-makers and others in positions of power, 
and, ultimately, themselves contribute to framing policy (see Mulkay, 1976). 
Although the arguments of Boehmer-Christiansen (1994a and 1994b) and Paterson 
(1996a) are rather different, they similarly acknowledge the `powerful' standing of, 
usually, mature protagonist scientists, with political connections, such as Houghton. 
They highlight the role that these individuals play as `leaders' of groups such as the 
IPCC; frequently interacting, influencing and networking with policy makers. These 
scientists are almost certainly aware of their influence and are in a position to use it. 
However, Paterson (1996a) also argues that the collective embodiment of scientists 
acting together on their consensual beliefs, through prestigious organisations, are 
potentially more influential (see Chapter Two). It follows, therefore, that Margaret 
Thatcher's willingness to fund the Hadley Centre would have been much less without 
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the collective emphasis by protagonists regarding the importance of global warming and 
climate research as a whole. It is perhaps more likely, therefore, that it is the combined 
influence of both the mass of bench scientists and the high-profile scientific elite that 
affects research agendas and funding budgets. As noted above (see section 5.3.1), many 
bench scientists have a degree of influence in informing research councils and 
government bodies about research priorities. Efforts to persuade funders to allocate 
more money to climate science were noted by a UK protagonist interviewee: 
scientists like anybody else are very able to spot an opportunity for funding if it's 
in an area that they want to research in and they will emphasise it because they 
want to increase their chances of funding (UK interviewee G, 2000). 
The recent increase in UK and US government funding for climate research appears to 
reinforce this argument, particularly in the US, where funding will increase by 1400% 
over the next 10 years (see section 5.3.2). 
Collective efforts appears to characterise the seemingly opposed camps of protagonists 
and sceptics. Paradoxically, their continuing debate probably strengthens the case for 
funding climate science by reinforcing the notion of scientific uncertainty. On the one 
hand, sceptical scientists emphasise the failings of existing climate science and the 
potentially serious economic implications of climate change policy. This stance attracts 
organisations or businesses with a vested interest in debunking climate science, which 
may direct funds towards further research in this area. On the other hand, protagonists 
highlight the need for continuing research to confirm the seriousness of climate change. 
This involves attention to resolving the remaining uncertainties and to exploring the 
implications of climate change. Such arguments are intended to increase the pressure on 
governments to direct further funding to the issue. In both cases, however, the existence 
of scientific debate between protagonists and sceptics further strengthens the scientists' 
claims for funds. 
At the same time there is conflict between the two opposing camps of scientists. Each 
accuses the other of bias, reflected in a willingness to compromise good science in the 
pursuit of funding. Moreover, the two sides claim that their opponents are uniquely 
`corrupt'; while they themselves maintain scientific values of objectivity and truth. The 
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following section explores these allegations, investigating whether they are used to 
undermine the credibility of science and the scientists involved. 
5.4.4 Debunking Climate Protagonists 
Boehmer-Christiansen (1994a and 1994b) has been particularly critical of the actions 
and motives of IPCC protagonists, arguing that their stance is in part opportunistic, 
being driven by the desire to gain money for further research. This section explores such 
criticisms, setting them against the insights gained from interviews, especially those 
with climate sceptics. 
Boehmer-Christiansen has advanced her argument through a series of papers, including 
material published under the auspices of the pro-market think-tank, the IEA (Morris, 
1997). Essentially, she claims that many of the scientists associated with the IPCC are 
guilty of a `bureaucratic imperative' in exaggerating the effects of climate change and 
the need to reduce the uncertainty that still surrounds much climate science (Boehmer- 
Christiansen, 1997, p. 53). In part, this is argued to be a plan to strengthen the case for 
international action to combat climate change through implementation of the UNFCC. 
However, Boehmer-Christiansen also claims that scientists' are driven by other self- 
interested motives, principally that governments can be encouraged to commit 
additional funding to data collection and climate change research (Boehmer- 
Christiansen, 1994a and 1994b). Indeed, she highlights that one of the outcomes of the 
1992 Rio Earth Summit was an additional investment in research, which satisfied the 
interests of climate protagonists (Boehmer-Christiansen 1994a and 1994b). Thus, she 
argues that there is a calculated conspiracy between protagonist IPCC scientists and 
other interests, including environmentalists and businesses promoting renewable energy 
technologies, to secure research funding that will disproportionately benefit those who 
argue for the seriousness of climate change. 
Boehmer-Christiansen's case is well founded, although Shackley and Skodvin (1995) 
criticise Boehmer-Christiansen for claiming to know the motivations of the IPCC. The 
summary for policy makers that accompanies the 2001 WG1 report devotes a whole 
section to a call for further research, emphasising that `further action is required to 
address remaining gaps in information and understanding' (Houghton et al, 2001, p. 17). 
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It appears that protagonist scientists associated with the IPCC hope to convince policy 
makers and governments to direct increased funding towards climate research. Their 
motivation for doing so is probably two-fold: to advance what they see as a genuinely 
important issue, but also to direct more research funding into an area that will benefit 
them personally. 
Boehmer-Christiansen's views and those of other external commentators are echoed in 
some of the criticisms of climate protagonists by interviewees from both the UK and 
US. Several claimed that the IPCC over-emphasised uncertainty over climate change in 
their 1995 report, in the hope of gaining more funding for the broad field of climate 
science. Thus a UK contrarian contrasted the sense of urgency displayed in the most 
recent IPCC publication with: `One of their earlier reports [in 1995, which] ... was 
pretty prevaricative, waffling about whether there was decisive change (UK interviewee 
K, 2000). He also argued that protagonists are now emphasising the seriousness of 
climate change to direct more funding into the subject, as 
there isn't funding being offered around to people who are saying that there isn't a 
danger, don't do anything (UK interviewee K, 2000). 
The tone and the content of IPCC reports appear to be important in preserving a high 
political and media profile for climate change. Similar charges were made by a US 
contrarian, who claimed that the 1995 IPCC report overstated the human capacity to 
modify the global atmosphere (US interviewee M, 2000). This interviewee also asserted 
that this stance was motivated by the desire of prominent protagonists to direct more 
money into global warming research, as well as to gain greater personal prestige and a 
higher media profile (US interviewee M, 2000). 
Contradicting Boehmer-Christiansen's argument, yet at the same time, also criticising 
the IPCC, Seitz, the Global Climate Coalition (GCC) and other sceptics have accused 
the IPCC of fraud in the WGI IPCC report of 1995. They alleged that lead authors of 
Chapter Eight, had suppressed scientific uncertainty to pursue a political agenda 
(Edwards and Schneider, 1997; FOE, 2002). This suggests that some IPCC protagonists 
are not only interested in securing increased research funding for their field, but that 
they are also aware of the political ramifications of their work. Indeed, Paterson (1996a) 
claims that this political motive was of primary importance. He recognises that the 
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IPCC is goal seeking, but argues that the actions of its leading scientists primarily 
reflected their understanding of the potential seriousness of climate change and its likely 
effects upon society and the natural environment. It does seem to be the case that 
external political considerations influenced the content of the IPCC report. Indeed, the 
process is derived on consultative and open-peer review system, where there is 
`negotiation and accommodation between `legitimate' parties involved', thus creating a 
situation where it is possible for such manoeuvres to occur (O'Riordan and Jordan, 
1999, p. 78). Many lead authors seemingly wanted the 1995 report to contain a stronger 
statement about the potential for serious climate change, but they were over-ruled by 
governments as a result of heavy pressure from the OPEC countries and the GCC 
(Edwards and Schneider, 1997). As a result, the debate about the 1995 IPCC report has 
been marked more by assertions than proven fact. 
Contrarians also criticised climate protagonists claiming that they individually tried to 
gain a larger share of the available funding for their own research. Hence, one of the 
prominent US sceptics claimed that since the politicisation of climate change many 
scientists throughout the western world have become involved in global warming 
research and have committed themselves to a protagonist stance because the issue is not 
only high profile and of societal relevance, but also because they are attracted by the 
substantial research funding available (US interviewee N, 2000). This was echoed by 
another US contrarian who noted that: `some of the scientists find that it is remunerative 
to support the side that has the most money' (US interviewee L, 2000). Indeed, this 
interviewee went further, accusing protagonists of departing from the ideal of 
objectivity in the interpretation of their research findings. Allegedly this was a 
calculated attempt to obtain or maintain research funding. In particular, he suggested 
that the expense of operating GCMs had prompted some scientists to `tilt the story in 
the direction that's most likely to give them money' (US interviewee L, 2000). Indeed, 
Wynne (1984, p. 277) claims that GCMs are not `objective technical frameworks'. Thus, 
they are perhaps open to ambiguity. 
Such accusations are a serious charge against the integrity of climate protagonists. 
However, they are not necessarily to be taken at face value. Scientific interest in climate 
research perhaps reflects a genuine belief in the importance of the issue and the need for 
sound scientific foundations on which to build policy to combat climate change and its 
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effects. Nevertheless, funding is a contentious issue, especially as scientists face 
increasing personal and institutional pressures to obtain research funds. Contrarians' 
claims of protagonist opportunism are centred on the alleged ease with which funding 
can be obtained for such research. By comparison, several US contrarians asserted that 
their particular stance on climate change was a hurdle to gaining state funding. As a 
result of such alleged inequalities in the distribution of funding, some former climate 
sceptics may change their scientific stance. Since the interviews, the US has seen a 
change of government, with the election of a strongly pro-business, Republican 
President, George W Bush. It remains to be seen whether this results in a significant 
change in the funding profile for climate sceptics. 
Although controversy surrounding commercial sponsorship of climate research has 
particularly revolved around the support given to research that is questioning of climate 
change, several interviewees pointed to the funding that is available to climate 
protagonists, to reinforce their charge of opportunism. This has echoes of Boehmer- 
Christiansen's (forthcoming) inclusion of the promoters of renewable energy amongst 
her climate `conspirators'. Indeed, in recent years the mainstream energy industry has 
taken an increasing interest in alternative and renewable energy sources (Rowlands, 
2000). Climate change is therefore presented as a profitable investment opportunity 
(Environmental Defence Fund, 2000; Mastio 1998; Tudge 2002). Indeed, government 
aid and sponsorship is often available to support commercial innovations in renewable 
energy (UK interviewee K, 2000). Energy companies may also perceive a new 
commitment to investment in renewables as a means of improving their public image by 
highlighting both their environmental credentials and their capacity to offer an effective 
answer to climate change (Environmental Defence Organisation, 2000; Mastio 1998; 
Tudge 2002; UK interviewee K, 2000). The change in attitude - which is also evident in 
the departure of a series of high-profile companies from the sceptical Global Climate 
Coalition over the past five years - may in turn affect the availability of commercial 
sponsorship for climate science. Again the claim is made that funding is driving science 
in ways that are at odds with a proper understanding of climate change. Some US 
energy corporations still appear to be willing to sponsor the production of scientific 
knowledge that challenges the seriousness of global warming. But their potential as a 
source of funding for climate sceptics seems to be decreasing. The most likely 
beneficiaries of any reallocation of research funding are not, however, climate 
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protagonists. Rather, the likely outcome of this change in commercial strategies 
involves a diversion of resources away from fundamental science, towards applied 
research in areas including sustainable energy (Rowlands, 2000). 
The interviews disclosed a degree of personal bitterness amongst some climate sceptics 
at the alleged ease at which protagonists obtained research grants and other rewards as a 
result of their stance on climate. Individual animosity appeared to colour the arguments 
of some interviewees and their attempts to cast doubt on the ability and integrity of 
high-profile protagonists: 
If you go to scientist V [the interviewee names specific scientists], or scientist W, 
or scientist X, or scientist Y, each of them has collected in the order of a million 
[dollars] on Kyoto for being politically correct. The case with scientist Z, his 
earnings from talking about this exceeds his salary by a lot (US interviewee N, 
2000). 
These allegations are themselves hypocritical because such figures are earned by 
leading scientists on both sides of the debate. The interviewee himself has increased his 
own income by around $5,000 per year from lecture fees (Beder, 1999); although he 
legitimises this with the observation that it is far less than one of the leading 
protagonists referred to above who receives 1100 thou[sand] a year' (US interviewee 
N, 2000). Beder also notes that when prominent sceptics are commissioned by the fossil 
fuel industry they demand substantial fees, of the order of $2,500 per day (Beder, 1999, 
p. 121). 
The interviews display arguments common to UK and US contrarians, which are also 
often maintained by some social commentators and anti-environmentalists to 
delegitimise the practice of protagonist scientists and the IPCC. These views reflect and 
support the stance of organisations such as the UK-based lEA and SEPP in the USA. 
Both the interviewees and previous published studies (such as Boehmer-Christiansen 
1994a, 1994b, 1996,1997, forthcoming), however, concentrate on the alleged failings 
of their opponents and the willingness of some climate protagonists to compromise 
good science in order to win either funding for the field as a whole, or an individual 
advantage in the competition for funding and career advancement. Yet the suggestion 
that such suspicious practice is unique to climate protagonists is not sustainable. The 
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potential for tensions between scientific ideals and reality is equally evident amongst 
contrarian scientists themselves. 
5.4.5 Debunking Climate Sceptics 
Charges of bias against climate sceptics have been advanced by a number of social 
commentators including Beder (1997,1999), Gelbspan (1998) and Rowell (1996). They 
argue that contrarian scientists have been `purchased' by external groups with an 
interest in the climate change debate. In the light of such claims, this section will reflect 
on the ways in which interviewees discussed the stance and the practice of climate 
sceptics. 
As noted above, sceptics often presented themselves as discriminated against in the 
competition for research funding from official and mainstream sources. A US contrarian 
explained that if research is interpreted as `reducing the implications or the impact of 
global warming, you get your research funds cut off (US interviewee M, 2000). 
However, this view was not universal amongst the interviewees. Most sceptic 
interviewees declared that all their peers were familiar with funding problems (US 
interviewee L, 2000). Sceptics alleged repeated problems of obtaining funding from 
state sources in the USA, including the NSF and the EPA. They believed that this was a 
result of discrimination, rather than any failing on the part of the researcher (US 
interviewee M, 2000; US interviewee L, 2000). Some interviewees specifically raised 
the political point that sceptical climate research would conflict with the agenda of the 
then Democratic Presidency led by Bill Clinton. They claimed that US government 
agencies, such as the EPA, were unlikely to present grants to scientists whose proposals 
ran counter to the views of the pro-environmental Vice-President, Al Gore (US 
interviewee M, 2000). One US interviewee appeared to be unique in his opinions 
regarding these perceived funding problems faced by contrarians. He proclaimed his 
success of obtaining research funding from government agencies throughout his career, 
emphasising that government agencies are willing to fund alternative research on 
climate change, because it contributes to healthy scientific debate (Chubin, 2002; US 
interviewee N, 2000). However, this interviewee is well established and well respected, 
and works within a prestigious university, thus making him a strong candidate for state 
funding. 
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A British contrarian endorsed similar opinions regarding the difficulty in obtaining state 
funding for contrarian research. He pointed out that government organisations provide 
funds for protagonist global warming studies, yet sceptics are forced to seek funds 
elsewhere, such as from industry or right-wing NGOs (UK interviewee K, 2000). He 
supported the American interviewees and provided an additional argument as to why 
governments are interested in funding only certain research perspectives on global 
warming: 
... all successive governments 
have got a strong belief in global warming for the tax 
raising power they can use with it and consequently funding research that opposes 
such polices would be unwise... we need global warming scares basically to justify 
more public transport and that's a good thing [. ] (UK interviewee K, 2000). 
This statement implies that some governments are influenced by considerations other 
than the potentially detrimental societal effects of global warming. Climate change is 
seen as a means to justify restructuring taxation and reinforcing environmentalism. 
Global warming could be used to legitimise heavier pollution taxes upon industries, as 
well as `green' taxes for the general population. Governments may present a green 
image, such as charging for the use of specific roads as an initiative to try and decrease 
the number of cars on the road, claiming that it would reduce emissions of atmospheric 
pollutants that contribute to global warming. This is the situation in London where Ken 
Livingston has authorised plans to charge motorists for driving in the centre of London 
to lessen congestion and help `reduce pollution' (Tempest, 2002). However, such 
legislation may not be as environmentally friendly as implied by the government. 
Indeed, Lord Birt has recently proposed putting fee-paying motorways next to existing 
ones, which would only encourage car use (Rusbridger, 2002). This counteracts 
Livingstone's efforts to reduce car use and supports the UK interviewee's suggestion 
regarding the government's motivations. 
Recognising the supposed position that sceptics claim regarding their difficulties in 
approaching standard funding sources for research, it needs to be investigated how 
sceptics have reacted to their situation. The views expressed by the interviewees were 
diverse. Some highlighted that the difficulty in obtaining funding has supposedly forced 
some US contrarians to withhold their preferred scientific research on climate change. 
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Thus, they compromised their beliefs to be able undertake scientific research. This was 
noted by a US sceptic repeating words said to him by somebody else: 
... underneath 
I'm on your side [the sceptics], but I would never dare voice it 
because the Science Foundation would cut me off (US interviewee L, 2000). 
This perhaps encourages some scientists to choose to work in other fields rather than 
climate change. It may also motivate some individuals to present a protagonist stance 
because of the greater individual funding opportunities and the supposed imbalance of 
research monies in favour of protagonist scientists (US interviewee N, 2000). 
An alternative response to being denied state funding was to seek money from different 
sources, particularly businesses or NGOs. Sceptics legitimised this position by arguing 
that they are being forced to do so by the absence of state funding for contrarian 
research. A US interviewee supported this case, claiming that $2 billion are spent per 
year on protagonist directed research, in contrast to less than $1 million for sceptics (US 
interviewee L, 2000). Although the source of these figures are not clear, it is likely that 
the former figure is state money and the latter consists largely of private contributions. 
This opinion is consistent with the earlier point regarding ease of funding for 
protagonist science. Such a perceived deficiency in funding for climate sceptics creates 
greater competition between them, as well as making it harder for them to promote their 
scientific standpoint (US interviewee L, 2000). 
With the apparently limited options for sceptics to gain funding, some of these scientists 
are probably under great pressure. Therefore they are willing to accept money from 
bodies that are most likely to allocate them funding, which are usually less traditional 
sources that have specific agendas within the politicised climate arena (US interviewee 
L, 2000). This is perhaps the case in the US where there is a greater willingness 
amongst commercial organisations to become involved in funding climate sceptics in 
order to help their agenda by blocking the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and 
postponing any form of precautionary action (see Chapter Two). In turn this relates to 
the greater strength of contrarian opinion, the number of sceptics researching in the US 
and support for climate research from energy companies and other business sectors. 
Beder (1999) highlights the extent of commercial interests in deligitimising climate 
science. She notes how the New York Times reported on the American Petroleum 
141 
Chapter Five: Funding climate scientists 
Institute documents that showed that fossil fuel interests intended to raise $5 million 
over two years to establish a Global Climate Science Data Center as a non-profit 
educational foundation to influence the media and public to recognise the uncertainties 
in climate science (Beder, 1999, p. 119). 
A number of social commentators, such as Beder (1999), Gelbspan (1998), Rowell 
(1996) and Karliner (1997), support these opinions, which is the core criticism against 
climate sceptics. They defend this position by criticising sceptics as being `bought' by 
fossil fuel companies, pro-free market NGOs or think tanks to produce `dishonest 
science' by playing up certain results, or even producing sceptical climate research, to 
assist in their agenda in condemning global warming science. Evidence demonstrates 
that US sceptics, Michaels, Nierenberg, Seitz, Singer and Ellsaesser have all received 
funding from oil companies, think tanks or anti-environmental NGOs. A detailed 
summary of their commercial sponsorship can be found in Beder (1997 and 1999). 
Proof of British sceptics accepting money from energy corporations is not available or 
perhaps does not exist. Gelbspan presents further supportive evidence of contrarians 
using scientific research to promote political ideals. He claims a pro-environmental 
social commentator, declared that a scientist from republican think tank, the George C 
Marshall Institute (GCMI), used his/her scientific ability and influence to promote the 
political position of the GCMI. The Institute supports the views of five extremely 
conservative foundation supporters and has subsequently produced many reports 
dismissing climate change (see website for the George C Marshall Institute) (Gelbspan, 
1998). This implies that this grand sounding `foundation' is really just a front for a 
handful of individuals, who established an institute to make their arguments sound 
official, appear professional and have greater influence upon political agendas such as 
the Kyoto Protocol. As noted in Chapter Three, the LEA is a UK based think-tank 
supported by industry that aims to argue against conventional climate change policy, as 
it is opposed to regulation and state intervention. Although their uptake of the issue is 
political, like the GCMI, science has become a means to uphold arguments which are 
essentially political and support business interests. A US sceptic's economically liberal 
attitude was reflected in his comments about energy. Some sceptics strongly believe that 
because fossil fuel energy is very important for the functioning of a modern economy, 
implementing Kyoto, which will increase the cost of fuel, may trigger a recession (US 
interviewee L, 2000). The Republican think tank `The National Centre for Public Policy 
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Research', estimates that stabilising greenhouse gas emissions to their 1990 levels by 
2010 would slow US Gross Domestic Product by nearly 1%, and reduce income and 
wages by between 5 and 10% per year (Yohle, 1999). An economic firm, DRI/McGraw 
Hill, projects that reducing greenhouse gas emissions to their 1990 levels by 2010 will 
cost 500,000 jobs per year for a decade, resulting in a total of loss 5 million jobs (Ibid. ). 
WEFA (formerly Wharton Economic Forecast Associates), has also predicted dire 
economic consequences if Kyoto is implemented. However, the predicted economic 
consequences described by such anti-environmental or anti-Kyoto organisations, 
depends upon the emphasis that underlies their respective models. Thus, data from pro- 
environmental NGOs suggests that implementing Kyoto will actually create jobs. 
Some protagonist interviewees, however, made exactly the same charge against their 
sceptic counterparts. They accused sceptics of deliberately seeking individual funding 
from alternative sources for a political agenda. Collectively, UK and US protagonists 
accused contrarians of being influenced by organisations or companies which have 
specific interests in deligtimising the protagonist viewpoint: `... some sceptics are in the 
pay of particular people, and obviously they can be bought' (UK interviewee F, 2000). 
This interviewee's opinion was supported by other protagonists, suggesting that strings 
are attached to research monies that force scientists to influence or emphasise certain 
results and thus provide further support or legitimacy for the funding body's viewpoint. 
On a similar note, a US protagonist claimed that Patrick Michaels, a vocal US 
contrarian, is in the `pocket' of organisations with vested interests against climate 
legislation (US interviewee B, 2000; Beder, 1999). He asserts that he produced tainted 
research in accordance with the organisation's agenda. Yet, Michaels choice to work for 
anti-environmental NGOs implies that he supports their principles. Indeed, he is an 
advisor to many anti-environmental groups (Beder, 1997). This suggests that Michaels 
has a political opinion on the climate debate, which he supports with his scientific 
stance. Therefore, it appears that some sceptics may use their scientific research to 
express and emphasise their political viewpoint, thus going beyond the accepted 
boundary of `objective' Western science. The integrity of these scientists is, therefore, 
questionable when their political ideals or opinions actually effects the research they 
undertake. 
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Sceptics retain a different account of their practice. They claim that they are not bribed 
to hold their stance; rather they see their manoeuvres as pragmatic, accepting funding 
from other sources because they are denied state funding. Indeed, the limited funding 
that goes to sceptic research is still dwarfed by state funding for protagonists. Sceptics 
believe, therefore, that they are not compromising their objectivity, but are warning 
against unnecessary action on climate change that would impose real economic 
penalties. A US sceptic referred to the alleged difficulties and imbalance of state 
funding for climate sceptics, claiming that his colleague had been `dried up' and 
therefore forced to accept money from sources interested in promoting the contrarian 
viewpoint (US interviewee M, 2000). As noted earlier, the terms of confidentiality 
related to commercial sponsorship harbours the opportunity for sceptics who assert 
growing pressures in obtaining grants, to distort the scientific process and deliberately 
misrepresent research results as a means to continue to receive funding. Thus, there is 
the potential for climate sceptics to cross the threshold from an acceptable departure 
from the scientific ideal to biased or corrupt research focused on achieving future 
individual research funding. In such cases, commercial support reinforces the assertions 
that: `it is, of course, nonsense to assert the value-freedom of natural science. Scientific 
practice is governed by norms and values generated from an understanding of the goals 
of scientific enquiry' (Longino, 1990, p. 4). `External' investment for sceptics, however, 
may help to maintain healthy scientific debate about the climate issue, which could 
otherwise be quashed. 
Reflecting on these various claims suggests that some sceptics are perhaps not so 
concerned about gaining grants, but more interested in using their stance to portray a 
political perspective. Other sceptics do find it difficult winning state funding and 
therefore seek alternative sources of sponsorship. Business and NGO funding for 
sceptics is, however, more available in the US than in the UK by all accounts. As a 
result, the scientific playing field is perhaps more level in the USA. Indeed, the political 
context has changed in the US since the interviews were conducted. The Republican 
administration elected in 2000 may be more sympathetic to sceptical research. As noted 
earlier, government agents refuse to implement Kyoto, yet indicate a degree of 
commitment to combating climate change by directing more money into climate 
research. This money may fund contrarian research. Indeed, the largest share of US state 
funding on climate is distributed to NASA, which is chiefly devoted to funding satellite 
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data. Their research frequently contradicts climate models. Such data has, therefore, 
been used by climate scientists, such as Dr John Christy, who has worked alongside 
NASA's Dr Roy Spencer, to question the seriousness of global warming (see for 
example, NASA, 1997). As a result, protagonists' allegations regarding the financial 
benefits gained by adopting a contrarian stance may therefore be correct: [t]he real way 
to increase your funding is to say that climate change isn't happening' (US interviewee 
C, 2000), which is precisely the opposite of what the contrarians interviewees implied 
5.5 Conclusion 
The ideal of science proclaims an objective search for universal truths. However, the 
attitudes expressed by the UK and US interviewees reflected a reality in which most 
climate scientists, regardless of their stance or transatlantic position, depart from the 
scientific ideal when individually tailoring research projects to give them the best 
opportunity to bid for competitive funds. Paradoxically, the continuing debate between 
climate contrarians and protagonists itself helps to sustain funding to the field of 
anthropogenic climate change. Reflecting Hart and Victors' (1993) claim, elite scientists 
are, however, more influential than bench scientists in this role as they are referees and 
editors, as well as being familiar with institutional processes. Yet, their efforts are 
reinforced by the support of bench scientists (Paterson, 1996a). This critical mass 
confers its own legitimacy upon individual's claims of the importance of climate 
science. 
This implies that scientists have a degree of influence within society and the 
substructure does not dominate politicised science in totality. Yet, climate scientists are 
still affected by societal pressures, as one interviewee noted: 
I don't think there's any such thing as neutral research anywhere. All research takes 
place in a context, and the research that was done depends on economic necessities. 
There's all sorts of research I would like to do [but]... no ones going to pay me for 
that (UK interviewee K, 2000). 
Thus, the Polanyi (1962) and Mertonian (1973) models which portray science as a 
sphere totally separate from wider society seem naive. This view was endorsed by a 
number of UK and US interviewees who acknowledged that the reality of contemporary 
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politicised science was a long way from the ideal of a neutral scientific search for truth. 
This does not necessarily mean that scientists who undertake research that has direct 
political consequences are influenced by the wider context of their work. Indeed, 
recognising that scientists are under pressure to gain funds for research, and that 
relatively generous funding is available for climate research from UK and US 
government agencies, it is not surprising that individual researchers try to define 
proposals in a way that will maximise their chance of funding. However, if scientists go 
further than this, deliberately misrepresenting their research in pursuit of financial gain 
or political ends they risk calling into question the integrity of their discipline. Within 
politicised science, where scientific results have potentially huge political, economic 
and social consequences, there is perhaps a greater tendency to go beyond the boundary 
that separates accepted manoeuvres to obtain funding for research, from less legitimate 
behaviour, including the use of research to obtain grants, or advocacy of a particular 
political perspective to attract external sponsorship. 
Each camp of scientists accused the other of bias, compromising good science for 
funding or to push a political position, thus undermining the credibility of science and 
the scientists involved. They alleged that their opponents were uniquely `corrupted', yet 
they themselves are pure and moral. UK and US sceptics universally claimed that 
protagonists received a disproportional amount of individual funding simply as a result 
of their stance on climate change. Sceptics claimed that they themselves were alienated 
and discriminated against in competition for state funding, both in the UK and US, thus 
forcing them to seek alternative sources of funding from the commercial sector or 
corporate organisations. If, however, the Bush administration does increase funding on 
climate research by $700m over the next 10 years, this may significantly change the 
funding profile for climate sceptics in the US. 
The sceptic transatlantic interviewees echoed Boehmer-Christiansen's (1994a and 
1994b, 1995,1997, forthcoming) argument, claiming that IPCC protagonists 
emphasised uncertainty and the seriousness of anthropogenic climate change to gain 
further funding for the issue. One UK sceptic uniquely claimed, however, that 
protagonist scientists have the opportunity to gain individual funding from corporations 
which are promoting and establishing sustainable development. Such companies appear 
to be re-presenting themselves as having not just a green image, but also practical 
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solutions to environmental problems. They are attempting, therefore, to convince 
governments that they should provide the necessary funds to help other businesses make 
a similar transition to sustainable energies and create a more competitive market (UK 
interviewee K, 2000). 
UK and US protagonists reflected the views of commentators such as Beder (1997, 
1999), Rowell (1996) Gelbspan (1998) and Karliner (1997). They collectively claimed 
that sceptics advanced their stance and used their research to continue to obtain funding 
from fossil fuel companies. They also unanimously agreed that some sceptics have a 
particular vested interest in promoting their scientific standpoint as a means to gain 
support for their political position. For instance, George C Marshall Institute scientists 
were seen to have vested interests in advancing their Republican anti-environmental 
agenda through their scientific research. 
The line of argument provided by Boehmer-Christiansen (1994a, 1994b, 1995,1997, 
forthcoming) and the views expressed by Beder (1997,1999), Rowell (1996) Gelbspan 
(1998) and Karliner (1997) reflect a partial analysis of the practice of climate scientists. 
Indeed, Shackley and Skodvin (1995) specifically claim that Boehmer-Christiansen's 
view is one-sided. They can all be criticised, therefore, for underplaying the collective 
manoeuvres of both climate sceptics and protagonists. The literature would also benefit 
from greater consideration of the various positions of climate scientists and how they 
relate to policy production. 
Allegations regarding western contrarian and protagonist scientists raise questions 
concerning the credibility and integrity of some climate scientists. They suggest that 
within modern science some scientists may be deliberately crossing the threshold of 
integrity in their use of climate science as a means to either gain funding or to promote 
political perspectives. Hence, the interviewees' assertions have serious implications for 
the reliability of climate science as a whole, as well as other politicised scientific areas. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Scientific Output: The Academic and Non-Academic World of 
Publishing 
6.1 Introduction 
Funding (input) for climate research cannot be investigated without examining 
publishing (output). This chapter, therefore, balances Chapter Five, and examines the 
internal (academic) and external (public, mass media) world of scientific publishing. 
The processes of knowledge production and dissemination of research, in turn, help to 
justify further research funding. State funding for research is warranted through the 
production of new knowledge and its dissemination in published form; traditionally 
through academic papers, but also books and in some disciplines the popular press, TV 
and the Internet. Commercial or contract research is more likely to be produced for a 
specific target audience, and the means chosen to reach this audience may be rather 
different; involving unpublished reports and project briefings. 
The first half of this chapter examines the stated purpose of the peer review process, 
based upon interpretations of the system as applied to all academic publishing. 
Attention then turns more specifically to the experience of climate science, investigating 
the possible influence that climate scientists obtain within the global warming debate 
through publishing their research within academic circles. This leads on to consideration 
of the extent to which academics as experts may gain influence based on their ability to 
publish and to control what others publish through refereeing. By examining 
interviewees' perceptions of the peer review system, this section investigates the reality 
of the process and compares it with the ideal. Particular attention will be paid to the 
following questions: 
" To what extent does academia perceive peer review to create a system that 
potentially encourages, or at least allows, bias and prejudice, despite the initial aim 
of ensuring high standards and the objective review of work? 
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" To what degree does the process provide some scientists with influence as the 
gatekeepers of what is published? 
" To what extent does authority gained through peer review give scientists influence 
over funding and/or the policy process? 
This section concludes by investigating the possible implications of the reality of the 
peer review process. 
The second half of this chapter analyses the mass media as an alternative or 
complementary outlet to peer-reviewed academic publications. The underlying theme of 
this section is the relationship between UK and US climate scientists and the mass 
media. It investigates the motives of those climate scientists who seek a media platform 
from which to put forward their views. 
6.2 The Peer Review Process 
6.2.1 The Peer Review Process as an Ideal 
A formal process of peer review can be traced back to 17`h century. Then, as now, it was 
a system implemented to ensure high standards of publication (Chubin and Hackett, 
1990; Daniel, 1993; Hirschman, 1994). However, the modem day process originated in 
post-war America, where it became common practice in the production of scientific 
knowledge. Peer review refers to several related processes: the review of proposals for 
research funding; the evaluation of ongoing or completed research projects; the 
evaluation of teaching; and the review of manuscripts for publication in academic 
journals (Berg, 2001; Lee, 1997). Chapter Five considered the peer review process in 
relation to research funding; this chapter, for the most part, is concerned with the last in 
the list of contexts: peer review as a means to publication in academic journals. 
Publication in academic journals is the major international mechanism for disseminating 
and producing scientific knowledge. 
Editors of academic journals - who are usually themselves senior academics - oversee 
the review process. It is they who choose referees to review academic papers for the 
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specific journal with which they are associated. There is rarely any formal institutional 
association between referees and particular journals; referees are chosen on an 
individual basis because their expertise is relevant to a particular paper. Although 
referees are not paid for their reviews, their position carries a degree of prestige and 
reflects an acknowledgment of their expertise that may help, indirectly, to advance their 
careers. Editors and reviewers judge papers against generic guidelines, such as 
originality, coherence of argument, standard of presentation, integration into existing 
scientific debate and contributions to that debate, and reliability of methods, data and 
other evidence (Berg, 2001; Daniel, 1993). 
There are two main processes involved in refereeing articles for publication in academic 
journals. The first involves the editor who receives the manuscript and is the ultimate 
judge. The editor has several options: 1) to return manuscripts to the author without a 
review; 2) to send the manuscript out to reviewers directly; 3) to send a manuscripts to a 
member of the journal's wider editorial board, either for initial evaluation or full review 
- the initial evaluation may - or may not - lead to the manuscript being sent on to an 
external reviewer. Reviewers, chosen by the editor, judge the manuscript (Gura, 2002, ) 
and have four basic options to advocate: 1) acceptance without revision; 2) acceptance 
with minor revisions; 3) rejection with an invitation to resubmit after major revisions; or 
4) outright rejection (Berg, 2001). 
Peer review is supposed to reinforce the quality of published science. It is the method 
imposed to measure the value of publications. As Aisen (2002, p. viii), notes: 
We need to hold ourselves to the highest possible scrutiny and only accept that 
evidence that can stand up to the closest of scrutiny. 
Thus, the process is intended to filter out substandard or unoriginal papers, as well as 
articles where the claimed `objectivity' of science has been fatally compromised. 
Longino (1990) claims that the process aims to ensure that authors have interpreted the 
data in a way that is free of their subjective prejudices. The peer review process was 
established to extend the scientific method to the review process itself, by judging 
academic papers `objectively'. In theory, therefore, peer review is a `mutually beneficial 
system that provides effective quality control in publication (Dalton, 2001, p. 103). It 
also helps to improve the readability and quality of the article in question (Spier, 2002). 
Thus, once a paper is published in a journal it bears the stamp of authenticity from 
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editors and referees (Ziman, 1968). However, Longino point outs that publication of 
peer reviewed work `does not [of itself] make an idea a brick in the edifice of 
knowledge' (Longino, 1990, p. 69). Indeed, few papers that are published in journals are 
widely cited or read, and most, therefore, make little impact within the academic 
community. 
Referees of papers are usually anonymous and equally authors' names are invariably 
removed from the manuscript before they are sent out for review. This reflects the belief 
that anonymity provides protection for both reviewers and authors. For example, it 
provides the opportunity for junior academics to comment on work by more senior 
colleagues. Furthermore, it allows reviewers to express criticisms about publications 
without feeling compromised by friendship or other associations (Bondi, 1998). 
Anonymity is thus identified as a means to ensure impartiality and objectivity and to 
prevent bias or subjectivity. Berg (2001, p. 514) presents this process as follows: 
Objectivity = impartiality = disembodiedness = anonymity. 
This model `relies upon an older, masculine model of "objectivity" that is disembodied 
[and] impartial' (Berg, 2001, p. 51 1). However, the reality of the academic peer review 
process is often perceived to be different. The subjectivity of academic scientists 
involved in the publishing process has led researchers to question scientists' integrity. 
For example, according to Berg (2001, p. 512), the `objectivity' that underpins the 
anonymous refereeing process is `false'. Furthermore, Symanski and Pikard (1996) 
detail the subjectivity involved in the system. They claim that: 
Everyone has agendas and prejudices, and some people not only dislike certain 
members of their profession but may also be quite prepared to apply their agendas 
and prejudices against those whom they dislike; and (2) people vary immensely in 
their willingness to be honest with themselves and with others... 
Thus, it is important to consider how the process potentially provides academics 
(editors, reviewers, as well as authors) with a degree of influence that has particular 
implications for what is published and considered to be knowledge. 
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6.2.2 The Reality of the Review Process: The Influence of Gatekeepers 
The following section explores how the design of the peer review process relates to its 
aims. It considers the criticisms and doubts expressed regarding the process, underlining 
how the system can be abused in relation to discrimination against certain individuals, 
viewpoints and, indeed, whole sections of academia, such as women. This section 
investigates the influence that editors, referees and authors can have over the review 
process and the implications that this has for claims of objectivity. 
As noted earlier, the peer review process is a system organised and controlled by 
academics themselves to assess the credibility of their work. Academics, therefore, have 
many roles; they are not solely researchers, but potentially the gatekeepers of future 
knowledge (Daniel, 1993). Individuals will, on different occasions, be involved both as 
author and reviewer. Authors of papers themselves play an active role in the peer review 
process, not least in deciding which journal to send their paper to. This reflects 
judgements as to the quality of journal, its kudos and circulation, but also the likely 
sympathies that editors and reviewers will have for the particular piece of work. It is 
apparent, therefore, that authors have a perceived degree of influence if they decide to 
publish papers. Equally, authors may choose not to publish their research because the 
results are not sufficiently interesting, or the project has produced null results. Although 
such work may be valuable, it is displaced by research that seems more interesting and 
publishable. 
Individual researchers, therefore, choose whether or not to publish their work and aim to 
consign it where it will be most sympathetically received and make the most impact. 
However, as noted earlier, journal editors and referees police the system and ultimately 
determine what gets published. Potentially, therefore, they have more influence over 
what gets to count as knowledge. Indeed, Berg notes how his position as a peer reviewer 
gave him a degree of `power' over the subject (Berg, 2001). Longino (1990, p. 68) 
concurs that `The production of scientific knowledge is crucially determined by the 
gatekeeping of peer review'. Yet referees are rarely called to account for what they 
write in reviews (Davidoff, 1998). Consequently, the accusation has been made that 
`referees are able, with relative impunity, to delay or deny funding or publication to 
their rivals' (Goodstein, 1995, p. 618). Thus, it appears that the influence which 
gatekeepers possess can be used to abuse the peer review system. 
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Chubin argues that `innovative work survives because of its intrinsic merit: it succeeds 
as people become familiar with its advantages and prospects' (Chubin, 2002, p. 109). 
Many others, however, take a more jaundiced view. Spier, for one, considers that the 
peer review system acts to reinforce the scientific status quo as referees resist significant 
departures from the dominant paradigm and `the introduction of that which is deemed 
foreign' (Spier 2002, p. 101-2). Similarly, Gura claims that `good work is rejected 
because it clashes with reviewers' own studies and opinions - or simply because the 
ideas expressed are "too left-field", or perhaps ... too right-wing' (Gura, 
2002, p. 258). 
The anonymous refereeing process `provides a good opportunity to belittle the work of 
another through apparently "objective" attack on the merits of a manuscript', for 
referees `are more willing to make use of their agendas and prejudices if their identities 
are concealed' (Symanski and Pickard, 1996, p. 177). In practice too, anonymity is often 
one sided; reviewers are often able to identify an author through knowledge of their 
prior work and the citations included in the manuscript (Davidoff, 1998; Wessely, 
1999). As a result, some scientists are discouraged from even submitting papers for peer 
review because they believe it to be an `enormous waste of scientists' time' (Roy and 
Ashburn, 2001, p. 393). 
More worrying still is the evidence that the peer review system can be used as a tool to 
discriminate systematically against certain viewpoints, or groups of authors, not least as 
defined in terms of gender. Wennerds and Wold (1997) note the massive gender bias in 
the peer review of research grant applications to Sweden's Medical Research Council. 
Ives, too, explains that out of 114 applicants for postdoctoral fellowships, those 
successfully elected included 16 men, but only 4 women. Even taking into account the 
gender inequality in the pool of applicants `women were only half as successful as men' 
in the final competition (Ives, 1997, p. 1). This study, partly based on scientific 
competence, highlighted that women have to be 250% more productive through 
publishing to receive the same competence scores as men (Ives, 1997). Berg also 
observes the systematic discrimination against women who submit papers or funding 
proposals for peer review. However, he also specifically notes that within the field of 
geography reviewers are `bourgeois, white Anglo-American, heterosexual, able-bodied 
and masculine', which encourages a degree of supremacy by such individuals and 
discrimination against those who do not fit the model (Berg, 2001, p. 517). Moreover, 
the leading academic journals are predominantly under the editorial control of 
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Europeans and North Americans; as a result it is common for manuscripts from 
developing countries to be discriminated against (Berg, 2001). More specifically, 
articles or grant applications from `Ivy League' and `Red Brick' universities are 
frequently rated higher than, or published over, those from unknown universities, 
regardless of quality. This was noted by Longino who points out that scientific papers 
`in at least one discipline were accepted on the basis of the institutional affiliation of 
authors rather than the intrinsic worth of the paper' (Longino, 1990, p. 68). 
The abuse of peer review by editors and referees is also evident in the tactics sometimes 
employed whilst reviewing manuscripts. Dalton notes that reviewers may be 
deliberately slow in responding to authors if they wish to delay a rival's paper (Dalton, 
2001). This may occur because the reviewer has a competing manuscript under review 
elsewhere. More generally, scientists complain about manuscripts being deliberately 
stalled in review until similar findings emerge in other journals. Editors or reviewers 
may also plagiarise articles which they decide not to publish. Such problems are usually 
a result of the intense pressure to use publishing as a method to increase researchers' 
career profiles (Ibid. ). Researchers also express concerns about leakage of information 
during the review process. In particular, they worry that reviewers who also act as 
commercial consultants may have privileged and premature access to information that 
should remain confidential. This access may be exploited to enable the businesses with 
which they are connected to obtain a commercial advantage in developing or marketing 
new products and processes (Ibid. ). 
Dissatisfaction with the established model of peer review has led to subversion of the 
process and a search for alternative means of publishing and dissemination (Roy, 1985). 
Recently, the internet has opened significant new possibilities for electronic publishing. 
As a result, an author can communicate with and receive comments on articles from 
thousands of people (McCarty, 2002). The internet also allows more work to be 
disseminated when publication in well-known journals is extremely competitive and 
very slow. Indeed, there is often a significant delay of 12 to 18 months between the 
acceptance of a manuscript and publication. For example, the prestigious international 
journal, The American Psychologist, receives more than 350 submissions per year, and 
has a rejection rate greater than 90% (McCarty, 2002). Thus, the intemet provides an 
important alternative avenue for authors to circulate their research. 
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6.3 The Peer Review Process as it Relates to Climate Science 
6.3.1 Climate Scientists' Reflections on the Publishing Process 
Scientists and academics generally, have a vested interest in publishing articles to 
advance their careers and university profiles, and to help secure further research 
funding. As Spier (2002) notes the performance of an academic is measured by 
successful publications. However, individual scientists' reasons for publishing may 
vary, ranging from a belief in a moral duty to disseminate knowledge to a wider 
audience, to a desire to convince other academics of their perspective, and a personal 
desire for prestige. At the same time all academics face institutional pressures to publish 
their research. Indeed, the profiles of academic departments under review systems such 
as the UK RAE's, are largely assessed on the collective number and quality of their 
publications (see Chapter Five, section 5.4.1). Thus, academics are pressured to target 
prestigious (international) journals and are frequently directed to produce a certain 
number of published articles each year. 
The pressures and incentives to publish were clearly recognised by the interviewees 
involved in the present study. As one UK interviewee emphasised `my boss would look 
at me and think that I was bit second rate if I hadn't published in the Journal of Climate 
(UK interviewee F, 2000). But equally it was acknowledged that productivity brought 
rewards; professorships and other senior positions went to those who had `brought in 
quite a bit of money and written quite a lot of papers' (UK interviewee I, 2000). Less 
senior academics also realised the importance of publishing peer-reviewed articles to 
advance their careers (UK interviewee J, 2000; UK interviewee K, 2000). It appears, 
therefore, that the career incentives to publish in academic journals hold good at every 
stage of the academic ladder. This may lead some scientists to research in `fashionable' 
subject areas, in the belief that this will enable them to generate a steady stream of high 
impact papers. As one interviewee suggested initial idealism may become clouded by 
more self-interested objectives: 
Most of them [climate scientists] started off thinking they wanted to publish things, 
and then after a while they probably think money and career is more important. 
These things are bound together usually; the more you publish the more career 
prospects and the more funding (UK interviewee K, 2000). 
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The possibility of some scientists being motivated to publish for career purposes, and 
potentially to generate future funding seems at odds with Polanyi's (1962) model of 
objective science, and the ideal of science in general. However, as noted in Chapter Five 
modem science encourages scientists to consider their research environments 
pragmatically. Yet thinking in this way can become problematic, leading to questions 
such as those outlined above about the integrity of the peer review process. Scientific 
reputation and credibility, gained through reviewed publication, is particularly 
significant when an issue is controversial, uncertain and policy relevant. Thus, in the 
light of general concerns about biases in the peer review system, we must consider 
whether particular shades of opinion in the climate debate are subject to systematic 
discrimination. 
The following section examines the perceptions of UK and US climate scientists about 
the peer review process. Claims of censorship in the process are explored alongside the 
potential for the system to be used to gain influence in the scientific world and policy 
arena. The discussion also considers whether scientists use their influence as 
gatekeepers not only to control what is published in the field of climate science, but 
also, as a result, to influence the allocation of funding for both the broad field of climate 
change research as a whole and for individual projects. 
6.3.2 Perceptions of Bias Against Viewpoints and Researchers 
All bar one (US interviewee N, 2000) of the contrarians interviewed argued that they 
and their fellow sceptics were discriminated against in their efforts to secure publication 
of their work and opinions. As one US contrarian put it, they are `pushed out' of the 
publication system (US interviewee M, 2000). According to a sympathetic UK 
commentator this reflected the character of peer review as `a corrupt process... because 
it relies very heavily on the status quo, people in there want to defend their own 
positions.... [Hence, ] it appears a rather conservative process' (UK interviewee S, 
2000). Sceptics claimed, therefore, that protagonist arguments dominated the 
mainstream scientific literature as a result of their own papers being marginalised or 
excluded. Certainly, by comparison climate protagonists displayed no collective sense 
that the peer review process was fraught with difficulties. Newald's arguments may help 
account for these differences. He claims that by challenging the status quo, contrarian 
authors ultimately undermine the case for continued funding in a particular research 
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field (Newald quoted in BBC, 1996). Similar thoughts were expressed by a US 
commentator who asserted that: 
peer reviewers, the entire ... social system of science tends to prefer things that are 
at the cutting edge of recognised areas and not things that are trying to innovate 
theoretical foundations, unorthodox paradigms or whatever (US interviewee Q, 
2000). 
This leads, therefore, to questions regarding the logic behind the perceived systematic 
discrimination by journals against contrarian scientists. The pressure upon all academics 
to publish and secure research funding creates an extremely competitive environment. 
This is compounded by the specific controversy that surrounds climate change as an 
issue, creating particular struggles between certain viewpoints both for academic 
credibility and influence within the policy arena. This perhaps provides an enhanced 
motive for the climate protagonists, who form the scientific majority, to attempt to 
discredit sceptic viewpoints. Protagonists may seek to strengthen their own credentials 
as credible scientists and policy advisors by discrediting sceptic viewpoints. It seems 
important, therefore, to explore further sceptics' claims of prejudice, by investigating 
the presence of the contrarian voice in academic publishing on anthropogenic climate 
change. 
Table 6.1 - derived from a Web of Science search - highlights the successful record of 
publication of papers relating to anthropogenic climate change achieved by six 
prominent US sceptics in some of the most prestigious international journals over the 
last 20 years. For comparison, material about the publication record of six UK and US 
prominent protagonists was also extracted. As noted in Chapter Three, identifying UK 
climate contrarians proved difficult, thus the table only provides examples of US 
sceptics. Identifying prominent climate scientists, those who had a degree of media 
involvement, provides a more consistent contrast between the two opposing camps, 
considering that most climate sceptics communicate with the media. 
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Table 6.1 Academic publications on climate change: papers by prominent sceptics 
and protagonists in Nature, Science and the Journal of Climate, 1982-2002 
Climate Scientist Journal Total 
Nature Science Journal of Climate 
Sceptics 
Balling, RC 2 3 2 7 
Michaels, PJ 1 1 0 2 
Lindzen, RS 2 2 3 7 
Nierenberg, WA 1 2 0 3 
Seitz, F 5 1 0 6 
Singer, SF 3 12 0 15 
Total 40 
Protagonists 
Houghton, J 13 7 0 20 
Hulme, M 5 0 5 10 
Santer, BD 4 4 3 11 
Schneider, SH 14 6 0 20 
Shine, K 1 2 4 7 
Wigley, T 29 5 2 36 
Total 104 
The table highlights that sceptic climate scientists have produced around 62% fewer 
papers compared to protagonists. The number of sceptic publications in these leading 
journals was substantially increased by the contributions made by Singer, who 
produced, on average, twice the amount of papers than most other sceptics. The total 
number of papers by sceptics is perhaps reduced by the few publications contributed by 
Michaels. One explanation for this difference is related to the career stage of these two 
individuals. Singer is retired, yet still publishes papers, whereas Michaels is only part 
way through his career. It is, therefore, clearly not the case that contrarian opinions are 
excluded from publication in leading journals. This sample suggests, however, that 
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sceptics do publish fewer papers in leading academic journals compared to their 
counterparts. 
The evolution of thinking about climate change itself reveals evidence of the significant 
contributions that leading climate sceptics have made through their reviewed 
publications. For instance, Patrick Michaels, a notorious US sceptic, recognised the 
potential importance of omission of sulphur in models of atmospheric processes. 
Michaels (1991b) suggested that sulphate smog emanating from industrial areas was 
cooling the atmosphere over sufficiently large areas to mask global warming. 
Developments of this work - plus other research by the same author - have been 
published in prestigious journals (Michaels 1996b, 1994,1993). This theory forms the 
basis for Wigley's argument that reducing emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO2) - the 
main source of sulphates in the atmosphere - might exacerbate global warming (Wigley, 
1999). Such innovative work by sceptics compelled climate modellers to reassess 
GCMs and incorporate this missing substance. This has resulted in various GCMs 
across the world producing similar readings, and has made them the dominant tools in 
suggesting future climate change (Pearce, 1997; Shackley et al; 1998; UK interviewee 
F, 2000). Furthermore, Budyko has also helped to improve carbon cycle models by 
emphasising the benefit of CO2 fertilisation upon the growth of plants (Budyko cited by 
UK interviewee F, 2000). 
Overall, it seems that sceptics' claims of difficulty in getting their work published may 
be as much a reflection of individual grievances as they are of any systematic 
discrimination against their viewpoint as a whole. Indeed, the comments offered by 
protagonists regarding sceptics' concerns suggested an eagerness to debate with, and be 
challenged by, others holding different views. This was particularly well expressed by a 
UK interviewee: 
you can see that in the journals, usually in an article where there is some criticism 
and there is quite often a series of responses and letters responding to a certain 
article, and that's obviously a healthy way [of advancing debate] (UK interviewee 
J, 2000). 
It is generally true that scientific arguments are necessary to encourage healthy 
scientific debate. There are, moreover, specific reasons to question whether it is in 
protagonists' interests to sideline sceptical arguments. This relates back to the case 
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made earlier about the links between debate, funding and professional livelihoods. If 
contrarian research and publications maintain a degree of uncertainty within climate 
science, it may be beneficial for all sides in the debate in strengthening the case for 
further funding as a means of resolving important outstanding differences. If anything, 
therefore, climate protagonists may have a vested interest in seeing that sceptics get 
their research published in peer reviewed journals. 
Nevertheless, some climate contrarians who perceive difficulties in publishing in 
mainstream journals, are encouraged to seek alternative means to disseminate their 
knowledge, including the mass media. Indeed, some sceptics may deliberately choose 
alternatives to the conventional academic means of information dissemination in an 
effort to reach a different audience. Chapter Five also noted that some scientists, such as 
those associated with the George C Marshall Institute, use their knowledge and research 
regarding climate science as a means to push a particular political perspective. Realising 
the problems associated with academic peer review publication and the probability that 
anything they write in this vein is likely to fall foul of the criteria for academic scrutiny, 
such scientists may take a strategic decision to promote their research through 
alternative channels. Moreover, publishing or disseminating knowledge via the mass 
media, in particular, will probably result in their work reaching a wider audience. This 
may strengthen support for their views and increase their influence upon policy-makers. 
As a result, they frequently write for a broad, non-expert audience, aiming also to be 
accessible to politicians who may struggle to follow the full intricacies of any scientific 
argument. Although work in this form may not have the credibility or legitimacy 
associated with refereed publications it is often incorporated into the broader scientific 
debate through mutual citation by particular scientific practitioners. Leading US 
contrarians, such as Singer, Michaels, Seitz and Nierenberg all regularly refer to each 
others' arguments. Furthermore, individuals associated with the George C Marshall 
Institute and the US Science and Environmental Policy Project (SEPP) regularly publish 
jointly authoured material as a means of strengthening their authority. 
This recognition of the use of alternative avenues to disseminate climate knowledge 
prompts the following investigation of the relationship between UK and US climate 
scientists and the mass media. This will also return the argument to the theme of 
funding, by considering the potential ability to affect policy on research funding and the 
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distribution of resources, that some scientists acquire through maintaining a high media 
profile.. 
6.4 Mass Media and Science 
6.4.1 The Mass Media: An Introduction 
The mass media incorporates the press, radio and TV, especially those channels 
transmitted terrestrially. This section is principally concerned with UK and US 
newspapers and television programmes and their reporting of news information. The 
daily press in both Britain and America is divided into different categories by perceived 
journalistic weightiness, circulation and political inclinations (Cracknell quoted in 
Hansen 1994 p. 5; see also Chapman et al, 1997). However, while the British newspaper 
industry is dominated by a handful of national papers, the US press is more diverse, 
reflecting the much greater importance of a regional press focused on the hinterland of 
the major cities. 
In all media, different themes and topics - political, economic, social and environmental 
- are inevitably thrown into competition with each other in a struggle for coverage 
(Dunwoody and Ryan, 1983). Even within a single news area there is rivalry between 
specific stories and individual journalists as each attempts to gain the greatest number of 
column inches. In this struggle it may not be the intrinsic worth, or importance, of the 
news item, but the way that it can be sold, which may determine the extent of coverage. 
Thus stories that are sensationalist; that appear relevant to a broad spectrum of the 
public; that can be presented as new or exciting; or that are light-hearted may win 
through, because they appeal to editors concerned to maintain circulation and audience 
figures (Dunwoody and Griffin, 1994). It is for this reason that journalists, on the one 
hand, and scientists, on the other, may deliberately sensationalise a story to increase its 
appeal to the intended audience of a particular news outlet (Hannigan, 1995). 
UK and US editors play an important part in determining whether stories about 
environmental issues such as climate change get media coverage. The decision as to 
whether to `run' with any particular story involves consideration of its audience appeal 
and the potential implications for circulation and, hence, advertising revenue. It is 
usually in meetings of editorial teams and in exchanges between editors and reporters 
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that the crucial negotiations concerning the selection of stories and the extent of 
coverage to be devoted to each take place (Chapman et al, 1997; Dunwoody and Ryan 
1983). This process of editorial decision-making appears analogous with the role of the 
academic editor as gate-keeper, discussed above. 
The following section focuses on how the mass media portrays climate science. It will 
initially examine how global warming is reported in the news. Inevitably, climate 
science, as a slow process of academic exploration of complex issues, sits uneasily 
within a news agenda driven by instant coverage of events and a need to simplify the 
presentation of issues (Henderson-Sellers, 1998; Ward, 2002). Attention will then turn 
to consider the extent to which climate change stories engage with science in a 
substantial and sophisticated way, or whether reporting is simplistic or sensationalist. 
This section concludes by analysing the role that climate scientists themselves are 
perceived to play in placing stories on the news agenda and shaping news content. 
6.4.2 Mass Media Reporting of Climate Change 
Chapman et al (1997, p. 47) claim that environmental stories are frequently sidelined `in 
the battle for space and time'. As Hendersen-Sellers (1998) notes, time is a key factor in 
the media and an important point of disjunction with the sphere of scientific research. 
The news operates within a timeframe measured in terms of hours, or at most days, yet 
the development of science extends over months and, often, years (Hendersen-Sellers 
1998). Reporting is thus biased to favour daily time-frame stories, rather than issues 
such as climate change that are considered slow burning by journalists and editors. 
Moreover, global warming cannot easily be presented in a way that makes it a 
journalistic `sound bite' because of the sheer complexity of the scientific subject matter 
(Chapman et al, 1997). Journalists themselves often find environmental issues complex 
and complicated, and, hence, difficult. Such issues require a relatively advanced 
understanding of science if the subject is to be reliably reported. Indeed, the media has 
been charged with frequently miscommunicating climate change stories as a result of 
misrepresentation and misunderstanding (Henderserson-Sellers, 1998). 
The first time journalists `discovered' global warming they were able to `splash' the 
story. This was noted by a UK commentator amongst the interviewees participating in 
the present study. He argued that coverage often had a particular bias: 
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It tends to be environmental journalists not the science journalists [who report on 
climate change], and the environmental journalists tend to form an apocalyptic 
view of the world.. . scare stories sell. .. 
it's easier to sell a scare story and get front 
page coverage (UK interviewee S, 2000). 
Subsequently, extreme climate events, taken by some to be evidence of global warming, 
have triggered a brief rash of climate change stories across the media. However, 
journalists and editors have to consider the issue-attention cycle of the public, which 
works against extended coverage of any story. The media's appetite for specific and 
sensational events can sometimes be exploited to obtain coverage for environmental 
stories. A celebrated instance in relation to climate change was Hansen's public warning 
of potential catastrophe as a result of global warming, made in 1988 to a US 
congressional hearing staged at a time of extreme summer heat and drought. In the 
following days the US mass media carried extensive and high profile coverage of 
Hansen's statement (Shabecoff, 1988). Not only did this episode and the way it was 
reported successfully draw attention to the issue of climate change, it also secured it a 
place on the political agenda (see Chapter Two, section 2.3.4). After two or three stories 
about the same issue, however, journalists are usually unable to argue for further 
coverage; old news ceases to be interesting. This works against sustained coverage of 
environmental stories and may even mean that some issues never find a place on the 
news agenda, as the environmental journalist Alex Kirby notes: 
there is an awful lot of what I would consider as environmental stories that I don't 
bother with, not because I don't think they are interesting but because I don't think 
they are going to get anywhere (quoted in Hannigan, 1995). 
Extreme climate events, however, are not the only trigger of media coverage. The 
release of key scientific reports and studies, such as those produced by the IPCC every 
five years, as well as significant international conferences or initiatives, for example, the 
various Conference of the Parties, produce media coverage. Indeed, at the time of 
writing, global warming is gaining media attention as the Earth Summit in 
Johannesburg gets underway. Although such events do not raise concerns about 
sensationalism, as has been suggested above, they do often inspire political controversy 
as they have direct policy implications which create stimulating features. 
The news media, therefore, appears to encourage controversy in the climate debate in its 
search for interesting and exciting stories. Indeed, climate stories may be presented as 
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politically, as well as scientifically, controversial. This was noted by a US sceptic 
amongst the interviewees, who suggested that a television corporation `had a particular 
vested interest' in misrepresenting the George C Marshall Institute and the climate 
scientists associated with it (US interview L, 2000). The interviewee claimed that the 
corporation took a deliberately provocative stance in the hope of making their 
programme controversial, interesting and widely watched (US interview L, 2000). But 
more than this, however, it seems likely that the television corporation was trying to 
make a political point. But the George C Marshall Institute scientists were also playing 
their own political game. They appear to have solicited the coverage themselves. This 
reflected the hope that coverage of their scientific arguments would win support for 
their political perspectives and thus influence the wider political arena. The attempt, 
however, appears to have backfired. 
Media interest in climate may, at times, raise the profile of the subject. However, this is 
not necessarily advantageous to climate science, because the subject may be presented 
in a way that is selective, inaccurate, or insensitive. In the light of this potential for 
climate change stories to be distorted we might ask why climate scientists become 
involved in the mass media. 
6.4.3 Climate Scientists and Direct Media Involvement 
This section analyses the thoughts of UK and US climate scientists, to investigate the 
roles that they perceive themselves to play in putting stories on the news agenda and 
shaping the news content. Most importantly, it examines the extent to which climate 
scientists perceive involvement in the media to be a means of gaining scientific, and 
ultimately political, influence. 
Scientists are sometimes uniquely positioned to place certain issues on the public 
agenda because society values their expertise and thus has an interest in their research 
(Hannigan, 1995). Society relies on scientists to identify and explain many of the most 
difficult environmental problems. This involves, to some degree at least, a public profile 
for the scientists involved as they participate in a wider dialogue with publics and 
politicians to shape a policy response. Because of their expertise, scientists are in a 
unique position to introduce new issues on to this public agenda. Indeed, without their 
involvement policy makers are more likely to make bad decisions in framing any 
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response (Liftin 1994). Bell (1973) went so far as to predict an imminent shift to a 
society where theoretical knowledge was central to policy formation and scientific 
experts would be the primary advisors to government and business. Some signs of this 
are evident with respect to climate change, where the IPCC has an important role in 
informing politicians of advances in climate research. Climate scientists have created a 
viewpoint which cannot be ignored because global warming could pose a serious threat 
to society and the environment. 
The charge has been made that some environmental stories are effectively censored 
because `politicians, bureaucrats, and corporate managers regularly insist that 
information about environmental risks and crisis be channelled through them' (Tankard 
et al, 1991, p. 11). However, most academic scientists are not beholden to politicians or 
other agents of control and feel free to discuss their work. This partly reflects scientists' 
perceptions of their own roles; not least the idea, discussed earlier, that the academic 
world is independent from other societal interests. Indeed, it is invariably the case that 
academic scientists are freer to voice their concerns than those contracted by business, 
or government employees, such as Met Office scientists. Individuals in these latter 
categories are often discouraged from communicating with the media about climate 
change, seemingly to protect the interests of government agencies and business (UK 
interviewee G, 2000; UK interviewee E, 2000). Given the controversy surrounding 
climate science and the potential that climate change has to impose structural limitations 
on the development of modern societies, it is not surprising that some degree of 
censorship exists in these cases. 
Those scientists who opt to become involved with the media, especially when dealing 
with controversial and policy relevant science, risk exposing themselves to heightened 
public scrutiny. The results of this are not always positive for a scientist's work and 
reputation, especially if the media exposure appears premature and the scientific results 
untested. This was highlighted by the case of Dr Arpad Pusztai (1998), whose work on 
the potential health risks of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) attracted 
considerable media attention (BBC News, 1998). Pusztai's work on GM potatoes and 
their apparent ill-effects on rats received coverage on UK television before it had been 
academically `validated' by the publication of peer reviewed papers. This left Pusztai in 
a vulnerable position. It was relatively easy for opponents to discredit his work, and his 
own academic institution sought to distance itself from controversial and `unproven' 
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claims (Tudge, 1999). Episodes such as this suggest further reason for caution amongst 
scientists regarding media involvement. Some scientists may feel inhibited about media 
coverage, not because of any perceptions of censorship, but because they are wary of 
the implications for their work of intrusive or inaccurate reporting. 
Yet scientific research continues to attract media attention and there are good reasons 
for scientists to seek coverage for their work. Litfin (1994, p. 33) argues that `scientists 
care and are committed to specific values ... they 
believe in the value of their own 
information'. Assuming this to be the case, some scientists may be driven by a moral 
duty, rather than any search for individual advantage, to disseminate their findings to 
the widest possible audience. A UK interviewee supports Litfin's suggestion, asserting 
that: 
its the duty of the scientists to inform the public and I think it's a very rewarding 
thing to do (UK interviewee G, 2000). 
Indeed, if the public pay for science, then perhaps scientists should be available to 
inform the public of their research. Public communication by scientists, however, does 
extend their accountability beyond the scientific community (Nelkin, 1987). Hendersen- 
Sellers (1998, p. 429) notes that scientists generally believe that they have a duty to 
communicate their results to the widest possible audience as a means of educating the 
public, or to `pay-back public funding'. But controversial science may inspire other 
motives. Perhaps some climate scientists get involved with the media because they want 
to advance a specific perspective on the issue, to raise their individual profile as an 
authority on the subject, and, ultimately, to secure greater funding for their research 
area. 
Elements of such an argument were advanced by individual interviewees. One US 
interviewee suggested that American scientists who have had their views reported in the 
popular media have an advantage in the competition for further funding because the 
attention gives them greater recognition and, consequently, credibility: 
if you are well represented in the literature, in the press as well, if you are known in 
wider circles, then funding is easier. Most funding agencies would like people who 
are well known (US interviewee D, 2000). 
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The respondent went on to explain that he has himself encouraged his research group to 
seek media exposure (US interviewee D, 2000). The US interviewee described how his 
research group made sure that their work was presented in the `newspapers ... or written 
up in the New York Times ... as 
it was helpful in getting funding, to be able to point out 
that we have such representation' (US interviewee D, 2000). 
Other interviewees observed that universities were often keen for scientists to become 
involved with the media. They noted that deans and other institutional leaders will 
sometimes pressure researchers to obtain media exposure (US interviewee B, 2000). 
Larger private universities in the US, such as Stanford and MIT, have a `system of 
getting young scientists recognised by the press' (US interviewee B, 2000). These 
comments accord with previous claims that a national sample of social and physical 
scientists showed that, 
engaging in the public dissemination of information ... may be instrumental in 
obtaining `external' rewards - such as research funding (Dunwoody and Ryan, 
1985, p. 26). 
Yet, interviewees noted that public exposure can sometimes backfire. One respondent 
suggested that a US sceptic had experienced funding difficulties as a direct result of his 
assertiveness in expressing his views publicly (US interviewee B, 2000). 
The interviewees also raised issues about the ways in which institutions react to the 
involvement of the scientists they employ in media discussion of controversial issues. 
One US interviewee drew a distinction between the stance of different institutions. He 
claimed that whereas large and prestigious institutions such as Harvard and MIT can 
afford to accommodate vocal and controversial scientists, other less well-established 
universities may be more defensive of their reputation (US scientists D, 2000). This 
implies different experiences of academic freedom. Some of the same reservations were 
expressed by UK interviewees. While positive coverage is supported by institutions, UK 
interviewees were unanimous that controversial media publicity was not encouraged by 
universities and their senior staff. This reflects institutional concerns that the reputation 
of the university as a whole may be coloured by association with maverick individual 
scientists. Indeed, Dunwoody and Ryan (1985, p. 26) note that academic environments 
do not encourage individuals to become involved `in the public dissemination of 
information'. Hendersen-Sellers (1998) also claims that scientists' careers may suffer 
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and individuals may experience `retribution' from colleagues if they go against 
scientific orthodoxy or speak out too strongly about a controversial issue. Relations 
within institutions may also be soured by personal rivalries when individuals attain a 
high public profile through media work. The accusation was sometimes made that the 
time demands of being a `media scientist' prevent some individuals from continuing to 
research and teach within their own institutions, with the implication that this 
undermined their scientific credibility (UK interviewee F, 2000). 
Although, there are evidently a number of vocal climate scientists who argue the 
protagonist case - such as Schneider, Houghton and Wigley, it appears that, given the 
proportion of contrarians to protagonists, the former are more frequently in the public 
eye. This is perhaps because they place greater priority on alternatives to the 
conventional academic means of disseminating their arguments. But it is also the case 
that they benefit from the need that the media often has to present both sides in any 
argument. In contrast with the protagonists, all the contrarian interviewees had 
experience of media involvement. They did not, however, overtly state that they chose 
public communication as a result of any difficulties with publication in peer-reviewed 
journals. An alternative motivation was suggested by a US social commentator who 
argued that sceptics' behaviour reflected their `concern that people are being mislead' 
by climate protagonists (US interviewee 0,2000). Such thinking was also echoed in a 
rather less idealistic list of motives set out by a UK interviewee, who claimed that 
sceptic scientists have a high media profile because `they probably like publicity, like 
getting some money, they may believe in it as well' (UK interviewee K, 2000). In 
addition, some contrarians may identify media publicity as the best means to gain 
influence over the policy process for their own scientific and political perspective. 
Chapter Three suggested that particularly vocal scientists may be prime targets for 
`purchase' by businesses with a vested interest in questioning climate change, 
emphasising uncertainty and postponing precautionary action. Such a strategy is 
potentially effective as science is widely perceived to be a privileged good within 
modem society, and scientists generally command a respectful audience. In turn, 
individual scientists benefit from a new funding source, whether to support further 
research, or to enhance their personal income (see Chapter Five, section 5.4). It may 
follow that some scientists deliberately court media coverage to attract this form of 
external sponsorship. For example, scientists associated with the George C Marshall 
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Institute, who do not produce academically reviewed publications, use media coverage 
not only for the immediate dissemination of their views, but to attract continued 
financial and political sponsorship. As Nelking (1987, p. 18) argues, such scientists are 
overtly engaged in political campaigning to `attract support from legislators, corporate 
leaders and foundation executives'. Interviewees endorsed this argument, noting that 
some scientists are publicly vocal because media exposure attracts political attention to 
their perspectives (UK interviewee K, 2000). As another UK interviewee put it, climate 
scientists' involvement with the `non peer-reviewed press is a political question' (UK 
interviewee S, 2000). 
The media has also been used by groups and scientists advancing a sceptical stance on 
climate change to accuse IPCC protagonists of deliberately misrepresenting scientific 
facts (Paterson, 1996a). As noted in Chapter Five, in mid 1996 the motives of the lead 
authors of the IPCC WGI report - Houghton, Wigley and Santer - were publicly 
questioned via the media. Through the New York Post and the Washington Times, the 
director of George C Marshall Institute and President Emeritus of Rockefeller 
University, Dr Frederick Seitz, amongst others, claimed that the IPCC report had been 
`constructed, reviewed and finally published' to invoke political action against 
greenhouse gas emissions (Hendersen-Sellers, 1998, p. 436). He accused the authors of 
the IPCC of `exaggerating risk... solely - we suspect - to satisfy an ideological 
objective of aggressively constraining the use of energy' (Seitz quoted in Gelbspan, 
1998, p. 53). He also stated that he had `never seen a more disturbing corruption of the 
peer review process' (Seitz quoted in Melloan, 2001). The lead authors conceded that 
they had `re-worded' certain section of the report's text, but argued that this was 
justified in the interests of clarifying the argument. The authority of this particular 
report, and perhaps, in some quarters at least, of the IPCC itself, was, nevertheless, 
weakened. Sceptic climate scientists also gained support for their views from specific 
papers. In the US, the Wall Street Journal is particularly interested in conveying and 
gaining support for the contrarian stance, which accords with the papers' pro-business, 
pro-Republican perspective (for example, Singer 1997). This was noted by a UK 
interviewee: 
The Wall Street Journal doesn't present a fair picture of climate change science at 
all. Maybe that's because it thinks its readers want to hear the sceptical views, so 
they have articles which come from some institute in Oregon .... 
[The Wall Street 
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Journal] certainly go over board in trying to use them to show a particular end (UK 
interviewee E, 2000). 
The respondent explained that the paper expresses this viewpoint to support the case 
that anthropogenic climate change should not inspire either concern, or political action 
(UK interviewee E, 2000). Similarly, the Washington Post promotes a sceptical 
viewpoint about global warming (see for instance, Warrick 1997). 
Arguments about the links between media exposure and funding are, however, by no 
means simple. Two US interviewees (US interviewee 0,2000; US interviewee P, 2000) 
made the case that scientists who adopt a high profile on climate change sometimes 
have a primary interest in other research areas. As a result media exposure - whether 
negative or positive - has relatively little impact on their ability to access grants for 
projects for this other research. A case in point may be Stephen Schneider, a US 
protagonist based at Stanford, one of the wealthiest universities in the world. 
Schneider's work on climate and climate physics have made him well known, but he 
holds a full professorship in the Department of Biology, giving him the opportunity to 
work in a number of different fields (US interviewee 0,2000). Schneider thus enjoys 
academic security and regular public communications regarding climate change cannot 
threaten his position or career. Equally, Richard Lindzen, one of the most vocal US 
contrarians, holds a permanent tenured position and professorship at MIT, a high-status 
institution. Lindzen has also reached to pinnacle of his profession and is seen to have 
nothing to lose by taking a public stand (US interviewee D, 2000). Although vocal 
contrarians are less numerous in the UK, a similar argument can be made about one of 
the most prominent, Professor Phillip Stott of the University of London (Amos, 2001). 
Stott holds an emeritus chair in a field, biogeography, that is related only indirectly to 
the study of climate change. He thus has few constraints upon his freedom to speak out. 
Another UK sceptic, Dr Piers Corbyn, is founder and managing director of the 
forecasting organisation Weather Action, and also lectures at South Bank University in 
London on computing and mathematics (Guldberg, 2000; Revis, 1997). Again it is 
evident that his professional posts are not necessarily related exclusively to climate 
science. All these scientists are thus in a strong position to advocate controversial views 
publicly (UK interviewee S, 2000). 
Such high-profile scientists are often successful in the media because they understand 
its mechanisms, they are precise, able to think across disciplines and translate scientific 
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language into ordinary English. But they also ignore the uncertainties that are a 
necessary part of the scientific discourse (Dunwoody and Ryan, 1983, p. 647). Indeed, 
they have `a natural ability, and learn or cultivate the talents, of effective 
communication with and through the media' (Hendersen-Sellers, 1998, p. 430). The 
media, therefore, often relies on these scientists for their opinions on global warming. 
However, the position of media-involved scientist's may be manipulated; if, for 
example, their prestige is used to legitimate policy objectives in areas beyond their 
specific expertise (Litfin, 1994). Such strategies may help to explain the presence 
amongst the most vocal commentators on climate change of scientists whose research is 
not exclusively related to global warming. Governments and other interests may find it 
convenient to use vocal sceptics as an excuse to ignore the advice of the IPCC. This is 
arguably particularly the case in the US under the administration of George W Bush. 
Disagreement amongst experts - here between vocal climate protagonists and sceptics - 
can also be used as a reason to delay action. 
Interviewees universally recognised the personal financial gains made by media-active 
scientists. Furthermore, media exposure of global warming resulted in political attention 
and, thus, funding for climate research (UK interviewee K, 2000). It is generally the 
case that media communication gains support for research funding (Gascoigne and 
Metcalfe 1997; Henderson-Sellers, 1998; Dunwoody and Ryan, 1985). Thus, motivation 
for eminent scientists' media involvement is perhaps twofold - to gain political 
publicity, which will in turn gain both further research funding for the subject, and to 
increase the individual's personal funding. Some climate scientists are prepared to 
become involved in the media because it raises public awareness of the issue. But often 
the motives are mixed, reflecting both a moral responsibility to communicate scientific 
knowledge and increase public understanding, and a desire to raise an individual's 
profile. This was neatly expressed by one UK interviewee: 
Perhaps I like being on television, I don't know! I'm vocal because... I used to 
believe in the fact that if we speak out this would perhaps attract some good 
publicity and get people to come towards us. Our motive is that we believe it's 
right... I probably enjoy being on television at times, but if I only wanted to be on 
television I could always find something else to do (UK interviewee K, 2000) 
It appears, therefore, that media-involved scientists are genuinely concerned about 
global warming. They may have a mixture of other motives - including access to 
political influence and research funding - but they are not solely interested in using the 
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subject as a vehicle for getting on television. Although, of course, if they were, it would 
be unlikely that they would openly acknowledge such motives. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The first half of this chapter set out to investigate the experience of climate scientists, 
considering the possible influence that they obtain within the global warming debate 
through publishing their research through academic circles. It highlighted that scientists' 
manoeuvres within the publishing process contradicted the Polanyi (1962) and 
Mertonian (1973) models of objective science. Some scientists are motivated to publish 
articles to advance their careers and university profiles, and help secure further research 
funding. However, some scientists also believed that it was their moral duty to 
disseminate knowledge to a wider audience. Increasing institutional pressure on 
scientists to publish and target prestigious journals may lead some scientists to research 
well-funded subject areas, in the belief that this will generate a number of high impact 
papers. Recognising the pragmatic manoeuvres of some climate scientists, it is 
possibleto question the integrity of the peer review process. This is perhaps even more 
serious when considering the alleged claims of discrimination by some sceptics 
regarding their experience of publishing their work. They accused protagonists of 
systematic discrimination, asserting that their papers were marginalised or excluded. 
Within an extremely competitive environment which is compounded by struggles 
between particular viewpoints for academic credibility and influence within the policy 
arena, there is perhaps a motive for some protagonists to attempt to discredit climate 
sceptics. Protagonists may, therefore, discredit sceptics to strengthen their own 
credentials. However, it was recognised that scientific debate is crucial for the 
advancement of science. Thus, some sceptics' assertions are more a reflection of 
individual grievances. Specifically, the continuing publication of contrarian research 
serves, in itself, to perpetuate a degree of uncertainty within climate science, thus 
encouraging further funding to advance understanding of the issue. It is perhaps the 
case, therefore, that protagonists have an interest in seeing that sceptics get their 
research published. Indeed, Table 6.1 highlights the successful publication of papers 
relating to climate change in three leading academic journals by six prominent US 
contrarians. Although the number of publications produced by sceptics was smaller, 
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compared to their counterparts, Table 6.1 suggests that contrarians were not completely 
marginalised. 
It is appropriate to remind ourselves of Litfin's (1994, p. 29) claim that `The power of 
scientists to interpret reality has itself become a productive source of political power'. 
Scientist's academic influence is gained primarily through the validation and 
publication of their knowledge in peer-reviewed outlets. In this context scientists 
themselves make most of the key decisions about what is published and withheld. 
Academic referees and editors exert a particular influence upon the publication of 
papers by specific researchers and the degree of exposure available to the different 
arguments of sceptics and protagonists. However, the readership of academic papers is 
usually small and restricted to the scientific community itself. Scientists may, therefore, 
pursue other avenues to attract attention to their arguments, including coverage in the 
mass media. Such reporting reaches a much wider public and political audience than the 
vast majority of academic papers. Media scientists may, therefore, gain a greater 
influence upon public and policy debate. 
The second half of this chapter, therefore, considered the mass media as an alternative 
or complementary outlet to peer reviewed academic publications. It examined the 
motives of scientists who seek a media platform. As a subtext it considered the triggers 
for media reports on global warming. It was noticed that the media encourages 
controversy by presenting stories which are both politically and scientifically 
contentious in the search for interesting and exciting stories. 
Significant events, such as international climate conferences, or the release of reports or 
key research, also gain coverage. Yet, global warming stories were often inaccurate and 
selective (Hendersen-Sellers, 1998). With such problems associated with the 
presentation of scientific information the reasons for climate scientists involvement with 
the media were analysed. On the one hand, climate scientists appeared to engage in 
public communication as a means to gain scientific, and ultimately political, influence, 
knowing that disseminating or publishing their work via the mass media probably 
results in their work reaching a wider audience. This may increase support for their 
views and their influence upon policy-makers. On the other hand, climate scientists 
claimed that some individuals were active in the media because they were more likely to 
raise their individual profile and have an advantage in the competition for further 
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funding. It was also noted that public dissemination of knowledge perhaps helped to 
secure greater funding for the climate change field. Some climate scientists, however, 
may simply engage in the media because they believe it is their moral duty to 
disseminate their findings as widely as possible. 
It was also recognised that climate sceptics are more frequently in the public eye. This is 
probably because they seek alternative routes to publishing their knowledge. They also 
benefit from the media trying to represent a balanced view of the issue considering the 
majority of climate scientists are protagonists. Thus, climate sceptics are perhaps 
individually more influential within the climate debate because of the extent of their 
media coverage, by comparison with the mass of protagonist scientists. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusion 
a society which measures man's worth in terms of volume of 
publications accumulated is no less sick than one which measures his 
worth in terms of dollars amassed. The academic community has no 
right to cast stones - it has taken on the values of the society which 
spawned it, substituting stacks of paper for stacks of money... (Stea, 
1969, p. 1). 
7.1 Recapitulation: Theoretical Foundations 
The science of anthropogenic climate change is complex, contested and uncertain, and 
continues to be debated amongst scientists, politicians, commercial interests and the 
wider public. Within science itself, differing opinions can usefully - if rather too simply 
- be represented as a division between contrarians, or sceptics, who question the scale, 
and even the reality of anthropogenic climate change, and protagonists, who argue that 
such climate change is not only real, but a serious threat to the continuing development 
of established socio-economic systems. 
It is this potential impact upon both environmental and human systems that renders 
climate change more than a matter of scientific debate. The adverse effects of climate 
change could destroy habitats and property, undermine livelihoods and exacerbate 
social inequality on a national and a global scale. Hence, some concerned observers 
argue, the need for urgent action to reduce existing emissions of greenhouse gases. Key 
means for securing such reductions include significant advances in energy conservation 
and efficiency, and a switch from dependency on fossil fuels to much greater use of 
energy derived from renewable and low-emission sources. An optimistic reading of this 
process of change is that it guarantees the continuation of economic and social 
development in the long term, while also creating specific new commercial 
opportunities for producers of alternative and sustainable energy. But counter arguments 
abound; these not only stress the short-term costs of transition and the potential loss of 
economic growth and social welfare entailed, but also question the necessity for any 
immediate action at all, in the absence of any absolute proof of human impact upon 
climate. 
This wider debate about the impacts of both climate change per se and the policies 
proposed to address it inevitably focuses greater attention than would otherwise be the 
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case upon the work of climate scientists. This expert group is not only our chief source 
of information about the workings of global climate systems and future climate trends, 
but potentially also an important influence upon the framing of policy responses to 
climate change and the urgency with which they are pursued. External scrutiny of the 
activities of scientists and the circumstances of the production of scientific knowledge is 
not, however, peculiar to the case of climate scientists. Indeed, the thesis has been able 
to draw upon a substantial literature which explores the potentially complex 
relationships between science and scientists, on the one hand, and a broad range of 
economic, social and political interests, on the other. Often, such work aims to explore 
the nature of the links which bind science and society together; a mutual dependency 
which ultimately rests upon society's need for the knowledge generated through 
scientific research, and the needs of scientists for the injection of continued funding to 
facilitate this research. Exploration of the process of exchange between scientists and 
external sponsors, however, throws up further questions about the extent to which the 
production of scientific knowledge is influenced by the availability of funding. At the 
very least this may distort the scientific agenda by directing research efforts 
differentially towards ends that interest specific powerful sponsors. At worst, it is 
sometimes alleged, the power of money acts to undermine scientific integrity, leading to 
scientific `findings' that are not an objective representation of reality, but a reflection of 
the self-interested world-view of a particular sponsor. Any such distortion of scientific 
`truth' is, arguably, not only particularly likely, but also likely to have particularly 
profound societal impacts, where - as is the case with climate change - research 
addresses areas of knowledge that are academically contested and bear directly upon 
commercial and political policy (Jones, 2002). 
The specific study of climate change science and its practitioners presented here should, 
therefore, be viewed in relation to a wider body of research addressing the nature of 
science as an activity and scientists' relationships with other societal actors. Previous 
attempts to theorise the relationship between science and society have included those 
which tend to polar extremes. Accounts such as those advanced by Merton (1973) and 
Polanyi (1962) present an idealised science that is defined as a separate sphere of 
activity where the pursuit of knowledge proceeds unencumbered by external influences. 
At the other end of the spectrum, some reductionist interpretations of Marxist political 
economy argue that the economic base exerts such an all-embracing influence upon 
social and intellectual life, that the course of production of scientific knowledge is 
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entirely determined by its external paymasters (cf Bunge, 1991; Sohn-Rethel, 1975). 
For reasons detailed in Chapter Three, neither of these perspectives seems a useful 
theoretical starting point for the present study. The existence of such views of science 
is, however, a useful counterpoint to the neo-Marxist approach adopted here. We must 
also remember that the ideal of science as an independent sphere beyond the influence 
of external interests is still widely cited as a justification for the privileged status often 
accorded to scientific knowledge. It is thus a view of science that retains an appeal for 
some of the scientists interviewed for this thesis and, doubtless, also for many of those 
who sponsor science. 
Initial empirical discussion of the recent evolution of climate science in Chapter Two 
suggests that any theoretically-informed account of scientific activity must take account 
of its relationships with a wider political, economic and social context. However, it 
appears that the complexity of these relationships cannot begin to be accurately 
represented by crudely reductionist models that accord a dominant influence to an 
undifferentiated economic base. By comparison, engagement with neo-Marxist models 
of society and of the links between economic interests and other societal forces offers 
the potential to address the undoubted external influences upon scientific activity in a 
more sophisticated fashion. 
As noted in Chapter Three, the thesis thus starts from the position that the workings of a 
capitalist economy exert an influence upon the character of the state, and on the conduct 
of science. Economy, politics and science should not, however, be taken to constitute a 
simple unity of interest. Indeed, the logic of the different roles allocated to the economic 
and political spheres is that the latter should preserve at least a degree of autonomy (cf 
Block, 1987a, 1987b; Miliband, 1977; Poulantzas, 1978). The state can only perform its 
allotted role of manager, or guardian of the long-term survival of capitalist economic 
growth, if it has the freedom to pursue policies that work against specific capitalist 
interests in the short term (Miliband, 1969; Schwarzmantel, 1994). Preservation of the 
health of the environment is a case in point. Action to combat environmental 
degradation is unlikely to be adopted voluntarily by business where it runs counter to 
the short-term pursuit of profit and economic growth. But such action is often necessary 
to preserve the integrity of environmental systems on which long-term economic 
development depends. If the state is to promote effective environmental action in such a 
context it must have the means to overcome business resistance. This requires not only 
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that the state has the political means to promote effective environmental policy, but also 
that such policy is legitimated by scientific understanding of environmental processes 
and problems. 
Thinking in this way immediately suggests that there are likely to be several different 
motives for external sponsorship of research in environmental science. It is not simply 
the case that business will sponsor research - either directly, or through its influence 
over state funding systems - that has the greatest potential to advance its short-term 
aims of economic growth and pursuit of profit. The state may also sponsor research that 
aims to identify and address environmental threats to the long-term survival of existing 
economic and political systems. This, in turn, may create new motives for business 
sponsorship of research in response to this diagnosis of environmental problems. Nor, 
evidently, should we assume a total unity of interest within the two spheres of business 
and politics. As just noted, state-directed funding for scientific research may be directed 
both towards projects with direct commercial applications and those which reveal the 
necessity of addressing the environmental costs generated by business. At the same 
time, particular sectors of business may come to regard specific environmental issues in 
different ways that inspire different interests in scientific research. For energy-intensive 
heavy industry climate change is potentially a problem to be down-played because the 
policy response threatens to impose major short-term costs. By contrast, business 
interests keen to exploit the commercial opportunities of emission-free energy sources 
may actively seek to promote science that promises to increase demand for their 
products by maximising the environmental and economic threats associated with 
climate change. Other business sectors, such as the insurance industry, have their own 
reasons for seeking clarification of the expected extent of damage and liability caused 
by climate change (Paterson, 1996b). 
Neo-Marxist models thus offer a logic for the existence of a diversity of interests as 
competing influences upon the scientific agenda. Indeed, the population of actors can be 
extended beyond the different branches of the state and the various sectors of business 
to embrace a growing number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) representing 
a whole series of social, economic and environmental interests. However, the view of 
science outlined above also raises questions about the role of scientists themselves and 
the specific conduct of science that are less well addressed by existing theory, which 
chiefly focuses on the spheres of politics and the economy. Hence, the empirical focus 
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of the present thesis and the attempt made to explore the actions and opinions of climate 
scientists. 
If existing neo-Marxist theories of the state help us to outline the different potential 
motives that may explain external sponsorship of science, they are less forthcoming as a 
starting point for any attempt to explore the extent to which scientists themselves set the 
agenda for research and participate as active partners in decision-making about the 
distribution of funding. Yet, clearly, there are good reasons for thinking that scientists 
do often play such active roles, rather than being cast as the passive recipients of 
funding distributed by outside interests. Science is valued by society because of 
particular insights it offers into the nature of human existence, the character of the 
physical world which we inhabit and the effects of interaction between human and 
natural systems. Such knowledge confers influence upon those who produce it. As 
noted above, the links between science and society rest not only on the financial 
demands of science, but also on society's need for the `useful' knowledge which, 
uniquely - at least in the world-view that constitutes modernism - derives from science. 
It follows, as Litfin (1994, p. 29), amongst others, has argued that `The power of 
scientists to interpret reality has become a productive source of political power'. This is 
not, of course, to assert that the `political power' accorded to scientists by virtue of their 
expertise cannot be over-ridden or outweighed by other forces. Indeed, the existence of 
contrary scientific opinion on a particular issue may in practice reduce the status of the 
scientist as expert. Rather than policy being shaped by a definitive scientific opinion, 
other actors are able to select and promote the science that best serves to legitimate their 
existing stance. Therefore, as noted in Chapter Three, it may be better to regard 
expertise as conferring influence - that is `an episodic effect on decision-making' (Arts, 
1998, p. 58) - upon scientists, rather than any more enduring ability to direct the 
determination of policy. But such claims maintain expectations that some scientists, at 
least, play an active role in shaping state policy in areas such as environmental 
protection. Moreover, in so doing they are also making decisions that will directly affect 
the future distribution of research funding in related fields. This raises questions, that 
can best be addressed empirically, about the extent of scientific influence and the degree 
to which it is consciously wielded in particular instances. Nor it is clear whether the 
influence that is deemed to derive from expertise is exerted by the broad mass of 
scientists, or only by a minority whose particular scientific reputation or political 
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enterprise enables them to secure positions of authority. We must also consider how any 
such influence might be evident within the scientific sphere. 
Attention to definition of the research and policy agenda as a means of influencing the 
distribution of research funding must also be complemented by exploration of the 
dissemination of research results. It may be particularly important to ask in situations, as 
is true of climate change, where there are competing scientific interpretations of reality 
how any struggle for status as a single legitimate and correct understanding is played 
out. Here, denial of funding for alternative perspectives may be reinforced by attempts 
to block the circulation of the ideas they embody through established scientific channels 
of publication. Increasingly, however, any denial of access to traditional academic 
means of information dissemination may be effectively overturned. Use of the general 
media and the world-wide-web offers alternative voices the means to reach much larger 
audiences than could ever be envisaged via academic publications. 
The recognition that contest, both internal and external to science itself, impacts upon 
the process of scientific research has potentially profound implications for our 
understanding of the nature of the knowledge generated as an end product. Idealised 
visions of science accord legitimacy to the knowledge produced because it is the result 
of a disinterested search for `truth'. How then are we to view the outcome of a process 
of scientific production that seems tainted by the involvement of vested interests? 
Certainly there are commentaries upon climate science that question the legitimacy and 
veracity of sections of its output. Often this relates to charges that the process of 
production of scientific knowledge has been unduly influenced by the economic or 
political agenda of outside interests involved in funding particular research projects. In 
some instances, too, scientists themselves are viewed as conscious `co-conspirators' in a 
process of distortion, or selective interpretation of scientific evidence. Thus the integrity 
of some climate sceptics is deemed to be compromised by their receipt of funding from 
fossil fuel producers and others with a commercial interest in minimising perceptions of 
any immediate threat from climate change (Beder, 1997,1999; Gelbspan, 1998; Legett, 
1999; Lubbers, 2002; Rowell, 1996). Equally, charges have been laid against some 
climate protagonists that they knowingly work with environmentalists and interests 
including the promoters of emission-free energy sources, to produce science that 
exaggerates the magnitude and consequences of projected climate change (Boehmer- 
Christiansen, 1994a, 1994b; 1997 and forthcoming; Morris, 1997). It is striking, 
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however, that where such charges have been advanced they are invariably laid against 
one specific side in the climate debate by commentators sympathetic to its scientific 
opponents. The impression sometimes given, therefore, is that any `misbehaviour' is a 
particular and unusual departure from an otherwise legitimate scientific process. Such 
work seems more a continuation of scientific arguments about climate change by other 
means, than a balanced attempt to understand the nature of climate science. 
The argument thus far provides a useful way of thinking about the climate change 
debate and the conduct of climate science. It also serves to reinforce the case for further 
empirical investigation; we must therefore turn to review the main findings of the 
research undertaken here. 
7.2 Funding in Practice and its Implications 
Given the theoretical importance attached to the financial connections between science 
and other societal actors it seems appropriate to start by exploring the available 
information about the scale and sources of funding for climate research outlined in 
Chapter Five. It should be noted at the outset that fully detailed information about such 
funding is not readily available. Even published figures for state expenditure on climate 
research do not allow us to distinguish definitively between funding for climate research 
per se and research on the implications of climate change, the potential for preventative 
and ameliorative action and the development of alternative energy systems. The fact 
that published figures for state funding in both the USA and the UK are broken down by 
government department or funding agency does, however, allow us to make some 
informed estimates of the proportion of funding devoted to particular ends. In the UK 
around two-thirds of climate research funding is distributed through NERC; this is the 
most likely sponsor of work investing climate change itself and its effects on 
environmental systems. By comparison, the US government advances much greater 
funding for climate research, but only a small proportion is distributed through the NSF 
as a major sponsor of basic climate research. Some of the funding allocated via NASA, 
the largest single funding agency, will also be devoted to basic climate science. 
However, what is really striking about the US government figures is the scale of 
funding provided by government departments whose chief interest is likely to be in 
applied research in fields such as energy and agriculture. The figures presented in 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show that overall the US government provided just under six times 
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the amount of funding for climate research provided by its UK counterpart. The US 
Department of Agriculture, however, advanced 22 times more funding than the UK 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
This distribution of funding in some ways runs counter to expectations. In the UK there 
is a substantial measure of acceptance of the scientific reality of climate change in 
official circles. This is reflected in a commitment to attempt to meet the targets for 
emission reduction stemming from the Kyoto Protocol. Clearly, however, this does not 
preclude continuing investment in basic research; much more is still to be discovered 
about the scale, timing and geographical patterning of both climate change and its 
environmental effects. However, there seems, on the face of it to be a stronger case for 
continuing investment in basic research in the USA, where arguments about the 
uncertainty of the existing science have been used in government and other circles to 
justify the lack of a definite commitment to specific emission reduction targets. More 
recent figures might, indeed, allow us to identify the investment in research made under 
the administration of George W Bush in the aftermath of American withdrawal from the 
Kyoto process. It is a moot point, however, whether any such investment is intended to 
speed the resolution of scientific uncertainty or to perpetuate it. 
For all their limitations the departmental breakdowns of the US and UK government 
funding totals are useful in apparently confirming that a variety of motives and sectional 
interests within government account for state support for research in this particular field. 
The scale of state funding for climate research and its distribution through a series of 
different ministries and agencies is consistent with the arguments outlined above 
regarding the state's interest in receiving a range of different sorts of scientific advice. 
This includes the best available advanced warning about the reality and scale of any 
potential environmental threat to economic development and, by extension, political 
stability. Where a threat is deemed to be real and serious, the state also has an interest in 
applied scientific research that will assist in the identification of strategies intended to 
reduce the scale of damaging environmental change, or to temper its impacts upon 
human and environmental systems. 
The existence of financial support for climate research from a range of other sources 
also seems consistent with previous arguments about the range of different motives for 
funding such research. The scale of funding from non-governmental sources, either in 
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total or as grants to particular researchers, is much more difficult to discern than was the 
case with respect to the state. It is clear, however, that money for research on issues 
related to climate change is being provided by a range of businesses, charities and 
NGOs. Business sponsorship is almost certainly the largest of these sources, especially 
in the USA. The motives for business sponsorship of climate research are likely to be 
different from those of the state - although the activities of the two groups are 
sometimes intertwined. Business interest in climate science is not necessarily related to 
the implications of climate change per se, but to the effects of actual or potential state 
policy implemented in response to climate change. 
A sense of the diversity of inter-related interests underlying business sponsorship of 
climate research is reinforced by acknowledgement of the range of different businesses 
involved. These include both those that might be expected to have a particular interest 
in downplaying the anthropogenic contribution to climate change (especially as this 
relates to modem energy-intensive industrial systems) and those for which climate 
change brings either specific risks (such as increased costs for the insurance industry) or 
opportunities (in, for example, the marketing of emission-free energy systems). It 
should also be noted that these sectional interests within business are not fixed and 
unchanging. Some major energy companies, for example, were initially chiefly 
interested in securing scientific evidence that would allow them to continue to question 
the links drawn between climate change and emissions from the combustion of fossil 
fuels. Maintaining this position has proved to be not only scientifically difficult, but in 
some respects commercially unattractive. As a result some energy providers have 
switched funding away from basic science to invest in the development of alternative 
energy systems as a basis for future business activity (see for example, Environmental 
Defense Organisation, 2000; Mastio, 1998; Rowlands, 2000; cf Lubbers, 2002, and 
Boehmer-Christiansen, 1996). 
Other actors in the system of sponsorship that surrounds climate science include NGOs 
and charities. Some of these are themselves directly connected to business, which 
provides much of their funding. The George C Marshall Institute, for example, pursues 
a pro-business and anti-regulation agenda. It is this central interest which not only 
explains its involvement in debating environmental issues, but also strongly colours its 
stance on climate change. In contrast, many other NGOs bring very different 
perspectives to bear upon climate, deriving from primary interests in global 
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development and the reduction of North-South inequalities, or environmental 
protection. The sector as a whole, therefore, provides further evidence of the spectrum 
of different interests involved in contesting climate change. In practice, however, 
charities and NGOs seem to be of lesser importance as sources of scientific funding 
than either business or the state. More often, interviewees indicate, the role of these 
organisations is to promote debate about the implications of climate change and climate 
change policy. This may, of course, have an indirect impact on the funding process in 
helping to draw attention to the work and opinions of specific figures. Publicity 
achieved in this way has consolidated the reputation of certain individuals as leading 
researchers and commentators, thus increasing their chances of funding from other 
sources. It is, however, possible that association with a controversial campaigning 
organisation and particular sectional interests has worked against some researchers' 
chances of obtaining funding from some more conventional sources. 
A small number of leading climate scientists also appear to tap other sources, 
particularly the media, that represent a further source of commercial funding. Payments 
- often substantial if the figures quoted in some of the interviews for this thesis are 
taken at face value - are obtained for television appearances, journalism and private 
lectures. The fees paid are in many instances a supplement to the personal income of the 
individual scientists concerned, but some may be devoted to supporting research. Some 
sections of the media, particularly the press, undoubtedly have a specific agenda to 
pursue in either highlighting or downplaying the risk of anthropogenic climate change 
and its likely effects. Often, however, the media aim to present both sides in any 
argument. This may work to the advantage of the smaller camp of climate sceptics if 
they obtain equality of coverage with climate protagonists. The result has been to raise 
the profile of a group of prominent sceptics; although as suggested above any reputation 
gained as an advocate of a controversial opinion may be a curse rather than a blessing in 
the search for new research funding. 
It is beyond the scope of the present study to compile comprehensive figures for non- 
state expenditure on climate science, but the evidence of the interviews undertaken here 
seems consistent with previous arguments made by authors such as Beder (1997,1999), 
that the scale of commercial funding in this field is greater in the USA than the UK. The 
most obvious expressions of such commercial sponsorship have often been provided by 
the funding of climate sceptics by fossil fuel producers and related interests in sectors 
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such as the vehicles industry. Indeed, there appears little equivalent logic for 
commercial sponsorship of basic research by climate protagonists, given the apparent 
strength of existing scientific evidence about the risks of climate change. Existing 
climate models are often relatively crude, however, in their indication of the timing and 
geographical distribution of any change (cf Shackley et al, 1998). Further refinement of 
this predictive capacity is likely to be of interest to sectors such as insurance, but this 
has not, as yet translated into any sustained commitment to support work in this field 
(Paterson, 1996b). 
Overall, it seems evident that greater funding is available to support research identified 
with the position of climate protagonists, than is the case for sceptics. Even in the USA 
corporate sponsorship does not greatly alter the picture. Sceptics amongst the current set 
of interviewees often reflected this position in their complaints about unequal access to 
funding, and an equivalent discrimination in the peer review system that determines the 
publication of research in key journals. It is striking, however, that when interviewed, 
leading figures in the sceptic camp did not express any sense of personal dissatisfaction. 
They did not present their own research as being handicapped by lack of funding, or 
opportunities for publishing. In part this seems to reflect an ability to access alternative 
means of securing research funding and dissemination from the conventional channels 
of research councils and refereed journals. Arguably rather more than their protagonist 
counterparts, leading sceptics often derive their current prominence from a willingness 
and ability to use the media to secure publicity for their ideas. They have also made use 
of the increasing potential of the internet to disseminate information extensively and 
rapidly, sometimes using platforms established by pro-business `think-tanks' such as the 
George C Marshall Institute. A brief analysis of the content of several leading journals, 
reported in Chapter Six, shows, however, that sceptical voices are not excluded from 
prestigious academic journals. This and the important business and political connections 
that some scientists have forged ensures that while the sceptic camp is not large, it does 
contain some influential figures. Indeed, in some respects it may serve the interests of 
climate protagonists that this is so. Many appeared to welcome the opportunity for 
continuing scientific debate about the future course of global climate. A more calculated 
argument against the total exclusion of sceptical voices from leading scientific 
publications and other forums is that it may lead potential funders to conclude that 
previous uncertainties and disputes have been resolved, thus reducing the need for 
further research funding. Controversy and debate not only have the potential to advance 
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knowledge; they also help to maintain the profile of a scientific issue as one that 
requires continuing research. 
Both the published figures for state funding and the more impressionistic evidence of 
the interviews points to trans-Atlantic differences in the scale and sources of funding 
available for climate research. This further confirms the limitations of a deterministic 
understanding of relations between science and society. Indeed, it is not simply the case 
that a capitalist economic base, taken as a whole, sponsors programmes of research 
which differ in the specifics of their content in different national circumstances. It is 
also evident that particular interests, such as fossil fuel producers and motor vehicle 
manufacturers, have reacted differently to the issue of climate change in the UK and the 
USA. For example, one of the British climate protagonists interviewed here had 
received funding from the British arm of a major vehicle manufacturer which had 
previously been linked to the sceptic position on climate in the USA. Any theoretical 
account should, therefore, be able to acknowledge and explain such specificity in the 
goals of scientific, commercial and political actors, and the relationships between them. 
The neo-Marxist model adopted here clearly outlines a rationale for the adoption of 
different stances with respect to the environment and environmental policy by specific 
sectors of government and business. But, as noted in Chapter Three, it does tend to 
assume that the logic of these positions is essentially universal, and somehow 
predetermined and unchanging. A determinism based on the assumption of the 
overwhelming influence of a unitary economic base is replaced by a perspective that is 
potentially no less deterministic in ascribing particular stances to the series of different 
economic and political interests which it identifies. Empirical evidence of differences 
and a degree of fluidity in the position adopted by specific actors and interests suggests 
that any future research should revisit the initial assumptions made here about the 
existence and nature of these positions. It may be logical to assume that particular 
interests will react to environmental hazards in particular ways, but this is dangerous if 
it leads us to ignore questions about the ways in which actors might construct and 
reconstruct their own roles and relationships with others in specific circumstances. 
There are perhaps echoes here of Jessop's extension of neo-Marxist theoretical debate 
through his focus on the form and function of the state not as some predetermined 
entity, but as an outcome of past and continuing strategic struggles. Viewed in this way 
the state is far from being a simple instrument of the ruling class; instead it is dynamic, 
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reflecting the balance of power within society at any point in time, and is thus an 
outcome of an ongoing hegemonic struggle (Jessop, 1984,1990). 
Arguably, the state is not bound to fulfil a role as environmental manager, perhaps 
especially in a context in which many key decisions are taken by individual office 
holders whose horizons are determined as much by the short-term prospects for their re- 
election as they are by concerns about the long-term welfare of their citizens. Several 
interviewees - not exclusively climate sceptics - even asserted the immediate value of 
concerns about climate change to governments as a means of raising revenue by 
apparently justifying energy and pollution taxes. Equally, business will not necessarily 
act in ways that reflect its existing set of commercial priorities, perhaps because it sees 
an opportunity for greater future profit through promoting change in public and policy 
stances on environmental issues. This is apparent in the way that leading energy 
companies are moving beyond a base in the production of fossil fuels to secure a stake 
in renewable energy markets. We might also recall the changing stance of DuPont 
regarding the practicality of developing commercial alternatives to CFCs; a change 
widely seen as important in influencing political decision-making about regulating the 
production of ozone-depleting substances (Purvis et al, 2000). 
It seems important, therefore, to learn more about such decision-making in practice; 
about the extent to which specific actors are seen and see themselves as having the 
power to respond in different and changing ways to particular environmental issues; 
about the range of contingent factors which influences any such process; about the 
specifics of relations between different interest groups and the ways in which they 
influence each other's actions; about the understanding that particular interest groups 
display about complex environmental issues and the degree to which their responses 
reflect imperfect knowledge. Ultimately, this points to the need to pay greater attention 
to the motives and decision-making of politicians, civil servants and business leaders to 
complement the focus on scientists evident in much research to date, including the 
present thesis. 
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7.3 Scientific Voices and Self-Perceptions 
This is not, of course, to discount the importance of the evidence provided by scientists 
themselves regarding their relationship with the sponsors of their research and the use 
made of scientific knowledge by society at large. The interviews conducted for the 
present study are interesting in the range of attitudes revealed towards the funding and 
dissemination of research. At one end of this range were many of the comments made 
by interviewees from the UK Met Office, which appeared to reflect a particular sense of 
demarcation between their own role as scientists and the political process of policy 
making. This presentation of science and society as essentially separate realms - very 
much in the manner of theorists such as Merton - perhaps reflected the specifics of their 
institutional context. As government scientists their position was in many respects more 
akin to the civil service than that of independent research scientists working in 
universities and other related institutions. Subsequent events have, however, highlighted 
some of the potential tensions inherent in the relationship between government 
scientists and their political masters. Public statements by Sir David King, the UK's 
Chief Scientific Advisor that climate change represented a greater threat to the future 
stability of world systems than did international terrorism are reported to have provoked 
a hostile political response. Further accusations followed that Downing Street was 
attempting to `muzzle' Sir David to prevent him repeating his argument (Connor and 
Grice, 2004). It should, of course, be noted that these specific comments do more than 
highlight the neglect of scientific evidence about the threat of climate change; they 
might also be taken to imply a criticism of government policy in other fields. 
In the main, the scientists involved do not emerge from the present set of interviews as 
passive or naive figures. They are aware of the interests that potentially motivate 
specific sponsors in funding research - interviewee K, for example, referred to the 
impossibility of undertaking `neutral research' - and lead to their employing the results 
to serve particular commercial and political ends. The reality of the position that the 
basic parameters of their work are set by external expectations that the provision of 
funding will create a return in the form of useful knowledge also prompted interesting 
reactions amongst interviewees. Many acknowledged that a lack of funding imposed 
some limitations on their freedom to set their own research agenda; as interviewee K 
continued `There's all sorts of research I would like to do ... 
[but] no one's going to pay 
me for that'. The existence of funding constraints was not, however, presented as 
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entailing the total loss of autonomy. Certainly, it did not preclude efforts to secure 
support for specific projects driven in part, at least, by a personal and professional 
agenda of scientific curiosity. 
This pursuit of personal scientific interests operates at a number of different levels. 
Interviewees noted the use of relatively simple presentational strategies when applying 
for research funding. To maximise their chances of success they placed greatest stress in 
the initial application on those aspects of the proposed work thought most likely to 
appeal to the sponsor involved. But underlying this statement of intent there were often 
other issues and sources of motivation that were just as important to the individual 
researcher. Indeed, interviewees claimed to be aware of specific instances where 
individual researchers have effectively misrepresented the aims of own work to secure 
funding. It is difficult to substantiate what is largely anecdotal evidence, but the picture 
painted of scientists as actively adopting tactical ploys to obtain funding seems 
consistent with the general tone of the interviews. Such claims also raise interesting 
questions about the extent to which referees reviewing funding applications, usually 
scientists themselves, are aware of the element of gamesmanship and act in ways that 
either perpetuate or frustrate it. 
Some individuals are, however, clearly able to go beyond any limited strategy of 
`subverting' the intent of funding agencies. This is the context within which the notion 
of influence (cf Arts, 1998; Litfin, 1994) emerges most strongly from the empirical 
evidence of the interviews. Individual researchers and members of research teams with 
a strong personal record of scientific work and publication are undoubtedly in a position 
not only to secure further funding for their own activities, but also to influence the 
distribution of funding to their peers. In part this reflects the role that their research 
plays in shaping scientific understanding and by extension their influence over any 
related areas of political policy. These, in turn, are amongst the determinants of 
decision-making about the scale and allocation of future research funding, particularly 
by research councils, government departments and other state-related agencies. Work 
that establishes itself as timely and important is disproportionately likely to receive 
further support. The wider influence that a small number of individual researchers wield 
on the allocation of funding to the work of others also reflects their role as referees of 
both research proposals and journal papers (see Chapter Six). In this way certain 
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individuals act as gatekeepers, shaping both the dissemination of ideas and information 
and the ways in which the scientific community responds to particular arguments. 
The account presented here is thus broadly consistent with the case made by Hart and 
Victor (1993) that a minority of elite scientists exert greater influence over the research 
agenda and relations between science and policy than do the broad mass of their 
colleagues. It is important, however, to acknowledge the qualification to this position 
made by Paterson (1996a); the influence of individuals is reinforced when they are seen 
to be making a case that reflects the opinions and interests of a wider constituency 
within science. Maverick individuals, however senior and forceful, may be sidelined if 
they are seen only to be speaking for themselves. Moreover, debates over the specific 
issue of funding for climate science confirm that it is more accurate to attribute 
influence, as distinct from power (Arts, 1998), to even the most prominent and well- 
connected scientists. The recent history of state funding for climate research in the 
USA, in particular, makes clear that significant changes in the scale and allocation of 
funding do not so much derive from new scientific understanding or expert scientific 
advice to government, as from change in the party of government and the links 
fashioned with leading commercial interests. 
The case of climate change should, however, also cause us to reflect on the implications 
of the availability of funding from different sources for different types of research, even 
within a single field. Potentially, at least, this provides scientists with choices about the 
conduct of their own research. Although a particular prestige was widely attributed by 
interviewees to funding from some specific agencies - particularly the research councils 
in the British context, a status reinforced by the RAE process - they were also aware of 
the potential availability of funding from the range of other sources discussed above. 
Interviewees were not asked to disclose specific details of the research funding awarded 
to them, but discussions for the present study confirm that the majority had secured 
support from a series of different sponsors. In many individual instances these sponsors 
included research councils, government departments and various commercial interests. 
This willingness and ability to tap into a range of different sources of funding implies a 
further source of flexibility for scientists in setting their own research agenda. This 
flexibility, which ultimately derives from the value placed on scientific knowledge by a 
range of different societal actors, rather than the expert status of specific individuals, is 
thus, in principle at least, available to all, whatever their position on climate change. 
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It remains true that a need for funding can lead some researchers to `revise' their 
scientific understanding in line with the position of potential sponsors. But where 
sponsorship is available from a range of different sources it may be that compromises 
on this scale are unnecessary, as researchers are able to seek support from sources 
whose position on climate change matches their own. Moreover, as suggested above, by 
participating in research and exchanges between researchers that appear to reaffirm the 
limitations of current understanding of climate change all researchers help to reinforce 
the case for further funding. Paradoxically, as previously noted, the continuing lack of 
agreement between sceptics and the protagonists is beneficial to both camps in 
justifying continuing investment in research. This should not, however, be taken to 
imply conscious collaboration between the two camps to secure this end. Any such 
strategy might also incur the ultimate risk that continuing disagreement only serves to 
call into question the broader credibility of climate science. 
Predictably, there was little to contradict the widespread assumption that efforts to 
secure research funding are a necessary part of the scientist's role - although the sense 
of being in open competition for funding was less marked in the case of government 
scientists employed through the Met Office. This need to secure external sponsorship 
was not, however, perceived necessarily to involve compromising the objectivity with 
which research was conducted or its results reported. Nor did interviewees raise 
concerns that funders commonly imposed any injunction upon the external discussion 
and publication of research findings. Yet interviewees' characterisation of their own 
stance and actions as legitimate did not prevent some from laying charges of 
opportunism, bias and distortion of scientific evidence against colleagues. Indeed, this is 
not surprising given disputes over the alleged distortion of scientific evidence in key 
documents produced by the IPCC (particularly the Working Group I report) and the 
presentation advanced in previous studies of climate science as beholden to various 
vested interests. 
Hitherto, many of the claims made about the influence of vested interests on research 
have been made in a way that itself presents a rather one-sided image of the conduct of 
climate science. Particular commentators have tended to concentrate on the allegedly 
distorting effects of commercial sponsorship on either the protagonist or the sceptic 
case. This tends to create the impression that any loss of scientific integrity reflects the 
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particular failings of a specific section of the community of climate scientists. 
Individual interviewees often presented their claims in a very similar manner, invariably 
pointing the finger at individuals whose stance on climate change was different from 
their own. But the inclusion of both protagonists and sceptics amongst the present 
sample of interviewees shows that such charges were made in both directions. 
Questions were raised about the legitimacy of the financial support given to the sceptic 
cause by energy companies and other related commercial interests. At the same time, 
climate sceptics were equally ready to charge protagonists - sometimes including 
named individuals - with accumulating substantial earnings, both in terms of personal 
and research income `for being politically correct' on climate change (Interviewee N). 
Interviewee L was particularly blunt in asserting that some scientists place potential 
financial rewards above their own ultimate convictions by taking a calculated decision 
to `support the side that has the most money'. In the light of previous studies where the 
focus has often been upon the implications of various forms of commercial sponsorship, 
it is interesting to note that climate sceptics sometimes attributed a distorting influence 
to state sponsorship of research. More state funding was assumed to be available, 
especially in Britain, for work broadly in line with the protagonist stance on climate 
change. As a result, it was alleged, a desire and need to secure such funding had caused 
some researchers to abandon their previous scepticism about anthropogenic climate 
change. 
Questions raised about the integrity of other scientists were not, however, supported by 
any specific evidence of malpractice. Instead, interviewees implied that receipt of 
funding from particular sources led in some, generally unspecified, way to bad science. 
In some instances it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that an absence of detail 
reflected a real absence of substance to any charges. Rather, that adverse comments 
reflected a degree of personal animosity between individuals (cf Breyman, 1993) - 
something that is not accounted for in theoretical treatments of scientific practice - or an 
intent to undermine the broader stance on climate change that was being discussed. To 
test such suspicions and also to subject claims of bad science to more critical scrutiny 
would, however, be difficult. This is an instance where a methodology based on 
interviews has limitations. Even with the promise of anonymity interviewees are likely 
to be unwilling to lay specific charges against their colleagues - although, as noted, 
some were ready to pass comment in general terms against named individuals! Any 
such charges would not, of course, constitute proof of malpractice; at best they might 
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serve as a starting point for more specific investigations. These, in turn, would present 
any researcher with a formidable challenge both in practical terms - given the likely 
need to secure further information from powerful and uncooperative sources - and in 
proving that the collection or interpretation of scientific evidence had been improperly 
influenced by the demands of external paymasters. The chances of a successful outcome 
to such research would be increased if accounts of the conduct of specific researchers 
and of the execution of particular research contracts could be secured from a series of 
different witnesses. Ideally, this would involve extending the research to include 
participants other than research scientists. Greater knowledge of the public and private 
case made by particular sponsors for their support of climate research, and the use made 
by such sponsors of the research findings would add an important dimension to study of 
the politics of climate science. Such an approach, however, raises very real problems 
about access to confidential and sensitive information. 
7.4 A Revised Agenda for Research 
Neo-Marxist theory, as outlined in Chapter Three, has proved useful in helping to 
formulate important questions about the conduct of climate science and relationships 
between scientists and other actors involved in the funding of science. Theoretical 
expectations concerning the range of potential sponsors of research and their likely 
motives appear to have been more than borne out. Indeed, the interviews conducted 
with scientists and the other evidence presented here suggest a diversity of motives for 
the sponsorship of science and a potential for change over time in the stance of 
individual sponsors that are not readily accommodated by the initial theoretical 
structure. Equally, the reported behaviour of scientists themselves suggests that a range 
of pragmatic strategies exist which allow individuals to retain at least some degree of 
autonomy. Such strategies are not always implemented at the grand level of agenda 
setting by influential scientists (cf Lukes, 1974). This points to the need for further 
study to address the complexity of the circumstances in which climate science is 
undertaken. 
Some of what this further study might entail has been anticipated above. As already 
noted, interviews with scientists should be set against further investigation of the 
attitudes and motives of other actors. Just as this thesis has included attention to 
differences in the stance of scientists, so any further study must engage with the specific 
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attitudes and motives of individual sponsors of scientific research. We need to know 
more about how and why these motives differ; this will involve attention to the stance 
of actors in particular national contexts, the potential for changes over time in the 
motives and attitudes of sponsors, and an exploration of the potential diversity of 
opinion at any one time within large institutional sponsors. The influence that potential 
sponsors exert upon each other, either directly through research funding, or in 
responding to related policy initiatives must also be taken into account. If we accept that 
research funding is provided to generate useful knowledge for an external sponsor we 
also need to know more about how this affects decision-making in practice about its 
allocation. We need to consider the extent to which the usefulness of knowledge is 
defined by more than its seeming power to legitimate the existing stance of sponsors. 
Perceptions of the authority with which particular scientists speak on specific topics 
may also influence the allocation of funding. We have largely assumed here that such 
authority derives from publication of research through established academic channels. It 
may be, however, that new electronic media for the dissemination of ideas and 
information are changing the ways in which scientific authority is constructed and 
perceived. The potential for change in this respect - not least because it seemingly 
removes the influence of the traditional gatekeepers controlling information 
dissemination - is worthy of more detailed scrutiny. Ideally, too, we should consider 
further the extent to which scientific status - and by extension the influence that derives 
from expertise - is a product of more intangible systems of networking within 
organisations such as the IPCC and between individual scientists, the media and policy- 
makers. 
Given the sheer weight of existing research on climate change we need to consider the 
extent to which external interests remain interested in sponsoring further scientific 
study. As an alternative, business and campaigning groups might consider their money 
better spent on political lobbying to influence the ways in which existing scientific 
results are interpreted by policy makers at a national and international level. 
It would also be valuable to test the impression gained here of the episodic influence of 
scientists upon the process of developing climate policy against the perceptions of other 
actors. This might enable us to be more precise about why and how scientific expertise 
translates into influence in some instances, yet is sidelined elsewhere. Further 
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investigation of such issues in the context of climate change could usefully be set 
alongside studies of other instances of politicised science, such as recent debates over 
the risks to human health from sources as different as BSE, mobile phones and the use 
of genetic engineering as a means of enhancing agricultural productivity (Bartlett, 1998; 
Burgess, 2004; Jasanoff, 1998; cf Wolpert, 2002). Indeed, an element of comparative 
study is vital if we are to build upon a greater understanding of the specifics of 
particular cases to refine our theoretical understanding of the roles played by particular 
actors in debating the implications of scientific research and the resultant relationships 
between science and its sponsors. Comparison of particular cases might, for example, 
lead to wider conclusions about the circumstances in which scientific expertise is most 
likely to be accorded a role in the policy process. For example, does it matter whether 
an issue is perceived by publics and politicians as a slowly developing threat which can 
potentially be debated at length, or a sudden emergency requiring an immediate policy 
response? Urgency may invest scientific expertise with an apparent policy relevance 
that eludes it in relation to `slower-burning' issues, even when it might be argued that 
the advance warning given by scientists contains the key to effective and relatively 
painless remedial action. Similarly, does it matter whether any danger is seen to have a 
direct impact on human health, which is perhaps more likely to motivate publics and 
politicians to seek scientific advice, as opposed to rather less well-defined implications 
for environmental systems, when the temptation may be to ignore `bad news'? Other 
factors which might affect how publics, politicians and other interest groups respond to 
scientific expertise include the scale of any threat and the implications for the 
construction of a response. Does it matter whether the latter is viewed as being national 
or international in scale; or whether any economic costs are likely to extend across an 
economy as a whole, or be borne by particular sectors? Such questions also point in the 
direction of greater engagement with the literature on public perceptions of science and 
the potential for active public participation in the creation of forms of `citizen science' 
(see, for example, Irwin, 1995,1996; Irwin and Wynne, 1996; cf Wynne, 1992,1995). 
Many of the questions noted above raise potentially sensitive issue about the behaviour 
of commercial and political decision-makers and the extent to which they prioritise 
narrow sectional interests over considerations of the common good. It is often difficult 
to tackle such questions directly, both because of the ambiguity of the definition of 
concepts such as `the common good' and the likely reluctance of actors to discuss 
behaviour on their own part that might be viewed as illegitimate. This confirms the need 
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for further investigation which is structured in a rather different way from the present 
thesis. This might involve highlighting a series of particular projects in climate science 
for more detailed investigation. The aim here would be to focus on the different 
interpretations of the relationships between scientists, research sponsors, policy-makers 
and other consumers of the research, offered by the full range of actors involved. 
A careful choice of projects for investigation would also allow more explicit attention 
than has been possible here to be paid to change over time in the stance of particular 
actors, both regarding climate change and the rationale for sponsorship of climate 
science. The trans-Atlantic contrasts suggested here could also be further investigated, 
and perhaps extended by investigation of projects involving scientists from other 
national contexts in both the developed and developing world, or cast as international 
initiatives under the auspices of the IPCC. This focus on specific instances might also 
allow more precise comparisons to be made between the observed behaviour of 
particular actors - whether measured in terms of the provision of funding for particular 
researchers and research projects, or the scientific opinion reported in resultant 
publications - and the interpretations of this behaviour obtained through interviews both 
with the parties involved and other commentators. This ability to establish the degree of 
consistency with which actions and opinions are presented in different contexts provides 
an important confirmation of the reliance to be placed on particular strands of evidence. 
7.5 Understanding the Nature of Science 
If recognition of the value of further investigation of the actions and motives of both 
scientists and their potential sponsors is one outcome of the present thesis, the work also 
points to the need for a mature understanding of the nature of science. Research such as 
the case study offered here cannot realistically aim to change the way in which science 
is conducted. Rather, it is important that publics and policy makers gain a clear 
understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge; that it should be regarded not as a 
indisputable truth, but as a contestable and provisional interpretation of the available 
evidence. Scientific debate is thus normal and healthy, a perpetual facet of scientific 
endeavour, rather than being confined to exceptional moments of paradigm shift (see, 
for example, Shackley and Wynne, 1996,1997). 
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Equally, it is impossible in practice for scientific research to be entirely driven by the 
personal curiosity of individual investigators. Nor is it necessarily desirable for this to 
be so. The history of science, of course, proves the value of individuals being allowed to 
pursue apparently inconsequential or ill-conceived research that ultimately delivers 
profound new insights. It is important that such freedoms are maintained (Lovelock, 
1988). But given that the availability of funding for research is always limited it seems 
reasonable to allocate the bulk of investment in ways that seem most likely to generate 
useful knowledge. We also have to accept that individual sponsors will have their own 
definition of what is `useful' and that the interests of individual sponsors may be at odds 
with each other and the wider interests of society. Such external sponsorship does not 
necessarily produce `bad' science in the sense of deliberate malpractice or 
misrepresentation of results - although it is evident that such cases do exist (cf Evans 
and Packham, 2003; Monbiot 2003; Pritchard, 1996). But it does reinforce the message 
that scientific knowledge is not an undisputed truth, somehow revealed through human 
actions; rather it is a provisional interpretation that is a product of a particular 
relationship between scientists, their sponsors and other social actors. 
Knowledge of the context in which science is produced is thus important to its 
interpretation. As Saunders and Ho (2001, p. 4) assert, `a public with critical 
understanding of science is necessary, both for making democratic decisions on science 
and science-related policies and in ensuring that science is accountable to society'. Any 
such critical understanding demands more than a general impression that all scientific 
research is somehow untrustworthy because it is beholden to vested interests (cf 
Monbiot, 2002; Tudge, 1999,2002). Indeed, understanding at this low level may simply 
cause a damaging loss of public confidence in the value of science and scientists - 
especially in an era when faith in science is under threat from other quarters (see, for 
example, Beck, 1998). This is especially counterproductive if it means that, as a society, 
we fail to recognise that for all its practical flaws science remains our best guide to the 
workings of natural environmental systems and their interaction with humanity. 
As an ideal, therefore, public understanding of science requires a specific and 
sophisticated approach based on knowledge of the circumstances in which individual 
exercises in research are conducted. It also requires a greater sense of what science can 
tell us about the workings of human and environmental systems, and what is beyond the 
scope of scientific investigation. In the case of climate change, science can clarify our 
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understanding of the causes and scale of warming, and offer projections of the 
environmental effects of different future policies regarding energy use. But science 
cannot tell us whether or not we should adopt particular policy options, for such 
decision-making necessarily also involves economic and social choices. Any indecision 
in the face of such choices often reflects not so much a failure of science, but a failure 
of political will when considering measures likely to be unpopular in the short term. 
We should not underestimate the extent to which publics already possess the awareness 
of the nature of science and the circumstances of its production identified as important 
above. Previous studies have shown a public willingness to engage critically with 
science and associated policy debates. This seems particularly to be the case if it is 
widely perceived that scientific expertise and advice has immediate implications for 
public health and safety - in instances such as BSE in cattle, or the combined MMR 
vaccination for children (Irwin, 1995). Yet the consolidation and extension of such 
understanding and the promotion of a sustained and widespread interest in scientific 
practice remains a daunting task. Moreover, in a case such as climate change where any 
public sense of the associated risks to human welfare and economic development is 
often more diffuse, it may be more difficult to inspire public scrutiny and `ownership' 
of the underlying science. 
In other contexts academic actors have adopted specific procedures to clarify the 
context in which specific research projects have been undertaken. These include a 
requirement to make an overt declaration of any relevant relationships - potentially 
extending beyond funding - between scientists and sponsors when work is published (cf 
Evans and Peckham, 2003). This provides a means, should it prove necessary, to clarify 
the status of individual research. Approached in this fashion greater critical 
understanding of science need not undermine public confidence in the legitimacy of 
most scientific practice. Attempts to move in this direction are evident in the policy 
adopted by several leading medical journals as a response to particular questions raised 
about the impact of sponsorship by pharmaceutical companies on research in this field. 
Such journals require authors to declare any relevant business interests, and undertake 
to publish the results of sponsored drug trials only when they can be assured that the 
scientists rather than the commercial interests involved have ultimate control of the way 
that the data are reported (The Times, 2001). A more extreme response from the New 
England Journal of Medicine, which attempted to refuse submissions from authors 
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receiving more than a given amount of funding from commercial sponsors, is also 
interesting - not least because the policy quickly proved unworkable due to the reduced 
number of submissions (Newman, 2002). 
The New England case seems to confirm that declaration, rather than exclusion, of 
sponsorship, is a more practical response to questions about the status of scientific 
research. There are, moreover, obvious dangers in the extension of any policy of non- 
reporting of commercially sponsored research in the wider media. Indeed, the mass 
media perform quite a different task from most academic journals. The latter serve to 
reinforce the status of research - publication in a refereed journal is widely taken to 
represent a guarantee of quality in research (Zimen, 1968). Withholding publication is 
therefore a potentially effective sanction (Goodstein, 1995). The mass media, however, 
offer a means to inform the population at large about unfolding scientific knowledge 
and any implications it may have for future human welfare and development. To 
withhold reporting in these circumstances implies a deliberate attempt to hamper public 
understanding. Given that it is through the media that most people gain their knowledge 
of science and its wider implications, this reinforces the importance of the engagement 
between these two spheres. Good science reporting must not only present an accurate 
account of unfolding developments in scientific knowledge, but also of the 
circumstances of its creation. As in the context of academic publishing noted above, one 
important dimension of this should be clearer statements in media reporting of research 
sponsorship and any other relevant business interests that link researchers with political 
and commercial interest groups. Such information should help others - whether publics, 
policy-makers, or other vested interests - to make an accurate judgement of the 
credibility that can be attached to expressions of scientific understanding and opinion. 
Ultimately, however, in a case such as climate change it reinforces the importance of 
political decision-making with respect to the policy implications of science. As noted 
above, science can offer informed perspectives on likely climate futures and the 
potential implications for human and environmental systems. But it is society as a 
whole that decides - not necessarily in any co-ordinated way - how we will react to any 
such expert advice. 
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APPENDIX A 
Social Science Interview Proceedings 
Interview proceedings 
1. My research concerns the context in which global warming scientists carry out 
research. I need to get all opinions in relation to this. Specifically, I am looking at 
the context within which scientific research in human induced climate change is 
conducted. This research is considering the pressures that scientists' come under 
when they are producing research in the climate change field. 
2.1 am going to be conducting the interview in a semi-structured format. 
-I hope that you do not mind being interrupted to elaborate on a certain point. 
- Any questions you feel that you are uncomfortable in answering please do not 
hesitate to say so, so that we can move swiftly on. 
- The whole interview should be less than an hour. 
3. May I use your name in my write-up? I will send a fully transcribed document of the 
interview for added comments and permission for the use of your identity later. 
4. Just 
. to 
let you know that any information that needs to be said off the record the 
dictaphone can be switched off at any moment during the course of the interview. 
5. Is there anything that requires further clarification? 
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Interview Proceedings 
SECTION 1 
1. I've read your most recent book - Global warming: challenging the conventional 
wisdom. It is pretty clear where your opinion lies. 
  Could you anticipate any circumstances where it might change? 
  Has anything changed in your article since you have written it? 
2. What do you think of the conclusions drawn from authors such as Beder, Karliner, 
Rowell? Do you feel they have any truth in their argument? 
Just a slight change in direction of my questioning. I would like to have your 
personal opinion on the influence of politics on research. 
3. Some research has shown that political values and beliefs (i. e. social, cultural and 
environmental) are important shaping factors in differences of opinion on global 
warming. 
  Do you think that this is true? (e. g. Martin Hoffman has speculated that 
opponents of GW tend to have politically conservative views, whilst proponents 
of GW happened to be politically liberal) 
a So, would you say that it is possible that scientists' political leaning may 
influence their views on climate change? 
4. Do you think that all scientists produce neutral research in this field? 
I would like to ask you a few questions on the policy relevance of scientific work 
and the global warming scientists themselves. 
5. Do you think that global warming scientists should campaign for their work to 
influence policy? (jeopardise the scientific integrity/neutrality) 
6. How do you perceive the role of a GW scientist (to produce results and to advise 
policy makers? ) 
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7. How have the scientists involved in your books have come to be involved in the 
IEA? 
8. Why do you think some scientists such as Professor Schneider are willing to put 
their head above the parapet, if you like? (Do you think it is purely because they 
have a point to make or maybe other factors like funding or publicity are involved? ) 
9. Do you think that it is for similar reasons that scientists like Fred Singer are able to 
speak up about the uncertainties of climate change? 
10. Why are there so few sceptics in the UK? 
  Why are there so many in the US? 
  Why are they so vocal? 
  Why are there no mainstream sceptics - all those that exist are very vocal in their 
opinion. This is in complete contrast to protagonists? 
SECTION 2 
I would now like to talk about publication concerning both scientists research and 
IEA work. 
11. Why do you think some climate change scientists on both sides of the issue engage 
in debate, or advance a certain perspective other than in academic papers? (e. g. non- 
peer reviewed journals) 
12. Do you know of any climate change scientists that have had their freedom of 
opinion restricted either within the academic publishing process or generally? So, 
are they able to say whatever they wish? 
  why do you think this happened? 
13. Do some sceptics find it difficult to get their articles published in Britain as there 
appears to be a strong opposing consensus? 
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14. One of the scientists I interviewed pointed out that publications for American 
journals were often restricted if they contradicted American research. Have any 
scientists you know of come across this? 
15. Do you know of any scientists who have come under pressure to dress up their 
argument! fill it out! not to be so direct? Would you say, therefore, that this pressure 
compromises their research? (to what extent? ) 
(If appropriate ask) Just so that I could follow this up, is it possible that you could refer 
me to other opinion-based research. Or, do you even have any offprints? 
16. Why do you think that some scientists are accused of jeopardising their scientific 
integrity if they write for outside the academic publishing press? 
  writing for non peer-reviewed press allows the public to question the integrity of 
scientists (loose trust in them)? 
I would now like to talk about the context of funding within research and the 
pressure it places on scientists, and if it is o. k to get your opinion on this issue. 
17. How do you perceive the whole funding argument? 
18. What pressure do you think scientists' come under when they research in this field? 
Could you categorise them - i. e. funding, career advancement, publishing, (morals) 
19. Obviously, some funding is given with the intent of influencing policy - how 
common do you think that is in climate change research? 
  Are such arrangements effective in your view? 
20. Do you think that funding plays any part in scientists' choice to research climate 
change? 
21. Obviously there are pressures to secure funding. In the filed of climate change 
would you say there is more pressure to secure funding? 
  Where do you think this pressure comes from? (i. e. from your department. ) 
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22. Why do you think scientists funding options ever broaden, or become reduced? 
  Could it be because their perspective/view on a certain subject has changed so 
therefore they are able to approach certain commercial sponsors or academic or 
government sponsors (Or, for other reasons also i. e. their academic opinion? / if 
they break the prevailing consensus) More accessible to funds. 
23. Do you know of any scientists that have had their conclusions in their research 
influenced by their funding body? 
24.1 understand that a scientist may choose an area to research because it is interesting. 
However, is it possible that a global warming scientist may choose or include a 
research area in a proposal as there may be a better chance of receiving funding? 
  Thus, is it possible that the research question may be subjective? Therefore, does 
this not colour the objectivity of the rest of the research and its results? 
25. Do you think that there is a more market-orientated approach to research now than 
in the past? 
  Should this continue, or do you think that it could hinder the objectivity of a 
scientist? 
  Do you think that government backed funding is a greater hindrance to 
objectivity? 
26. Could you conceive of a situation where there are good market reasons for accepting 
global warming as a serious environmental threat? 
SECTION 3 
I would like to talk to you about the IPCC and the Kyoto protocol. 
27. Is your opinion about the IPCC still the same as it is in your book? You form a very 
cynical view of the IPCC and their scientists. Do you still hold to this position? 
28. Out of interest do you think that they are producing good science? 
  Do you think that different opinions are equally represented? 
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  Do you think that the IPCC receive sufficient respect? 
  Do you think that they are achieving their objectives? 
29. One of my interview candidates proclaimed the IPCC process was very different 
from Boehmer-Christiansen's theory. What's your opinion of them? 
30. Following on from this, I would be interested to know what you thought about the 
Kyoto protocol and whether it is the right approach to dealing with the problem? 
  Do you think that it's doing a good job? 
  What would like to be seen done? 
I would now like to ask you some basic facts about the lEA and then your 
association with scientists. 
31. What is the objective of the IEA? 
32. What's the objective of the IEA environment group? 
33. Who are your publications intended for? 
34. Who funds the IEA? - What interest do they have in doing so? 
35. Why do the IEA take a similar line of argument against all environmental issues? 
36. What is the connection between the IEA and the ESEF? 
37. Does the IEA contract scientists? 
38. How do they choose which scientists to include/ information to include? 
39. Do they contact the scientists or do the scientists contact them? 
40. Why are these scientists willing to work for you - surely their academic argument 
stands strongly enough. 
228 
Appendix A 
41. Where else do the scientists (those referred to in their text) publish? 
42. Protagonists are not as prepared as contrarians to be associated with such groups - 
why do you think that is? 
43. What's your opinion on the GCC? 
44. What's your opinion on the IPPC? 
45. Why do you think these groups exist? 
46. Do you think they are necessary? 
End 
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APPENDIX B 
Pilot Interview Proceedings 
SECTION 1 
The first part of the interview will deal with the science and politics of climate 
change. As I am interested in scientists' opinions about the greenhouse effect I will 
begin by asking you a few questions about your view on the subject. 
1. Could you tell me whether you believe the enhanced greenhouse effect actually 
exists? Do you believe that it is man-made? 
  So has this always been your opinion about the greenhouse effect, or has it 
changed? 
  Why do you think your opinion changed? Is it purely because your knowledge 
of the subject increased, or were there any other contributing factors? (well, 
maybe greater possibility to publish papers in this area, better funding options, 
etc) 
2. How have you come to be involved with climate change research? Was it because it 
was a significant issue, or maybe because your funding options may broaden if you 
included the subject in your research? 
  (Did funding play any part in your decision to include climate change in your 
research. - was it a significant factor? ) 
  Would you ever consider taking your research in a certain direction, maybe 
because your funding options may broaden? (Explain why you would consider 
working in other research areas? ) 
3. Could you tell me more about the broader aspects of your research? 
For instance, are there any political and economic implications that could be 
associated with your research, or is this something that you have not really 
considered? 
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4. Just a slight change in the direction of my questioning now. What I am very 
interested in is the policy relevance of your scientific research. 
  Is it important to you that your work is policy relevant? 
  Why is it important to you? / Could you conceive it ever to be important to you? 
  This may sound a little repetitive but do you think that your research has a wider 
context like engaging in political aspects? 
5.1 would just like to go into a bit more detail about this and ask to what extent would 
you want your work to be involved in, or to influence, government policy? 
  Do you think that because you are a scientist that you should, or should not be, 
involved? (scientific objectivity may be compromised) 
6. Obviously, some funding is given with the intent of influencing policy - how 
common do you think that is in climate change research? - Why? 
  Maybe the people that fund you are looking for a particular payback... would 
you say that your research, or even your departments research is feeding into the 
policy process? 
  So, is that the objective of this research? (Then what is? ) 
7. Out of interest, do you support any environmental NGOs or lobby groups, or have 
you in the past? 
  What's that group's agenda? 
  So, do you actively support them today? How comes? 
8. Some research has shown that political values and beliefs (i. e. social, cultural and 
environmental) are important shaping factors in differences of opinion on global 
warming. Do you think that this is true? (e. g. Martin Hoffman has speculated that 
opponents of GW tend to have politically conservative views, whilst proponents of 
GW happened to be politically liberal) 
  So, would you say that it is possible that your political leaning may reflect upon 
your view on climate change? 
  Do you think that everybody produces neutral research in this field? 
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SECTION 2 
I would now like to talk about the feedback that you have received over the years 
as a result of the publication of your research. 
9. Do you know of anyone ever labelling you as having a particular perspective on the 
greenhouse effect? 
  Yes = Why do you think they came to that conclusion of you, was it, for 
example, as a result of the publication of a particular article? (Where do you 
publish your work? ) 
  Are you quite happy for people to think that of you? I mean, what particular 
perspective do you have of yourself? Why is that then? 
10. Is it possible that you can engage in debate, or advance a certain perspective other 
than in academic papers? (e. g. non-peer reviewed journals) 
  Are you, or would you ever be willing to engage in public debate and draw 
conclusions about the enhanced greenhouse effect? 
11.1 am very interested in knowing whether it is possible to express your perspective 
openly in your research? (i. e. suggesting an opinion in the conclusion) 
  Has anyone ever tried to restrict your freedom of opinion either within the 
academic publishing process or generally? I mean, have you ever felt your work 
has been censored? So, are you able to say whatever you wish? 
  (why do you think this happened) 
" One of the scientists I interviewed pointed out that publications for American 
journals were often restricted if they contradicted American research. Have you 
come across this? 
  Do you know of anyone, or maybe even yourself, who has come under pressure 
to dress up your argument/ fill it out/ not to be so direct? Would you say, 
therefore, that this pressure compromises your research? (to what extent? ) (If 
appropriate) Just so that I could follow this up, is it possible that you could refer 
me to other opinion-based research. Or, do you even have any offprints? 
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12. Why do you think that the likes of some scientists such as Professor Lindzen are 
willing to speak up about the uncertainties of climate change? (Do you think it is 
purely because they have a point to grind or maybe other factors like funding or 
publicity are involved? ) 
  Do you believe that it is for the same sort of reasons that protagonists like 
Professor Schneider are also prepared to put their head above the parapet, if you 
like? " 
SECTION 3 
I would now like to talk about the context of funding within research and the 
pressure it places on scientists, and if it is o. k. to get your opinion on this issue. 
13. Obviously there are pressures to secure funding. In your research field would you 
say there is more pressure to secure funding than in other fields? 
  Where do you think this pressure comes from? (i. e. from your department). 
  Do you think that there is a more market-orientated approach to research now 
than in the past? 
  Could the pressure ever be that great that you would compromise your preferred 
research just to get funding? 
  Do you think that this is down to the subject of climate change being different, 
for instance, it is very controversial? 
14.1 am very interested to know about the funding process of your research. Could you 
tell me whether your present research was specifically developed for the research 
grant you received, or did you approach a number of bodies? 
  Could you tell me a little bit more about this - which body did you say funds 
you? Is that a commercial/state organisation then? 
  Does this body only fund this type of research? 
  Out of curiosity, do you know of any research in your area that is commercially 
funded? 
 I would just like to know whether you have ever considered commercial 
funding, or, for that matter, would you ever think about it? 
  Would you be willing to accept funding from an oil company that you know has 
a vested interest in proving the greenhouse effect is not an important problem? 
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15. Why do you think that scientists funding options ever broaden, or become 
reduced? (Could it be because their perspective/view on a certain subject has 
changed so therefore they are able to approach certain commercial sponsors (or, for 
other reasons, i. e. their academic opinion? ) 
  Do you feel that this has personally affected you? (i. e. have your funding options 
ever increased or decreased? ) Do you think this could be because of your 
opinion on the subject? ) 
16. Would your perspective on the subject of the greenhouse effect influence your 
conclusions you draw in your research? (Could the body that funds you have any 
influence over the conclusions you draw? ) 
17. Just to bring the last couple of topics together, I would like to ask if you could 
weigh up, or categorise if you like, the types of pressures involved in research? I 
mean, what are the greatest pressures in your research? Is it at all possible to 
categorise them? (i. e. funding, career advancement, publishing, (morals) 
18.1 understand that you may choose an area to research because it is interesting. 
However, is it possible that you may choose or include a research area in a proposal 
as there may be a better chance of receiving funding? 
" Thus, is it possible that the research question maybe subjective? Therefore, does 
this not colour the objectivity of the rest of the research and its results? 
Subsection 3 
19. As we have a few minutes left, if you don't mind could I ask you what is your 
general opinion about the IPCC? 
  For instance, do you think that they are achieving their objectives? 
  Are they producing good science? 
  Do you think that the IPCC receive sufficient respect? 
  Do you think that different opinions are equally represented? 
20. Following on from this, I would be interested to know what you thought about the 
Kyoto protocol and whether it is the right approach to dealing with the problem? (in 
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other words, in your opinion, is it doing a good job? - politically, opinion on 
America) 
  For example do you think that enough being done within the right timescales? - 
  What would like to be seen done? 
End 
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APPENDIX C 
Interview proceedings 
1. Is it possible to record this interview by using a dictaphone? 
2.1 am interviewing you because ... 
3. My research is looking at the context within which scientific research in human 
induced climate change is conducted. 
I am basically researching the pressures that scientists' come under when they are 
producing research in the climate change field. 
4.1 am going to be conducting the interview in a semi structured format. 
- Any questions you feel that you are uncomfortable in answering please do not 
hesitate to say so, so that we can move swiftly on. 
- The whole interview should be less than an hour. 
5. I will not use your name in my write-up. I will send a fully transcribed document of 
the interview for added comments or if you wish to remove anything you said. 
6. Any information that needs to be said off the record the dictaphone can be 
switched off at any moment during the course of the interview. 
7. Is there anything that requires further clarification? 
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Interview Proceedings 
SECTION 1 
The first part of the interview will deal with the science and politics of climate 
change. As I am interested in scientists' opinions about the greenhouse effect I will 
begin by asking you a few questions about your view on the subject. 
1. How serious do you think the problem of the enhanced greenhouse effect is? 
  So has this always been your opinion about the enhanced greenhouse effect, or 
has it changed? 
  Why do you think your opinion changed? Is it purely because your knowledge 
of the subject increased, or were there any other contributing factors? (maybe 
greater possibility to publish papers in this area, better funding options etc) 
2. How have you come to be involved with climate change research? Was it because it 
was a significant issue, or maybe because your funding options may broaden if you 
included the subject in your research? 
  (Did funding play any part in your decision to include climate change in your 
research. - was it a significant factor? ) 
  Would you ever consider taking your research in a certain direction, maybe 
because your funding options may broaden? (Explain why you would consider 
working in other research areas? ) 
3. Could you tell me more about the broader aspects of your research? For instance, 
are there any political and economic implications that could be associated with your 
research, or is this something that you have not really considered? 
4. Just a slight change in the direction of my questioning now. What I am very 
interested in is the policy relevance of your scientific research. 
  Is it important to you that your work is policy relevant? 
  Why is it important to you? / Could you conceive it ever to be important to you? 
  This may sound a little repetitive but do you think that your research has a wider 
context like engaging in political aspects? 
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5.1 would just like to go into a bit more detail about this and ask to what extent would 
you want your work to be involved in, or to influence, government policy? 
  Do you think that because you are a scientist that you should, or should not be, 
involved? (scientific objectivity may be compromised) 
6. Obviously, some funding is given with the intent of influencing policy - how 
common do you think that is in climate change research? - Why? 
  Maybe the people that fund you are looking for a particular payback... would 
you say that your research, or even your departments research is feeding into the 
policy process? 
  So, is that the objective of this research? (Then what is? ) 
7. Out of interest, do you support any environmental NGOs or lobby groups, or have 
you in the past? 
  What's that group's agenda? 
  So, do you actively support them today? How comes? 
8. Some research has shown that political values and beliefs (i. e. social, cultural and 
environmental) are important shaping factors in differences of opinion on global 
warming. Do you think that this is true? (e. g. Martin Hoffman has speculated that 
opponents of GW tend to have politically conservative views, whilst proponents of 
GW happened to be politically liberal) 
  So, would you say that it is possible that your political leaning may reflect upon 
your view on climate change? 
  Do you think that everybody produces neutral research in this field? 
9. Why do you think that the likes of some scientists such as Robert Balling are 
willing to speak up about the uncertainties of climate change? (Do you think it is 
purely because they have a point to grind or maybe other factors like funding or 
publicity are involved? ) 
  Do you believe that it is for the same sort of reasons that protagonists like 
Professor Schneider are also prepared to put their head above the parapet, if you 
like? " 
Why do you think that there are so few sceptics in the UK and that most of 
them are concentrated in the US? 
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(Julian Morris from the IEA claimed that there is a 'homogenous scientific 
culture here. There is a less diverse source of funding here, whereas in the US 
there is a decentralisation of funding which creates, or allows for different 
visions'. ) He believed that that the decentralisation of funding in the US allows 
for a greater degree of interdependence. Do you think that is true? 
  What factions do you identify in the debate? (How do you envisage the various 
camps of scientists? ) 
  Julian Morris also believed that UK scientists are more in favour of government 
intervention. The government is involved in science and it vaguely is in control 
of science and its effects it might have on society. From your experience, do you 
think that this is true? 
SECTION 2 
I would now like to talk about the feedback that you have received over the years 
as a result of the publication of your research. 
10. Do you know of anyone ever labelling you as having a particular perspective on the 
greenhouse effect? 
  Yes = Why do you think they came to that conclusion of you, was it, for 
example, as a result of the publication of a particular article? (Where did you 
publish your work? ) 
" Are you quite happy for people to think that of you? I mean, what particular 
perspective do you have of yourself? Why is that then? 
11. Would you be prepared to engage in debate, or advance a certain perspective other 
than in academic papers? (e. g. non-peer reviewed journals) 
  Would you engage in public debate and draw conclusions about the enhanced 
greenhouse effect? 
12.1 am very interested in knowing whether it is possible to express your perspective 
openly in your research? (i. e. suggesting an opinion in the conclusion) 
  Has anyone ever tried to restrict your freedom of opinion either within the 
academic publishing process or generally? I mean, have you ever felt your work 
has been censored? So, are you able to say whatever you wish? 
239 
Appendix C 
(why do you think this happened) 
  One of the scientists I interviewed pointed out that publications for American 
journals were often restricted if they contracted American research. Have you 
come across this? 
  Do you think that sceptics find it difficult to get their research published in UK 
journals because there appears to be is a strong opposing consensus? 
  Do you know of anyone, or maybe even yourself, who has come under pressure 
to dress up your argument/ fill it out/ not to be so direct? Would you say, 
therefore, that this pressure compromises your research? (to what extent? ) 
(If appropriate ask) Just so that I could follow this up, is it possible that you 
could refer me to other opinion-based research. Or, do you even have any 
offprints? 
SECTION 3 
I would now like to talk about the context of funding within research and the 
pressure it places on scientists, and if it is o. k. to get your opinion on this issue. 
13. Obviously there are pressures to secure funding. In your research field would you 
say there is more pressure to secure funding than in other fields? 
  Where do you think this pressure comes from? (i. e. from your department. ) 
  Do you think that there is a more market-orientated approach to research now 
than in the past? 
- Do you think that the power in the debate is concentrated in those who have 
the economic control? 
- Do you feel therefore that scientific ability could be trade, something which 
can be marketed, or you could sell? 
  Could the pressure ever be that great that you would compromise your preferred 
research just to get funding? 
  Do you think that this is down to the subject of climate change being different, 
for instance, it is very controversial? 
 A social scientists has argued that protagonists are pressured to conform to the 
conventional wisdom in terms of getting funding for research. Do you think that 
this is true? 
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  Professsor Reginald Newall claimed that it is very difficult to go against the 
status quo because funding dries up. Do you think this is true? Or is there peer 
pressure to conform. In other words, do you think that social context influences 
scientists interpretative procedure? 
  Do you think that sceptics research is influenced by funding? 
14.1 am very interested to know about the funding process of your research. Could you 
tell me whether your present research was specifically developed for the research 
grant you received, or did you approach a number of bodies? 
  Could you tell me a little bit more about this - which body did you say funds 
you? Is that a commercial/state organisation then? 
  Does this body only fund this type of research? 
  Out of curiosity, do you know of any research in your area that is commercially 
funded? 
 I would just like to know whether you have ever considered commercial 
funding, or, for that matter, would you ever think about it? 
  Would you be willing to accept funding from an oil company that you know has 
a vested interest in proving the greenhouse effect is not an important problem? 
15. Why do you think that scientists funding options ever broaden, or become reduced? 
(Could it be because their perspective/view on a certain subject has changed so 
therefore they are able to approach certain commercial sponsors (or, for other 
reasons also i. e. their academic opinion? ) 
  Do you feel that this has personally effected you? (i. e. have your funding options 
ever increased or decreased? ) Do you think this could be because of your 
opinion on the subject? ) 
16. Would your perspective on the subject of the greenhouse effect influence your 
conclusions you draw in your research? (Could the body that funds you have any 
influence over the conclusions you draw? ) 
" Would you be willing to change your line of argument (for want of a better 
phrase) if sufficient evidence proved your initial work to be wrong? 
17. Just to bring the last couple of topics together, I would just like to ask if you could 
weigh up, or categorise if you like, the types of pressures involved in research? I 
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mean, what are the greatest pressures in your research? Is it at all possible to 
categorise them? (i. e. funding, career advancement, publishing, egoism, (morals) 
  One of the scientists I interviewed claimed that the climatic research unit 
emphasised the importance of climate change to achieve greater funding? Do 
you agree? (they claimed that they are given specific guidelines on what is 
required) 
18.1 understand that you may choose an area to research because it is interesting. 
However, is it possible that you may choose or include a research area in a proposal 
as there may be a better chance of receiving funding? 
  Thus, is it possible that the research question may be subjective? Therefore, does 
this not colour the objectivity of the rest of the research and its results? 
  Do you think that age has a role - i. e. are the pressure the same throughout your 
career? 
Subsection 3 
19. How do you perceive the IPCC? What is your opinion about the IPCC? 
  What do you think of B-C conspiracy theory? 
  What's the power/influence structure within the IPCC? (one scientists claimed 
that you have to be vocal so to get your opinion represented) 
  Do you think that different opinions are equally represented? I mean how 
influential are the sceptics in the IPCC? 
  Are they producing good science? 
  Do you think that the IPCC receive sufficient respect? 
  Do you think that they are achieving their objectives? 
20. Do you think that the Hadley Centre or MET office only employs protagonist 
scientists? (Do all those who are employed by the Hadley Centre share the same 
opinion about the enhanced greenhouse effect? 
21. Does the context of the Hadley Centre have any sort of influence over your or any 
body else's interpretative procedure? 
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22. Following on from this, I would be interested to know what you thought about the 
Kyoto protocol and whether it is the right approach to dealing with the problem? (in 
other words, in your opinion, is it doing a good job? - politically, opinion on 
America) 
  For example do you think that enough being done within the right timescales? 
  What would like to be seen done? 
End 
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APPENDIX D 
Miss Anna Matthews 
Research Postgraduate 
Rm. 1.01f (env. centre) 
School of Geography 
University of Leeds 
LS2 9JT 
England 
Tel: +44 0113 233 6757 
Or, 07957 457 922 
January 2000 
Dear Professor/Doctor, 
I am currently undertaking a PhD at the University of Leeds investigating influence in 
climate change scientists' research. The project, which is funded by the School of 
Geography, is exploring attitudes towards the enhanced greenhouse effect, considering 
not only individual scientist's convictions, but also the pressures they might have faced 
as their work has evolved. There is little analysis of scientists researching the 
phenomenon especially when their work has considerable political, social and economic 
consequences. Thus, I am particularly keen to look at the context in which research into 
climate change is conducted. 
To ensure that I represent the views of climate change scientists accurately I am 
undertaking a programme of semi-structured interviews with individual researchers. I 
would very much like to include your opinion within this project and talk to you about 
the pressures involved when undertaking research in the climate change area and would 
value your view regarding the utilisation of your work. I will contact you in the next 
few days by e-mail to arrange an interview that will be convenient to you. 
I can assure you that you will not be identified without your permission. 
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If you would like any further information about this research project, please do not 
hesitate to contact me on 0113-233-6757 or pgam@geog. leeds. ac. uk. I look forward to 
talking to you soon. 
Yours sincerely, 
Anna Matthews 
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APPENDIX E 
UK and US Interviewees 
1) Interviewee A: Climate Scientist - US, Doctor, University - Mainstream, Protagonist 
2) Interviewee B: Climate Scientist - US, Professor, University - Mainstream, Protagonist 
3) Interviewee C: Climate Scientist - US, Professor, University - Mainstream, Protagonist 
4) Interviewee D: Climate Scientist - US, Professor, University - Mainstream, Protagonist 
5) Interviewee E: Climate Scientist - UK, Doctor, Government - Mainstream, Protagonist 
6) Interviewee F: Climate Scientist - UK, Doctor, Government - Mainstream, Protagonist 
7) Interviewee G: Climate Scientist - UK, Doctor, Government - Mainstream, Protagonist 
8) Interviewee H: Climate Scientist - UK, Professor, University - Public, Protagonist 
9) Interviewee I: Climate Scientist - UK, Doctor, University - Mainstream, Protagonist 
10) Interviewee J: Climate Scientists - UK, Doctor, University - Mainstream, Protagonist 
11) Interviewee K: Climate Scientist - UK, Doctor, University/(Business) - Public, Sceptic 
12) Interviewee L: Climate Scientist - US, Doctor, University - Public, Sceptic 
13) Interviewee M: Climate Scientist - US, Doctor, University - Public, Sceptic 
14) Interviewee N: Climate Scientist - US, Professor, University - Public, Sceptic 
15) Interviewee 0: Social Commentator - US 
16) Interviewee P: Social Commentator - US 
17) Interviewee Q: Social Commentator - US 
18) Interviewee R: Social Commentator - UK 
19) Interviewee S: Social Commentator - UK 
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